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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays on various aspects of corporate finance. In the first 
essay, we examine the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap from creditors' perspective. Prior 
literature suggests that CEO pay gap relates positively to both the mean and the volatility of the stock 
return distribution. The mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap yield opposite predictions 
regarding the creditors' reactions to CEO pay gap. In this study, we systematically study the impacts of 
CEO pay gap on debt contracting. We first confirm the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap. 
However, we find that mean effect better explains the relation between CEO pay gap and a firm's tail risk, 
crisis-period performance, and default risk in that CEO pay gap is associated with lower tail risk and 
default risk and better performance during the crisis period. We then document comprehensive evidence 
consistent with the mean effect of CEO pay gap in debt contracting. In particular, we find that there exist 
negative relations between CEO pay gap and cost of debt and the number of restrictive debt covenants, 
but a positive relation between CEO pay gap and debt maturity. Overall, our results provide 
overwhelming evidence in support of the mean effect of CEO pay gap from the creditors' perspective.  
In the second essay, using an information asymmetry factor obtained from factor analysis using 
10 well-documented information asymmetry proxy variables, we first confirm the existence of an 
information asymmetry discount in firm value. We then empirically examine whether M&A 
announcements, which are usually accompanied by the release of large amounts of information about the 
targets due to careful scrutiny on the targets by the market, can serve as a mechanism to capture the target 
information asymmetry discount. We find that there exist significantly positive M&A announcement-
period wealth gains, as measured by target-acquirer portfolio abnormal returns, that are related to target 
information asymmetry. The wealth gains related to target information asymmetry are shared by both 
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acquirers and targets. We preclude acquirer information asymmetry, corporate governance, and post-
merger operating performance improvement as the alternative explanations of the wealth gains related to 
target information asymmetry. Furthermore, we find that firms with high information asymmetry are 
more likely to become targets. In terms of relative wealth gains between the acquirer and target, we find 
the party with high information asymmetry benefits less. At last, we document that target information 
asymmetry significantly influences certain deal characteristics such as method of payment, the likelihood 
of diversifying deals, the relative deal size, and days to complete the deals. 
In the third essay, we attempt to answer the following two questions: does the management-
shareholder power balance message delivered the 24 IRRC corporate governance provisions matter to the 
investors or do those provisions only matter for their antitakeover implications? Does the antitakeover 
effect of the BCF index and the staggered board provision indeed the cause of their strongly negative 
association with firm value documented by previous researchers? We design the study by re-examining 
the relations between various corporate governance indices (GIM, BCF, staggered board and cumulative 
voting) and acquirer announcement-period abnormal stock returns in the banking industry where the 
hostile takeover bids are rare. We find that in the absence of market for corporate control, the GIM index 
and the cumulative voting provision are still strongly related to acquirer abnormal returns while the BCF 
index and the staggered board provision lose their significance. Our findings confirm the linkage between 
market for corporate control, the BCF index and the staggered board provision and firm value. In 
addition, by showing that banks which distribute more rights to their shareholders are better acquirers, we 
provide evidence that the management-shareholder power balance effect of the corporate governance 
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On August 05, 2015, SEC passes final ruling requiring public companies to disclose the 
ratio of the median of the annual total compensation of their all employees to the annual total 
compensation of their CEOs
1
. This ruling signals the increasing scrutiny placed on the pay 
disparity by the regulators. Meanwhile, the pay disparity among executives has also become the 
focus of a growing stream of academic research. However, there is no consensus over the 
measures of executive pay disparity, its implications, and its economic consequences (see, for 
example: Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran (2009); Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011); Kini and 
Williams (2012); Chen, Huang, and Wei (2013); Masulis and Zhang (2014)). In this study, we 
mainly focus on the dollar measure of pay disparity, CEO pay gap, measured as the difference in 
CEO's pay and median pay of second-tier executive, and examine the pay disparity from 
creditors' perspectives. Our study from creditors' perspectives on CEO pay gap can shed further 
light on the impact of pay disparity on corporate decisions
2
. Prior research suggests two possible 
explanations for CEO pay gap. The tournament explanation maintains that CEO pay gap, 
together with the power and prestige associated with the CEO position, constitutes the incentive 
for a tournament among the second-tier executives for the top position (Kale, Reis, 
Venkateswaran (2009)). Because the true ability of managers is unobservable, a firm that runs 
the intra-firm tournament will rank managers based on their performance to select the next CEO. 
Kini and Williams (2012) suggest that the tournament incentive is analogous to a call option and 
                                                            
1 see https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9877.pdf for details of the ruling. 
2 There is a long line of extant research that shows that managerial incentives and preferences have a significant 
influence on the design of debt contracts. For example, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) argue that managers’ 
reputational concerns motivate them to pursue conservative investment options, which serves the interests of 
bondholders rather than shareholders, allowing the firm to raise more debt than equity. Chava, Kumar, and Warga 
(2009) document that bondholders use various types of covenants to deal with managerial entrenchment and the 
associated risk of managers’ excess consumption of private benefits. Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2010) report that 
bondholders use short-term debt to mitigate managerial risk-taking incentives and reduce agency costs induced by 
equity-based compensation of the borrowing firm’s CEO. 
3 
 
managers have the incentive to undertake risk-increasing activities to maximize the outcome 
which is used to rank them. In line with this argument, Kini and Williams report evidence of a 
positive relation between CEO pay gap and risky investment and financing choices as manifested 
in larger research and development (R&D) investment, higher financial leverage, and larger cash 
flow and stock return volatility. Alternatively, Masulis and Zhang (2014) offer the traditional 
performance-based argument to explain CEO pay gap. They assert that CEO pay gap reflects the 
productivity difference between CEO and other senior executives. In their model, the more 
productive the CEO relative to the other senior executives, the higher is the CEO pay gap. Their 
data and analyses reveal results consistent with this prediction. Although the prior studies 
disagree on the underlying rationale for CEO pay gap, they concur on the economic outcomes of 
CEO pay gap: there is a positive relation between CEO pay gap and firm value and performance, 
which we categorize as the mean effect of CEO pay gap, and a positive relation between CEO 
pay gap and return volatility, which we categorize as the volatility effect of  CEO pay gap.  
  Interestingly, the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap will elicit opposite 
reactions from the creditors. Specifically, higher operating performance and firm value provide 
thicker safety cushion for the creditors' investment, and should be perceived positively by the 
creditors (Collen, Livnat, and Segal (2009)). Whereas higher volatility implies greater downside 
potential of firm value which imposes greater risk for the creditors' investment, and should be 
perceived negatively by the creditors (Campbell and Taksler (2003)). In this study, we 
empirically investigate which effect of CEO pay gap, the mean effect or the volatility effect, 
prevails in explaining data from the creditors' perspectives.    
We start our analysis by confirming the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap. 
Following prior literature, we use Tobin's Q and ROA as measures of the mean effect and use 
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cash flow volatility and stock return volatility as measures of the volatility effect. Indeed, we 
find that Tobin's Q, ROA, cash flow volatility, and stock return volatility all increase in CEO pay 
gap, confirming the positive mean effect and volatility effect in CEO pay gap. 
Subsequently, we extend the analysis of CEO pay gap by examining the relation between 
CEO pay gap and a firm's tail risk. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, the importance 
of tail risk in asset pricing and risk management has been widely recognized by the academic 
researchers, policy makers, and practitioners (Bollerslev and Todorov (2011); Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013); Kelly and Jiang (2014)). In particular, researchers show that bondholders also 
react to the tail risk, the risk of extreme large losses (Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008); 
Gemmill and Keswani (2011); Chava, Garduri, and Yerramilli (2014)). The intuition is as 
follows: because of their fixed claims on the firm’s assets, creditors do not benefit from the 
upside potential but suffer from the downside risk, especially in the extreme tail events when 
equity capital is not enough to absorb the large losses. Thus, tail risk is a genuine threat to the 
creditors. Studying the relation between CEO pay gap and tail risk can further our understanding 
of the underlying cause of the relation between CEO pay gap and debt contract designs. The 
mean effect of CEO pay gap implies that because larger CEO pay gap promises greater firm 
value, we should observe a negative relation between CEO pay gap and tail risk. Alternatively, 
the volatility effect of CEO pay gap suggests that the larger spread of the return distribution 
resulting from CEO pay gap will lead to a positive relation between CEO pay gap and tail risk. 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we measure the tail risk as the negative of the average 
return on the firm's stock over the 5% worst return days in a year. Using 21,143 firm-year 
observations from 1993 to 2011, we find evidence consistent with the mean effect of CEO pay 
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gap, but inconsistent with volatility effect in that we find that CEO pay gap has a significantly 
negative association with the tail risk.  
We then investigate the mean effect versus volatility effect of CEO pay gap during the 
crisis period in 2007 and 2008. The crisis can be treated as a natural experiment to test the two 
effects of CEO pay gap. If the mean effect prevails, that is, either CEO pay gap serves as a 
motivation of the second-tier executives or a reward for a productive CEO or both, firms with 
higher pre-crisis CEO pay gap should perform better in the financial crisis. Conversely, if the 
volatility effect prevails, the sheer pursuit of highly risky projects should lead to worse crisis-
period performance for firms with higher pre-crisis CEO pay gap. To analyze how pre-crisis 
CEO pay gap impacts crisis-period performance, we limit the sample to firms headed by the 
same CEOs from 2005 to 2008 and measure the effects of pre-crisis CEO pay gap (the average 
CEO pay gap in 2005 and 2006) on the firms' ROA and annual stock return in 2007 and 2008. 
Again, we find evidence in support of the mean effect of CEO pay gap. In particular, we find that 
both ROA and annual stock return in the crisis period are better when pre-crisis CEO pay gap is 
higher. 
Next, we examine the effect of CEO pay gap on a firm's default risk proxied by its 
distance-to-default in a multivariate setting. Distance-to-default is measured as the z-score 
estimated using the Merton (1974) model, where the equity of the firm is considered a call option 
on the underlying value of the firm with the strike price equal to the value of the firm's debt. The 
higher the z-score, the lower is the default risk. Based on 20,199 firm-year observations from 
1993 to 2011, we find that CEO pay gap is positively associated with distance-to-default, 
implying a negative relation between CEO pay gap and default risk. This result provides further 
support for the mean effect of CEO pay gap. 
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At last, we turn our attention directly to debt contact designs. Prior literature has 
documented several arrangements by the bondholders to address the increasing volatility arising 
from CEO compensation arrangements, such as shortening debt maturity, increasing cost of debt, 
and increasing the number of debt covenants (Chava et al. (2009); Brockman et al. (2010)).  First, 
we analyze the relationship between CEO pay gap and debt maturity. We employ two alternative 
proxies for debt maturity in this analysis: i) the proportion of short-term debt out of total debt 
reported on a firm’s balance sheet obtained from the Compustat database; and ii) number of 
years to maturity of newly issued debt retrieved from the SDC Platinum database. Using the debt 
data reported on the balance sheet allows us to account for both the cross-sectional and time 
serial variations in corporate debt maturity. However, given that firms do not frequently access 
external debt market, corporate debt maturity as reported on the balance sheet may be stale 
whereas CEO pay gap tends to be more dynamic. Therefore, we complement the debt maturity 
analysis based on balance sheet data with a study using the debt maturity of new debt issues, 
which allows us to better capture the bondholders’ reaction to the dynamic CEO pay gap at the 
point when firms access external debt market. Our analysis results of both samples (15,215 firm-
year observations from Compustat and 23,216 issues from SDC Platinum) from 1993 to 2011 
consistently show a significantly positive relation between CEO pay gap and debt maturity, 
which is suggestive of the bondholders’ willingness to lengthen the debt maturity in response to 
a larger CEO pay gap. This finding lends further support to the mean effect of CEO pay gap. To 
gain a deeper insight into the relation between CEO pay gaps and debt contract terms, we 
subsequently use the new debt issues sample to examine the link between CEO pay gap and the 
cost of debt. We measure the cost of debt as the yield spread between the yield to maturity of 
newly issued bonds and the yield to maturity of the corresponding Treasury benchmark with 
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similar debt maturity. Our evidence shows that CEO pay gap is negatively related to the cost of 
debt, which further corroborates the mean effect of CEO pay gap. Finally, we examine the effect 
of CEO pay gap on debt covenants using 1,843 loan contract data retrieved from the Thomson 
One Banker database in the 1993-2011 period . We find that CEO pay gap is negatively related 
to the number of restrictive debt, indicating that bondholders are less restrictive when they lend 
to a firm with a larger CEO pay gap. Again, the positive response of bondholders towards CEO 
pay gap is consistent with the mean effect of CEO pay gap. Overall, we find significant evidence 
that creditors associate high CEO pay gap with low lending risk, consistent with our previous 
findings regarding the tail risk and default risk.  
Extant literature shows that CEO’s risk-taking incentives is influenced by the sensitivity 
of CEO’s compensation package to changes in stock price (delta) and the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation package to volatility of stock return (vega) (Brockman et al. (2010)). To ensure the 
robustness of our results, we control for the delta and vega of CEO compensation throughout our 
analysis. Furthermore, since the relations between CEO compensation and our dependent 
variables could be endogenous due to reasons such as reverse causality
3
, we address these 
endogeneity concerns by using several identification strategies including: (i) ordinary least 
square (OLS) regressions using lagged independent variables; (ii) instrumental variable 
regressions in which CEO pay gap, CEO delta, and CEO vega are instrumented. Our results are 
robust to the control for CEOs’ equity-based compensation and corrections for potential 
endogeneity bias. 
                                                            
3 For example, firm performance can be attributed to a productive CEO who receives relatively higher pay, leading 
to a larger CEO pay gap. Also, Ortiz-Molina (2007) offer a detailed analysis on the channels through which debt 
structure impacts CEO compensation. 
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There are two other measures of executive pay disparity discussed in the literature: CEO 
pay slice and Gini coefficient. We fail to find significant relations between the two alternative 
measures of pay disparity and various dependent variables in our analysis. We attribute this to 
the different implications suggested by the three measures of executives pay disparity. CEO pay 
gap measures the dollar gap between CEO's pay and median pay of second-tier executives. CEO 
pay slice measures the percentage of total compensation of all top executives captured by CEO. 
At last, Gini coefficient measures the pay inequity not only between CEO and other top 
executives but also among the other top executives (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)). 
According to our data, the correlation between CEO pay gap and CEO pay slice is 0.34, the 
correlation between CEO pay gap and Gini coefficient is 0.30, and the correlation between CEO 
pay slice and Gini coefficient is 0.60. Our findings indicate that only the absolute dollar pay 
disparity matters for debt contracting. This is likely attributable to the mean effect of the CEO 
pay gap: prior literature documents firm value increases in CEO pay gap but decreases in CEO 
pay slice (Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran (2009) and (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)). In 
terms of Gini coefficient, Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran (2009) show a positive relation between 
firm value and Gini coefficient in their robustness check, albeit the relation is much weaker, 
most likely because the pay disparity among the other top executives contained in Gini 
coefficient adds noise to the analysis on CEO pay disparity. This may also lead to the 
insignificant relations documented in our study. 
Our study is at the confluence of two growing strands of literature. The first strand 
focuses on executive pay disparity and its implications for corporate policies, cost of capital, and 
firm performance (Kale et al. (2009); Bebchuk et al. (2011); Kini and Williams (2012); Chen et 
al. (2013); Masulis and Zhang (2014)). These studies yield mixed evidence on the determinants 
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and consequences of executive pay disparity. We provide new insight to the debate by analyzing 
executive pay disparity from the creditors’ perspective. The second stream of literature studies 
creditors' perception of managerial compensation and incentives (e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor 
(1992); Chava et al. (2009); and Brockman et al. (2010)). These studies show that creditors are 
cognizant of the managerial incentives created by the design of executive compensation contracts. 
Our research extends this line of literature by examining the effect of another measure of 
executive compensation, notably CEO pay gap, on corporate tail risk, default risk and debt 
contracting. 
Our research makes two noteworthy contributions to the literature. First, we add to the 
on-going debate on the consequences of executive pay disparity. Our findings that firms with 
higher CEO pay gap have lower tail risk, better performance during the financial crisis, lower 
default risk, and receive favorable treatment from creditors complement the findings by Kale et 
al. (2009)and Masulis and Zhang (2014) on the positive association between CEO pay gap and 
firm value. Moreover, our findings further confirm that different measures of executive pay 
disparity may convey different information and thus entail different economic consequences. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the interactions among creditors, shareholders, and 
managers (Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Chava et al. (2009), and Brockman et al. (2010)). 
Previous studies mainly focus on the creditors' reactions to the volatility effect of CEO 
compensation arrangement and emphasize on the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
creditors. However, shareholders, executives, and creditors unquestionably share common 
interests and higher firm value and better firm performance can benefit all parties. Our analysis 
highlights the importance of this aspect of CEO pay gap.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the sample 
selection and data. We present empirical predictions, estimation results, and discussions in 
Section III. Section IV provides discussion of the three alternative measures of executive pay 
disparity, and Section V concludes the paper. 
2. Sample and Data Description  
A. Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
We obtain compensation data of CEO and other senior executives from Execucomp 
database for the period from 1992 to 2010. For this period, we extract the full sample of 
observations from Execucomp, which includes 31,241 firm-year observations. The total 
compensation package is measured by the variable TDC1 reported in Execucomp, which consists 
of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock grants, total value of stock option grants, long-
term incentive payouts, and other forms of compensation We calculate CEO pay gap as the 
difference between CEO’s total compensation package and the median total compensation 
package of the next layer of senior managers, (i.e., VPs) (Kale et al. (2009); Kini and Williams 
(2012)). We identify and exclude former CEOs who remain with the firm in an executive 
position from the pay gap estimation.  
Execucomp reports option values calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing 
model for the pre-2006 period but, following the passage of FAS 123R on December 12, 2004, it 
provides firms’ self-reported fair values of options for the post-2005 period. To maintain 
consistency in option valuation, we follow Kini and Williams (2012) and estimate the inputs for 
the dividend-adjusted Black-Scholes option pricing model, and use this model to estimate option 
values (and option delta and option vega) for the post-2005 period. We then substitute the 
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estimated option values for the firms’ self-reported ones in ExecuComp and re-estimate the 
TDC1 variable for the post-2005 period. We provide a description of the estimation method of 
delta and vega of CEO compensation in Appendix A. We adjust the calculated values of CEO 
pay gap, CEO compensation delta and vega for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
We estimate the distance-to-default following Bharath and Shumway (2008). Distance-
to-default is measured as the z-score estimated using the Merton (1974) model, where the equity 
of the firm is considered a call option on the underlying value of the firm with the strike price 
equal to the value of the firm's debt. The distance-to-default (DD)  is measured using the 
following formula: 
   
   
 
   
          
   
 
In this formula, we assume the firm's asset value V follows a geometric Brownian motion 
with drift  and volatility  denotes the maturity of the outstanding debt. P is the face value of 
the debt. Because firm's asset value V and its associated volatility  are not directly observable, 
we use equity data and an iterative procedure to estimate
4
.  
The debt-related data is obtained from a number of sources. The proportion of short-term 
debt (ST3), constructed as the proportion of debt maturing within three years out of total debt 
reported in a firm’s balance sheet, is gathered from the Compustat database.5  The maturity of 
new debt issue, defined as the number of years to maturity of newly-issued debt, and cost of debt, 
defined as the difference in yield to maturity of newly-issued debt and that of the corresponding 
Treasury bond with similar maturity, are obtained from SDC Platinum, and debt covenants are 
                                                            
4 See Bharath and Shumway (2008) for details and SAS code for the estimation procedure.  
5 Our results are robust to other measures of short-term debt, such as ST2, ST4, and ST5. 
12 
 
obtained from Thomson One Banker. We construct other variables based on the information 
provided by Compustat and CRSP.  
B. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the time series medians of the following compensation variables: CEO 
pay gap, CEO compensation delta, and vega. CEO pay gap exhibits an upward trend from 1993 
to 2005, a significant jump from 2005 to 2006, a notable drop from 2007 to 2008, and a gradual 
recovery from 2009 to 2010. The ascending trend from 1993 to 2005 possibly reflects 
recognition by the board of directors of the importance of CEO pay gap. The jump in CEO pay 
gap from 2005 to 2006 coincides with the adoption of FAS 123R, which changes the accounting 
treatment of stock options. Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012) document a decline in the use of 
options following the implementation of FAS 123R in 2005 and an increase in reliance on 
bonuses, restricted stock options and long-term incentive awards. The jump in CEO pay gap 
possibly indicates that board of directors substitute options with other forms of compensation 
that increase the pay gap between CEO and other top executives. On the other hand, we find 
noticeable drop in CEO delta and vega from 2005 to 2006, corroborating the findings of Hayes, 
Lemmon and Qiu (2012). From 2007 to 2008, the financial crisis affected all three variables, 
CEO pay gap, CEO delta and vega all experiencing declines. After the financial crisis, the three 
variables recover gradually and by 2010, reach almost the levels of 2007. Graph 1 documents 
similar pattern of yearly distribution of CEO pay gap.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of other variables. Panel A reports the distribution 
of compensation variables, Panel B reports firm characteristics, and Panel C reports issue. CEO 
pay gap has a mean value of $2.46 million and a median value of $0.94 million. The values are 
qualitatively similar to those reported by Kale et al. (2009) and Kini and Williams (2012). The 
13 
 
CEO delta indicates that, on average, CEO wealth increases by approximately $518 thousands 
for one dollar increase in stock price. In addition, an increase of 0.01 in annual stock return 
volatility results in an increase of $73 thousands in CEO wealth. All three variables are right-
skewed so we use their natural logarithm transformation in our regression analysis. 
As reported in Panel B, the mean (median) of cash flow volatility is 1.49% (1.03%) and 
the mean (median ) of stock return volatility is 2.84% (2.46%), similar to the number reported by 
Kini and Williams (2012). Tail risk, the negative of the average stock returns over the 5% worst 
return days in a year, has a mean(median) value of 5.81% (4.98%). These values are higher than 
the numbers reported in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) for bank holding companies, indicating that 
our sample of general firms has longer left tails than the bank holding companies. The distance-
to-default, i.e., the z-score, has a mean value of 7.36 and a median value of 6.57. ST3, which 
measures the proportion of short-term debt out of total debt reported on the balance sheet, has a 
mean (median) value of 0.40 (0.32), which is comparable to the number reported by Brockman et 
al. (2010). The size of sample firms is big, with an average market value of $11.4 billion. 
Following prior literature, we use its log transformation throughout our analysis. The mean 
(median) values of market to book ratio is 1.84 (1.48). The leverage ratio has mean (median) 
value of 0.16 (0.13).  
Panel C reports the summary statistics of the new debt issues sample. With total proceeds 
of $401.68 million, the new debt issues have average maturity of 12.37 years, 1.72 debt 
covenants, and yield spread of 1.88%.  Because years to maturity skew to the right, we use their 
natural logarithm transformation in our analysis. 
3. Empirical Predictions, Results, and Discussions 
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A. Mean Effect and Volatility Effect of CEO Pay Gap 
Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran (2009) argue that CEO pay gap is a proxy for tournament 
incentives that induce senior managers to exert more effort and take more risks in order to 
improve their chance of winning the intra-firm rank order tournament. Consistent with their 
prediction, these authors find a positive relation between CEO pay gap and corporate 
performance. In further corroboration of the tournament argument, Kini and Williams (2012) 
provide empirical evidence that CEO pay gap is positively related to riskier investment and 
financing policy decisions. Alternatively, from the perspective of the traditional performance-
based view of CEO compensation, CEO pay gap could simply reflect the superior productivity of 
the CEO relative to the second-tier executives (Masulis and Zhang (2014)). Nevertheless, the  
literature agrees that both firm performance and return volatility increase in CEO pay gap. We 
call the positive association between firm performance and CEO pay gap as the mean effect of 
CEO pay gap and the positive association between volatility and CEO pay gap as the volatility 
effect of CEO pay gap.  
To confirm the two effects, we examine the relations between CEO pay gap and a firm's 
performance variables including Tobin's Q and ROA and a firm's volatility variables including  
cash flow volatility, and stock return volatility in Table 3. Similar to Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran 
(2009), we use the following empirical specification to examine the effect of CEO pay gap on 
firm performance: 
Tobin's Qi,t/ROAi,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO 
Vega)i,t-1 + Tenurei,t-1 + Log(Size)i,t-1 + Log(Size)
2
i,t-1  + Leveragei,t-1 + Capital 
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to Salest-1  +  R&D to Capitalt-1 + Advertising to Capitalt-1+ Dividend Yieldt-1  + 
Firm Dummies + Year Dummies + i,t                                                                                               (1) 
  Panel A reports our findings of the effect of CEO pay gap on Tobin's Q and ROA. The 
first three models (column1, 2, and 3) use Tobin's Q as the dependent variable while the 
remaining three models (column 4, 5, and 6) use ROA as the dependent variable. Tobin' Q is 
defined as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt to book value of 
total assets. ROA is ratio of operating income before depreciation over book value of total assets. 
The  model 1 and 4 include CEO pay gap as the main explanatory variables controlling for firm 
characteristics while model 2 and 5 further include CEO compensation delta, vega, and CEO 
tenure into the analysis. In model 3 and 6, we consider the possibility that the relation between 
CEO compensation and firm performance is endogenous and therefore employ instrumental 
variable (IV) regression to examine the relations between CEO pay gap and Tobin's Q and ROA, 
in which CEO pay gap, CEO delta and CEO vega are instrumented. Following prior research 
(e.g., Kale et al. (2006); Kini and Williams (2011)), we use natural logarithm of industry’s 
median CEO pay gap, number of VPs, a dummy variable for inside promotion, a dummy 
variable for CFO as VP, and a dummy variable for succession plan as potential instruments for 
CEO pay gap, natural logarithm of median industry CEO delta as instrument for CEO delta, and 
natural logarithm of median industry CEO vega as instrument for CEO vega. We require the 
instruments to satisfy all the relevance and validity tests. Consistent Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran 
(2009), the coefficient estimates on CEO pay gap are positive and significant at at least 5% level 




Panel B reports our findings of the effect of CEO pay gap on cash flow volatility and 
stock return volatility using the following specification based on Kini and Williams (2012): 
Cash Flow Volatilityi,t/Stock Return Volatilityi,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + 
Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Vega)i,t-1 + Tenurei,t-1 + Log(Size)i,t-1 + 
Log(Size)
2
i,t-1  + Tobin's Qi,t-1 + Sales Growtht-1  +  Leveraget-1 + ROAt-1+ 
Two-digit SIC Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + i,t                                                                      (2) 
The first three models of Panel B use cash flow volatility as the dependent variable while 
the remaining three models use stock return volatility as the dependent variable Cash flow 
volatility is measured by the standard deviation of seasonally-adjusted quarterly cash flows over 
the period from year t to year t+4. Stock return volatility is measured by the standard deviation of 
the daily stock returns in calendar year t. Similar to Panel A, in model 1 and 4, we only include 
CEO pay gap as the main explanatory variables controlling for firm characteristics. In model 2 
and 5 further include CEO compensation delta, vega, and CEO tenure. In model 3 and 6, we 
consider the possibility that the relation between CEO compensation and firm risk-taking is 
endogenous and again employ instrumental variable regression to examine the relation between 
CEO pay gap and the volatility variables. Consistent Kini and Williams (2012), the coefficient 
estimates on CEO pay gap are all positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting that larger 
CEO pay gap is indeed associated with greater risk-taking. Taken together, our findings confirm 
the mean and volatility effect of CEO pay gap.  
According to prior literature, the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap should 
elicit opposite reactions from the creditors (Campbell and Taksler (2003) and Collen, Livnat, and 
Segal (2009)) The higher firm value and better firm performance  assures the creditors about the 
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safety of their investment and will lead to favorable treatment from the creditors while higher 
volatility implies greater risk of potential loss for the creditors and will receive more austere 
terms in debt contracts. How will creditors react to CEO pay gap? Are they more concerned with 
the its mean effect or volatility effect? Those are interesting questions empirically examined in 
our study.     
B. CEO Pay Gap and Tail Risk 
Before directly examining the relation between CEO pay gap and debt structure, we look 
at another measure of risk, the tail risk. Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we measure tail 
risk as the negative of the average stock returns over the 5% worst return days in a year. Because 
long left tail raises the possibility that equity capital is not enough to absorb the large losses. 
Long left tail imposes a genuine threat to the creditors. Researchers have shown tail risk is a 
factor to consider in bond pricing (Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008); Gemmill and 
Keswani (2011); Chava, Garduri, and Yerramilli (2014)). Studying how CEO pay gap relates to 
tail risk can facilitate our understanding of the effect of CEO pay gap on debt contract designs. 
The mean versus the volatility effect of CEO pay gap implies different relations between CEO 
pay gap and tail risk: the mean effect of CEO pay gap predicts a negative relation between CEO 
pay gap and tail risk while the volatility effect of CEO pay gap suggests a positive relation 
between CEO pay gap and tail risk.  
Table 4 reports our findings of the effect of CEO pay gap on the tail risk using the 
specification below: 
Tail Riski,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO 
Vega)i,t-1 + Tenurei,t-1 + Log(Size)i,t-1 + Log(Size)
2
i,t-1  + Tobin's Qi,t-1 + Sales 
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Growtht-1  +  Leveraget-1 + ROAt-1+ Annual Returnt-1 +  Altman Z-
Score(dummy) i,t-1 +  Number of Segmentsi,t-1 +Firm Dummies + Year Dummies + i,t                                                            
(3) 
 The first model of Table 4 includes CEO pay gap as the only main explanatory variable 
while the second model further includes CEO delta, CEO vega, and CEO tenure. In both models, 
the coefficient of CEO pay gap is negative (-0.1172 and -0.0728) and significant at 1% level, 
indicating that higher CEO pay gap is associated with lower tail risk. This finding is compatible 
with the mean effect of CEO pay gap: either because of highly motivated VPs or because of a 
exceedingly productive CEO or both, a firm with higher CEO pay gap tends to have shorter left 
tail. In term of the other variables, we find that tail risk increases in square-term of firm size, 
Tobin's Q, growth rate of sales, CEO delta and decreases in firm size, ROA, and annual stock 
return. Model 3 of Table 4 presents the results of IV regressions. The coefficient on the predicted 
CEO pay gap remains negative and statistically significant. This evidence suggests that our 
results are robust to the correction for potential endogeneity bias. 
C. Pre-crisis CEO Pay Gap and Crisis-period Performance 
 We then investigate the mean effect versus volatility effect of CEO pay gap during the 
crisis period. How the firms with high CEO pay gap fare during the crisis period can provide 
important clue of the economic consequences of CEO pay gap. If the mean effect prevails, 
managed by highly motivated VPs or/and marginally productive CEO, firms should have better 
performance in the financial crisis. Alternatively, if the volatility effect prevails, the investments 
in highly risky projects should result in worse crisis-period performance for firms with higher 
pre-crisis CEO pay gap. We limit the sample to firms headed by the same CEOs from 2005 to 
2008 to study the effects of pre-crisis CEO pay gap on crisis-period performance. We use the 
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average CEO pay gap in 2005 and 2006 to measure the pre-crisis CEO pay gap and use ROA and 
annual stock return in 2007 and 2008 to measure crisis-period performance. We estimate the 
regressions in the following form: 
ROAi,2007-2008/ Annual Returni,2007-2008= Log(Pre-crisis CEO Pay Gap)i+ 
Log(Pre-crisis CEO Delta)i + Log(Pre-crisis CEO Vega)i + Tenurei,2006 + 
Log(Size)i,2006 + Log(Size)
2
i,2006  + Leveragei,2006 + ROA2006 + Two-digit SIC 
Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + i,t                                                                                                      (4) 
Table 5 reports the regression results. Model 1 and model 2 test effect of CEO pay gap on 
ROA in 2007 and 2008. Model 1 includes only CEO pay gap as the main explanatory variable 
and other control variables. The coefficient on pre-crisis CEO pay gap is positive (0.0182) and 
statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that firms have better operating performance 
during the crisis period when pre-crisis CEO pay gap is larger. Model 2 presents ROA regression 
results that additionally control for CEO delta, CEO vega and CEO tenure. The magnitude of the 
coefficient estimate on CEO pay gap decreases slightly to 0.0166 and remains significant but at 
the 5% level, indicating that our results are robust to the control of other CEO-related variables. 
Model 3 and model 4 test effect of CEO pay gap on annual buy-and-hold stock return in 2007 
and 2008. The coefficients of pre-crisis CEO pay gap are 0.0136, significant at 5% level in 
model 3 and 0.0143, significant at 10% level in model 4. The difference is because of the further 
inclusion of CEO delta, CEO vega, and tenure in model 4. Our findings suggest that higher pre-
crisis CEO pay gap relates to better buy-and-hold stock returns during the crisis period. Again, 
the crisis-period performance of firms is consistent with the mean effect of CEO pay gap and 
inconsistent with its volatility effect.  Additionally, we find that the crisis-period performance is 
negatively related to pre-crisis CEO vega and the level of leverage in 2006.  
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D. CEO Pay Gap and Distance-to-Default 
To gain further insights into the mean effect versus volatility effect of CEO pay gap on 
debt contracting, in this section, we study how CEO pay gap relates to bankruptcy risk. We 
measure bankruptcy risk by distance-to-default. Distance-to-default is constructed based on the 
model by Merton(1974), in which the equity of the firm represents a call option on the 
underlying value of the firm and the strike price of the call option equals to the face value of the 
firm's debt. Distance-to-default is the z-score of the normal distribution that determines the value 
of the call option. Higher z-score indicates lower bankruptcy likelihood. We calculate distance-
to-default based on steps detailed in Bharath and Shumway (2008). Table 6 reports regression 
results with distance-to-default as dependent variable on CEO pay gap based on the following 
specification: 
Distance-to-defaulti,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + 
Log(CEO Vega)i,t-1 + Tenurei,t-1 + Log(Size)i,t-1 + Log(Size)
2
i,t-1  + Tobin's Qi,t-
1 + Sales Growtht-1  +  Leveraget-1 + ROAt-1+ Altman Z-Score(dummy) i,t-1 + 
Number of Segmentsi,t-1+ Firm Dummies +Year Dummies + i,t                                                 (5)                     
Model 1 reports the regression results that includes only CEO pay gap as the main 
explanatory variable while model 2 further control for CEO delta, CEO vega, and CEO tenure. In 
both regressions, CEO pay gap is positively related to distance-to-default. Specifically, the 
coefficient of CEO pay gap in model 1 is 0.1116 and significant at 1% level and after including 
other CEO-related variables in model 2, the magnitude of coefficient of CEO pay gap reduces to 
0.0959 but remains significant at 1% level. These findings indicate that a firm's default risk 
decreases in CEO pay gap. Consistent with our prior findings, the analysis of distance-to-default 
and CEO pay gap supports the mean effect of CEO pay gap. In terms of the control variables, we 
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find that a firm's distance-to-default is positively associated with the firm's Tobin's Q, operating 
performance as measured by ROA, and Altman Z-Score and negatively associated with growth 
rate of sales and leverage. We also run IV regression and report the results in model 3. The 
instruments pass the relevance and validity tests. The coefficient of predicted CEO pay gap is 
positive and significant at 1% level, indicating our findings on the relation between distance-to-
default and CEO pay gap are robust after controlling for the possible endogeneity concern 
between bankruptcy risk and CEO compensation variables.  
E. CEO Pay Gap and Debt Maturity 
So far, our empirical evidence suggests that the mean effect, instead of volatility effect of 
CEO pay gap, prevails in explaining the relations between tail risk, crisis-period performance, 
and default risk. In this section, we directly examine the impact of CEO pay gap on debt 
structure. The first aspect of debt structure we examine is debt maturity. Extant literature 
suggests that bondholders use debt maturity to protect their interests (Leland and Toft (1996), 
Rajan and Winton (1995); Brockman et al. (2010)). If the creditors are more concerned with the 
volatility effect of CEO pay gap, we should expect a positive association between short-term 
debt and CEO pay gap. The advantage of short-term debt stems from its flexibility of contract, 
and ability to monitor. Creditors usually use short-term debt to mitigate a firm's risk-taking 
behavior by subjecting the borrowing firm to the risk of failure to rollover short-term debt. 
Alternatively, if creditors focus more on the mean effect of CEO pay gap, we should expect a 
negative association between short-term debt and CEO pay gap. That is, the better operating 
performance and higher firm value associated with larger CEO pay gap lead to fewer use of 
short-term debt by the creditors. 
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We use two alternative measures for debt maturity in this analysis: the proportion of 
short-term debt out of total debt (ST3) reported on a firm’s balance sheet obtained from the 
Compustat database and number of years to maturity of newly issued debt retrieved from the 
SDC Platinum database.  
To examine the effect of CEO pay gap on proportion of short-term debt, we estimate the 
following multivariate regression model: 
ST3i,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Vega)i,t-1 + 
Log(Size)i,t-1 + Log(Size)
2
i,t-1 + Leveragei,t-1 + Asset Maturityi,t-1 + 
Ownershipi,t-1 + Market/Booki,t-1 + Term Structurei,t + Abnormal Earningsi,t-1 + 
Return Volatilityi,t-1 + Rate(dummy)i,t-1 + Altman Z-Score(dummy)i,t-1 + Firm 
Dummies +Year Dummies + i,t                                                                                         (6) 
Table 7 reports the regression results. The first model contains only CEO pay gap as the 
main explanatory variable. The coefficient of CEO pay gap is -0.0079 and significant at 1% level. 
The second model further controls for CEO delta and CEO vega. The coefficient of CEO pay 
gap remains negatively significant. However, both magnitude (-0.050) and significance (10%) 
level of coefficient estimate of CEO pay gap drop in the second model. Our findings indicate that 
larger CEO pay gap is associated with lower proportion of short-term debt, confirming the mean 
effect of CEO pay gap. The signs and significance of the coefficients on control variables are 
consistent with those documented in the literature. For instance, the coefficients of size squared, 
volatility, and ownership are positive whereas the coefficients of CEO compensation delta, size, 
and leverage are negative. Model 3 of Table 7 presents the results of IV regression in which CEO 
pay gap, CEO delta and CEO vega are instrumented. We require the instruments to satisfy all the 
relevance and validity tests. The coefficients on the predicted CEO pay gap are negative and 
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statistically significant. This evidence suggests that our results are robust to the correction for 
potential endogeneity bias. 
The use of maturity structure of outstanding debt reported in the firm’s balance sheet in 
the above tests provides an important advantage since we can track the impact of CEO pay gap 
on debt structure both in the cross-section and time series bases. However, because firms do not 
issue debt regularly, debt maturity is likely to follow a decreasing trend whereas CEO pay gap 
could change dynamically and any documented effect between CEO pay gap and debt maturity 
could be spurious. To address this issue, we analyze the effect of CEO pay gap on the maturity of 
new debt issues obtained from SDC Platinum. This analysis should better captures bondholders’ 
perception of CEO pay gap at the point when firms access external debt market. To that end, we 
use the following empirical model to examine the relation between CEO pay gap and maturity of 
newly issued debt: 
Log(Maturity)i,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO 
Vega)i,t-1 + Log(Size)i,t-1 + Log(Size)
2
i,t-1 + Leveragei,t-1 + Asset Maturityi,t-1 + 
Ownershipi,t-1 + Market/Booki,t-1 + Abnormal Earningsi,t-1 + Volatilityi,t-1 + 
Average Returni,t-1 + Interest Coveragei,t-1 + Term Structurei,t + Altman Z-
Score(dummy) i,t-1 + Firm Dummies +Year Dummies+ i,t                                     (7) 
Table 8 presents the results of our analysis of the relation between the maturity of new 
debt issues and CEO pay gap. Model 1 reports the results for the regression specification which 
includes CEO pay gap as the only main explanatory variable while model 2 controls for CEO 
delta and CEO vega. In both models, CEO pay gap is positively related to debt maturity, 
indicating creditors’ willingness to provide longer-term debt to borrowing firms that have larger 
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CEO pay gap. The positive reaction from the bondholders towards borrowers’ CEO pay gap is 
consistent with our earlier finding based on debt maturity obtained from balance sheet data, 
supporting the mean effect of CEO pay gap from bondholders' perspective. Turning to the 
control variables, our results indicate that the leverage, growth opportunity proxied by market-to-
book ratio, asset volatility, and term structure are negatively related to debt maturity while 
average return prior to debt issues and Altman Z-Score dummy are positively related to debt 
maturity, which is consistent with the evidence reported in the literature (Brockman et al. (2010)). 
We also estimated the IV regression and model 3. The instrumented CEO pay gap is positive and 
statistically significant, confirming that our earlier findings regarding the relation between CEO 
pay gap and debt maturity after correcting for potential endogeneity bias. 
In sum, using both the balance sheet and new issue data, we find consistent evidence that 
debt maturity increases in CEO pay gap. This finding is qualitatively unchanged when we 
control for other managerial risk-taking incentives proxied by CEO delta and CEO vega. The 
positive relationship between CEO pay gap and debt maturity indicates that bondholders react 
positively to CEO pay gap, suggesting that creditors place more emphasis on the mean effect of 
CEO pay gap rather than on its volatility effect.  
F. CEO Pay Gap and Cost of Debt 
In this section, we examine the relation between CEO pay gap and cost of debt for new 
debt issues. Previous literature shows that bondholders use cost of debt as a mechanism to 
restrain managerial propensity to risk-taking and as compensation for incremental risk 
(Brockman et al. (2010)). Specifically, bondholders increase cost of debt in response to 
managerial risk-seeking incentives, and reduce cost of debt when the incentives created by 
managerial compensation contracts are conducive to bondholders’ interests. As such, the relation 
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between CEO pay gap and cost of debt should further reflect bondholders' perspective on the 
mean versus volatility effect of CEO pay gap. we estimate the following multivariate regression 
model with cost of debt as the dependent variable: 
Yield Spreadi,t= Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO 
Vega)i,t-1 +  Volatilityi,t-1 + Average Returni,t-1 +  Log(Total Proceeds)i,t + Leveragei,t-1 + 
Interest Coveragei,t-1 +  Return on Salesi,t-1 + Treasury Benchmark Yieldi,t + Yield 
Curve Slopei,t + Firm Dummies +Year Dummies +i,t                                                (8)      
  Yield spread is the difference between yield to maturity of new debt issues and the 
corresponding Treasury benchmark yield. Table 9 presents the results of the cost of debt 
regressions. We gather the sample for this analysis with data from the Global New Issues of SDC 
Platinum. Model 1 includes CEO pay gap as the main variable of focus and control variables. 
The coefficient on CEO pay gap is negative (-0.0006) and statistically significant at 1% level, 
indicating that bondholders impose lower cost of debt when CEO pay gap is large. Model 2 
presents the regression estimates with additional control for CEO compensation delta and vega. 
The coefficient estimate of CEO pay gap remains negative (-0.0010) and significant at 1% level, 
indicating that our results are robust to the control for CEO equity-based compensation. Our 
findings further substantiate mean effect of CEO pay gap from bondholders' perspective. Turning 
to control variables, we find that CEO compensation vega, issue size, and leverage are positively 
related to the cost of debt, whereas average stock returns prior to debt issues, interest coverage, 
slope of yield curve, and profit margin measured by return on sales are negatively correlated with 
the cost of debt. These results are consistent with extant research. To address the concern about 
potential endogeneity between executive compensation and cost of debt, we run IV regressions 
with CEO pay gap, CEO delta, and CEO vega being instrumented and report the regression 
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estimates in model 3. The coefficient on predicted CEO pay gap remains negative and significant, 
suggesting that our results are robust to the endogeneity correction.  
G. CEO Pay Gap and Number of Debt Covenants 
Previous studies show that besides debt maturity and cost of debt, the other mechanism 
with which bondholders protect their interest is debt covenants. For instance, Begley and 
Feltham (1999) report that bondholders are more likely to use covenants restricting dividends 
and additional borrowings when they face a large threat of CEO opportunism, motivated by CEO 
stock ownership, to enhance shareholders’ interest at the cost of bondholders. In a similar vein, 
Billett, King and Mauer (2007) argue that short-term debt and debt covenants are substitutes in 
mitigating shareholder-bondholder conflicts. Chava et al. (2009) document that bondholders use 
debt covenants in response to managerial entrenchment and to mitigate the risk of managerial 
self-dealing. Next, we examine the impact of CEO pay gap on the use of debt covenants with the 
following model: 
Log(Number of Debt Covenants)i,t=  +Log(CEO Pay Gap)i,t-1 + Log(CEO 
Delta)i,t-1 + Log(CEO Vega)i,t-1 + Log(Maturity)i,t + Leveragei,t-1 + Asset 
Maturityi,t-1 + Market/Booki,t-1 + Return Volatilityi,t-1 + Ownershipi,t-1 + 
Abnormal Earningsi,t-1 + Altman Z-Score(dummy)i,t-1 +  Firm Dummies +Year 
Dummies + i,t                                                                                                          (9) 
We report the estimation results in Table 10. In columns model 1, we examine the 
relations between CEO pay gap and number of debt covenants. The coefficient estimate of CEO 
pay gap is -0.0515 and statistically significant, indicating that bondholders impose fewer debt 
covenants when lending to firms with larger CEO pay gap. This result is in line with our findings 
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in the previous sections and further corroborates bondholders’ favorable response to CEO pay 
gap. Our finding regarding the relation between CEO pay gap and number of debt covenants is 
essentially similar when we additionally control for CEO delta and CEO vega in model 2. The 
negative association between number of debt covenants and CEO pay gap reinforces the mean 
effect of CEO pay gap. Among control variables, consistent with the results reported by Billet et 
al. (2007), we find that the number of debt covenants increases in leverage. Furthermore, we find 
the number of debt covenants increases in asset volatility and decreases in market-to-book ratio 
and asset maturity. Finally, we use the IV regression approach to account for the endogenous 
relation among CEO pay gap, CEO delta and CEO vega, and the number of debt covenants. 
Model 3 reports the results. The coefficient of the instrumented CEO pay gap remains negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that our finding is robust to the correction for potential 
endogeneity. 
4. Discussion about Measures of Executive Pay Disparity 
According to current literature, There are three measures of executive pay disparity: CEO 
pay gap, CEO pay slice, and Gini coefficient (Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran (2009); Bebchuk, 
Cremers, and Peyer (2011); Kini and Williams (2012); Chen, Huang, and Wei (2013);). CEO pay 
gap measures the dollar gap between CEO's pay and median pay of second-tier executives. CEO 
pay slice measures the percentage of total compensation of all top executives captured by CEO. 
At last, Gini coefficient measures the pay inequity among the top executives. Although these 
three measures all captures the extent of executive pay inequality, they also differ in their 
economic implications. According to Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011), CEO pay slice 
captures the CEO entrenchment, or the relative negotiation power of CEO. The relations between 




              
                         
                                                 
      
 
              
            
 
  
                         
                                                  
            
 
                                   
                                                   
 
            
                                                   
 
            
                       
      
 
From the equations, we can conclude that CEO pay gap and CEO pay slice are not 
perfectly correlated and their relation relies on total VP pay and CEO pay. Of course, if total VP 
pay is greater than zero, the two variables are positively correlated but the correlation decreases 
in CEO pay. In particular, the equation (11) shows that when total VP pay is zero, there is no 
relation between CEO pay gap and CEO pay slice. Under this scenario, the CEO pay gap is CEO 
pay. The dollar value has no indication of CEO entrenchment. But CEO pay slice is one, 
indicating perfect entrenchment of CEO. This example shows that CEO pay slice captures the 
entrenchment effect better. Empirically, according to Table 11, the correlation between CEO pay 
gap and CEO pay slice is 0.34. The difference in CEO pay gap and CEO pay gap explains the 
different empirical findings documented by prior researchers: Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 
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(2011) show that firm value and performance decrease in CEO pay slice while Kale, Reis, 
Venkateswaran (2009) document that firm value and performance increase in CEO pay gap. 
Substituting CEO pay gap with CEO pay slice in our previous analysis, we fail to find any 
significant relations, which might be because of the entrenchment effect contained in CEO pay 
slice. 
In term of Gini coefficient, Table 11 reports that the correlation between CEO pay gap 
and Gini coefficient is 0.30 and the correlation between CEO pay slice and Gini coefficient is 
0.60. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) suggest that Gini coefficient not only contains the 
information on the pay disparity between CEO and other top executives, it also captures 
information on the pay disparity among the other top executives. Kale, Reis, Venkateswaran 
(2009) show a positive relation between firm value and Gini coefficient in their robustness check, 
but the relation is much weaker. Most likely it is because the information about the pay disparity 
among the other top executives adds noise to the analysis. This may also contribute to our failure 
to find any significant relations between Gini coefficient and debt-related variables.  
5. Conclusion 
Prior literature suggests two effects of CEO pay gap: the mean effect and the volatility 
effect. The mean effect suggests that CEO pay gap leads to higher firm value and better firm 
performance. The volatility effects indicates that CEO pay gap also motivates the greater risk-
taking. the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap predicts opposite reactions from the 
creditors. The mean effect benefits the creditors' interest while the volatility effect impairs their 
interest.  We empirically examine which effect is more important for the bondholders. In 
particular, we examine the effects of CEO pay gap on tail risk, crisis-period performance, default 
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risk, and various features of debt structure including maturity structure of debt, cost of debt and 
debt covenants. Consistent with the mean effect of CEO pay gap, we find that CEO pay gap is 
positively related to debt maturity and crisis-period performance, but negatively related to the tail 
risk, default risk, cost of debt and the number of debt covenants. Our finding is robust to the 
control of CEO equity-based compensation and corrections for potential endogeneity concerns. 

















Altman, Edward I., 1977, The Z-score Bankruptcy model: past, present, and future, Financial 
Crises, New York 1977, 89-129.  
Amihud, Yakov, and Baruch Lev, 1981, Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers, The bell journal of economics , 605-617.  
Barclay, Michael J., and Clifford W. Smith, 1995, The maturity structure of corporate debt, the 
Journal of Finance 50, 609-631.  
Bebchuk, Lucian A., KJ Cremers, and Urs C. Peyer, 2011, The CEO pay slice, Journal of 
Financial Economics 102, 199-221.  
Begley, Joy, and Gerald A. Feltham, 1999, An empirical examination of the relation between 
debt contracts and management incentives, Journal of Accounting and Economics 27, 229-
259.  
Bharath, Sreedhar T., and Tyler Shumway, 2008, Forecasting default with the Merton distance to 
default model, Review of Financial Studies 21, 1339-1369.  
Billett, Matthew T., TAO‐HSIEN D. KING, and David C. Mauer, 2007, Growth opportunities 
and the choice of leverage, debt maturity, and covenants, The Journal of Finance 62, 697-
730.  
Billett, Matthew T., David C. Mauer, and Yilei Zhang, 2010, Stockholder and bondholder wealth 
effects of CEO incentive grants, Financial Management 39, 463-487.  
Black, Fischer, and Myron Scholes, 1973, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, The 
journal of political economy , 637-654.  
Bollerslev, Tim, and Viktor Todorov, 2011, Tails, fears, and risk premia, The Journal of Finance 
66, 2165-2211.  
Callen, Jeffrey L., Joshua Livnat, and Dan Segal, 2009, The impact of earnings on the pricing of 
credit default swaps, The Accounting Review 84, 1363-1394.  
Campbell, John Y., and Glen B. Taksler, 2003, Equity Volatility and Corporate Bond Yields, 
The Journal of Finance 58, 2321-2350.  
Carpenter, Jennifer N., 2000, Does option compensation increase managerial risk appetite? The 
journal of finance 55, 2311-2331.  
Chava, Sudheer, Rohan Ganduri, and Vijay Yerramilli, 2014, Do Bond Investors Price Tail Risk 
Exposures of Financial Institutions? Available at SSRN 2417499 .  
32 
 
Chava, Sudheer, Praveen Kumar, and Arthur Warga, 2010, Managerial agency and bond 
covenants, Review of Financial Studies 23, 1120-1148.  
Chava, Sudheer, and Amiyatosh Purnanandam, 2010, Is default risk negatively related to stock 
returns? Review of Financial Studies , hhp107.  
Chava, Sudheer, and Michael R. Roberts, 2008, How does financing impact investment? The 
role of debt covenants, The Journal of Finance 63, 2085-2121.  
Chen, Zhihong, Yuan Huang, and KC Wei, 2013, Executive pay disparity and the cost of equity 
capital, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 849-885.  
Coles, Jeffrey L., Naveen D. Daniel, and Lalitha Naveen, 2006, Managerial incentives and risk-
taking, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 431-468.  
Core, John, and Wayne Guay, 2002, Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios 
and their sensitivities to price and volatility, Journal of Accounting Research 40, 613-630.  
Cremers, KJ M., Joost Driessen, and Pascal Maenhout, 2008, Explaining the level of credit 
spreads: Option-implied jump risk premia in a firm value model, Review of Financial 
Studies 21, 2209-2242.  
Daniel, Naveen, J. S. Martin, and Lalitha Naveen, 2004, The hidden cost of managerial 
incentives: Evidence from the bond and stock markets, Available at SSRN 612921 .  
Datta, Sudip, MAI ISKANDAR‐DATTA, and Kartik Raman, 2005, Managerial stock ownership 
and the maturity structure of corporate debt, the Journal of Finance 60, 2333-2350.  
Ellul, Andrew, and Vijay Yerramilli, 2013, Stronger risk controls, lower risk: Evidence from US 
bank holding companies, The Journal of Finance 68, 1757-1803.  
Gemmill, Gordon, and Aneel Keswani, 2011, Downside risk and the size of credit spreads, 
Journal of Banking & Finance 35, 2021-2036.  
Hayes, Rachel M., Michael Lemmon, and Mingming Qiu, 2012, Stock options and managerial 
incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R, Journal of Financial Economics 105, 
174-190.  
Hirshleifer, David, and Anjan V. Thakor, 1992, Managerial conservatism, project choice, and 
debt, Review of Financial Studies 5, 437-470.  
Kale, Jayant R., Ebru Reis, and Anand Venkateswaran, 2009, Rank‐Order Tournaments and 




Kelly, Bryan, and Hao Jiang, 2014, Tail risk and asset prices, Review of Financial Studies , 
hhu039.  
Kim, E. H., and Yao Lu, 2011, CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking, Journal of 
Financial Economics 102, 272-292.  
Kini, Omesh, and Ryan Williams, 2012, Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate 
policies, Journal of Financial Economics 103, 350-376.  
Knopf, John D., Jouahn Nam, and John H. Thornton Jr, 2002, The volatility and price 
sensitivities of managerial stock option portfolios and corporate hedging, The Journal of 
Finance 57, 801-813.  
Low, Angie, 2009, Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation, Journal of 
Financial Economics 92, 470-490.  
Masulis, Ronald W., and Shage Zhang, 2014, Compensation Gaps Among Top Corporate 
Executives, Available at SSRN 2517182 .  
Merton, Robert C., 1974, On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates*, 
The Journal of Finance 29, 449-470.  
---. 1973, Theory of rational option pricing, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science , 141-183.  
Ortiz-Molina, Hernan, 2007, Executive compensation and capital structure: The effects of 
convertible debt and straight debt on CEO pay, Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 
69-93.  
Shaw, Kenneth W., 2012, CEO incentives and the cost of debt, Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting 38, 323-346.  
Sundaram, Rangarajan K., and David L. Yermack, 2007, Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in 









Appendix A: Estimating CEO Compensation Portfolio Delta and Vega 
 
Sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to changes in stock price(delta) and stock return 
volatility(vega) are estimated using the following modified Black-Scholes (1973) model, 
modified by Merton(1973) to account for dividend payout: 
 
                                        
where  
  
   
 
         
  
  
   
 
N=cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S=price of the underlying stock 
X=option exercise price 
=expected stock return volatility over the life of the option 
r=log transformation of risk=free interest rate 
T=time to maturity of the option in years 
d=log transformation of expected divided yield over the life of the option 
The value of unexercised options (options granted in previous years whose value is not reported) 
held by executives is estimated using the following procedure suggested by Core and Guay 
(2002) and Frank and Goyal (2007): 
 Exercise price for unexercised options: First, we compute the ratio of realizable value of 
in-the-money exercisable options to the number of unexercised exercisable options. 
Second, we subtract this ratio from the fiscal year-end stock price. The resulting number 
is an estimate of the average exercise price for unexercised exercisable options held by 
executives. Similarly, an estimate of average exercise price of unexercised 
unexercisable options can be obtained by subtracting the ratio of in-the-money 
unexercisable option to the number of unexercised unexercisable options from the fiscal 
year-end stock price.  
 Option maturity for unexercised exercisable options: The maturity of unexercised 
exercisable options is assumed to be four years less than average maturity of the new 
grants. In case that no grants are made this year, it is set at 6 years. The maturity of 
unexercisable options is set at one less than the average maturity of the new grants. In 
case that no grants are made this year, it is set at 9 years.  
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Stock price, risk-free rate, dividend yield and volatility: these inputs are obtained from 



























Appendix B: Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Description 
Abnormal Earnings  (earnings in year t+1-earnings in year t)/(share 
price)*outstanding shares in year t 
Altman Z-Score dummy Equals one if a firm has Altman Z-Score greater than 1.81 and 
zero otherwise 
Annual Return Buy-and-hold stock return over the year 
Asset Maturity Book value-weighted average of maturities of property, plant 
and equipment and current assets 
Average Return Average daily stock returns 180 days prior to the debt issue 
Cash Flow Volatility Standard deviation of seasonally-adjusted quarterly cash flows 
over the period from year t to year t+4. 
CEO Delta Change in CEO wealth given a $1 increase in stock price  
CEO Vega  Change in CEO wealth given a 1% increase in stock return 
volatility 
CEO Pay Gap  Difference in CEO pay and the median pay of  other senior 
executives 
CEO Tenure Number of year in the CEO position of the current firm 
CFO as VP Equals one if CFO is VP, zero otherwise 
Inside Promotion Equals one if the current CEO is promoted from within the firm 
and zero otherwise 
Interest Coverage The natural log transformation of the pre-tax interest coverage 
ratio 
Financial Leverage Long-term debt divided by the market value of the firm 
Market-to-book ratio Market value of total assets divided by book value of total 
assets 
Maturity Years to debt maturity  
Number of VPs Number of VPs of a firm in a given year 
Ownership CEO ownership, calculated as number of shares owned by CEO 
scaled by total shares outstanding 
Rating dummy Equals one if a firm has S&P rating on long-term debt and zero 
otherwise 
Return on Assets Ratio of operating income before depreciation over book value 
of total assets 
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Return on Sales Operating income before depreciation divided by sales 
Volatility  Standard deviation of the monthly stock return in a year 
multiplied by the ratio of market value of equity to market 
value of assets 
Sales Growth Growth rate of annual sales 
Size  Firm size, calculated as market value of equity plus book value 
of total assets minus book value of equity 
Stock Return Volatility Standard deviation of the daily stock returns in a given year 
Yield Spread Difference between a bond' yield to maturity and the yield to 
maturity of the corresponding Treasury benchmark with similar 
maturity 
ST3  The sum of current liabilities, debt maturing in the second year, 
and debt maturing in third year, all divided by total debts 
Succession Plan Equals one if a VP is either president or COO but not chairman, 
zero otherwise. 
Number of debt covenants Total number of covenants of a debt issue 
Tail Risk Negative of the average stock returns over the 5% worst return 
days in a year 
Term Structure Difference between 10-year and 6-month Treasury rate at the 
fiscal-year end  
Total Proceeds Total proceeds of a new debt issue 
Treasury Benchmark Yield Treasury rate with terms that corresponds most closely to the 
maturity-term of a new debt issue  













Table 1: Distribution of Compensation Variables by Year 
This table presents distribution of medians of CEO pay gap, CEO delta, and CEO vega by year. 
CEO Pay gap, CEO delta and CEO vega are adjusted for inflation using 1990 as the base year. 
CEO pay gap is difference in total compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO 
delta is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the 
sensitivity of CEO total compensation to stock return volatility. The sample consists of 31,241 
Execucomp firm-year observations of 3,278 firms from 1992 to 2010. All variables are defined 
in Appendix B. 
Year   N CEO Pay Gap  
(in 000s) 
CEO Delta  
(in 000s) 
CEO Vega  
(in 000s) 
1992 363 818.927 106.984 20.798 
1993 1,152 586.233  98.374   15.433 
1994 1,541 571.237   87.742   12.332 
1995 1,591 577.918 102.611 16.265 
1996 1,636 686.351 124.814 17.657 
1997 1,661 777.920 168.803 22.108 
1998 1,721 797.162 146.689 30.546 
1999 1,793 822.674 164.984 28.751 
2000 1,779 824.957 160.018 32.863 
2001 1,651 892.695 170.275 40.758 
2002 1,656 858.893 144.947 44.512 
2003 1,725 807.676 185.955 48.515 
2004 1,732 951.459 204.488 46.518 
2005 1,734 922.136 186.430 41.018 
2006 1,814 2,064.480 161.371 18.773 
2007 2,036 2,004.891 139.001 21.257 
2008 1,948 1,297.416 79.840 17.944 
2009 1,883 1,594.157 105.592 18.754 






Total 31,241 942.037 137.143 25.125 
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Graph 1: Distribution CEO Pay Gap by Year 
This graph depicts the distribution of mean, median, upper-quarter, and lower-quarter CEO pay 
gap by year. CEO pay gap is adjusted for inflation using 1990 as the base year. CEO pay gap is 
difference in total compensations between CEO and other top executives. The sample consists of 












Table 2:  Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics of CEO compensation variables. CEO Pay gap, CEO delta and CEO vega are adjusted 
for inflation using 1990 as the base year.  Panel B reports the summary statistics of firm 
characteristics variables. Panel C reports the summary statistics of new bond issues variables. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: CEO Compensation Variables  








CEO Pay Gap (in 
000s) 
2,460.75 4,374.56 358.84 942.04 2,469.33 
31,241 
CEO Delta (in 000s) 518.13 1,332.39 47.35 137.14 392.33 31,241 
CEO Vega (in 000s) 73.40 133.35 5.36 25.12 75.72 31,241 
    
 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics Variables  








Abnormal Earnings 0.05 1.24 -0.01 0.01 0.02 23,216 
Altman Z-Score 
(dummy) 
0.85 0.36 1 1 1 23,216 
Annual Return 0.17 0.68 -0.14 0.10 0.35 21,143 
Asset Maturity 11.07 10.19 4.15 7.75 14.54 23,216 
Average Return 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0 0.01 23,216 
Cash Flow 
Volatility (%) 
1.49 1.46 0.62 1.03 1.78 21,681 
Distance-to-Default  7.36 4.78 4.02 6.56 9.79 20,199 
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Interest Coverage 2.07 0.75 1.56 1.95 2.50 23,216 
Leverage 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.13 0.23 23,216 
Market/Book 1.84 1.31 1.19 1.48 2.05 23,216 
Number of 
Segments 
1.84 1.12 1 1 2 20,199 
Ownership 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 23,216 
Rate (dummy) 0.59 0.49 0 1 1 23,216 
Return on Assets 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.19 21,681 
Return on Sales 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.27 23,216 
Sales Growth 0.14 0.75 -0.00 0.08 0.19 21,681 
Size(MM$) 11,414.07 30,518.68 951.88 2,626.82 8,527.19 23,216 
ST3 0.40 0.32 0.14 0.32 0.60 15,214 
Stock Return 
Volatility (%) 
2.84 1.52 1.80 2.46 3.45 22,576 
Tail Risk (%) 5.81 3.45 3.58 4.98 7.02 21,143 
Tenure 6.66 6.87 2 5 9 21,681 
Tobin's Q 2.01 1.72 1.20 1.55 2.23 21,681 
Volatility 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 23,216 
 
Panel C: New Debt Issues Variables  








Maturity 12.37 10.86 5.19 10.14 10.40 23,216 
Sum of Debt Covenants 1.72 0.89 1 2 2 1,843 
Spread (%) 1.88 1.71 0.77 1.33 2.36 23,216 
Term (%) 1.93 1.13 0.96 2.22 2.85 23,216 
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Yield Curve Slope 1.38 0.94 0.45 1.71 2.16 23,216 
Treasury Benchmark 
Yield (%) 
4.40 1.63 3.30 4.43 5.71 
23,216 

























Table 3: CEO Pay Gap and Firm Performance and Volatility 
Panel A: CEO Pay Gap and Firm Performance 
This table reports regression results with Tobin's Q and ROA as dependent variables on CEO pay 
gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011. Tobin's Q is the ratio of the sum of market 
value of equity and book value of debt to book value of total assets. ROA is ratio of operating 
income before depreciation over book value of total assets. CEO pay gap is difference in total 
compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO delta is the sensitivity of CEO total 
compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of CEO total 
compensation to stock return volatility. The OLS regressions control for firm and year fixed 
effects. The OLS regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 OLS  IV(2SLS)  OLS  IV(2SLS) 
 Tobin's Qt  ROAt 
Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 0.0597*** 0.0663***    0.0093** 0.0119**   
 (6.0882) (6.2417)    (2.4505) (2.4369)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   0.7469***     -0.0056   
  (10.6654)     (-0.4999)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   -0.2700***     -0.0195   
  (-8.0333)     (-1.1410)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    0.0649**     0.1698** 
    (2.2213)     (2.1170) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    0.5438     -0.5417*** 
    (1.4412)     (-2.8876) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    0.5787***     0.1976*** 
    (5.9856)     (2.9079) 
Tenuret-1  -0.0015  -0.0043   0.0005  0.0043** 
  (-1.0665)  (-1.0551)   (0.9749)  (2.1316) 
Log(Size)t-1  -1.2598*** -1.2900***  -1.1748***  -0.1112 -0.1206  -0.3630** 
 (-10.1757) (-9.9110)  (-8.5779)  (-0.6672) (-0.6906)  (-2.1864) 
Log(Size)2t-1 0.0439*** 0.0452***  0.0279***  0.0048 0.0055  0.0120 
 (6.1756) (5.9762)  (3.8349)  (0.4978) (0.5453)  (1.0316) 








 (-9.3223) (-6.7973)  (-2.9926)  (-5.4466) (-5.0157)  (-1.2227) 
Capital to Salest-1 -0.0033 -0.0033  -0.0030  -0.0018 -0.0018  -0.0015 
 (-1.0467) (-1.0433)  (-0.9296)  (-1.0825) (-1.0835)  (-1.0602) 
R&D to Capitalt-1 0.0039*** 0.0034***  0.0037***  0.0024 0.0025  0.0024 
 (2.6911) (2.9804)  (3.3189)  (0.4733) (0.4806)  (0.5021) 
Advertising to Capitalt-1 0.0030 0.0030  0.0036  0.0037** 0.0037*  0.0030 
 (1.0299) (1.0318)  (1.2654)  (1.9744) (1.9392)  (1.4215) 
Dividend Yieldt-1 0.1099*** 0.1101***  0.1259***  -0.0389 -0.0390  -0.0071 
 (4.9187) (6.1217)  (6.4308)  (-0.8402) (-0.8426)  (-0.7533) 
Intercept 8.1596*** 3.8950***  1.7907  0.5382 0.6778   
 (15.7785) (5.1538)  (0.6700)  (0.7802) (0.9393)   
          
Number of Obs 27,118 27,118  27,118  27,169 27,169   
R2 0.5604 0.5658    0.1547 0.1546   
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for 
Joint Significance 
   54.27***     3.88*** 
Hansen J Statistic     0.003     0.119 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics)  
   176.902***     15.090*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median 
CEO Deltat-1 
    Industry-
median CEO 
Deltat-1 
    Industry-median 
CEO Vegat-1 
    Industry-
median CEO 
Vegat-1 
    Number of VPst-1     Number of 
VPst-1 




Panel B: CEO Pay Gap and Volatility 
This table reports regression results with stock return volatility and cash flow volatility in 
percentage points as dependent variables on CEO pay gap. The sample covers period from 1993 
to 2011. Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of seasonally-adjusted quarterly cash flows 
over the period from year t to year t+4. Stock return volatility is the standard deviation of the 
daily stock returns in year t. CEO pay gap is difference in total compensations between CEO and 
other top executives. CEO delta is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to the change in 
stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to stock return volatility. The 
OLS regressions control for industry and year fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-
digit SIC code. The OLS regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
 OLS  IV(2SLS)  OLS  IV(2SLS) 
 Cash Flow Volatilityt  Stock Return Volatilityt 
Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 0.0617*** 0.0742***    0.0285*** 0.1039***   
 (6.6760) (7.2385)    (3.6050) (11.3881)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   -0.0260**     -0.0193**   
  (-2.3654)     (-1.9877)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   -0.0063     -0.1288***   
  (-0.7123)     (-16.7855)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    0.3483***     0.5776*** 
    (4.4029)     (22.7550) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    -1.4529***     0.2410*** 
    (-5.4513)     (5.8768) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    2.0699***     -0.2361*** 
    (5.3233)     (-6.7682) 
Tenuret-1  0.0016  0.0668***   -0.0012  -0.0214*** 
  (1.1159)  (5.2284)   (-0.9911)  (-7.6204) 
Log(Size)t-1  -1.2130*** -1.1955***  -2.0487***  -0.9114*** -0.8446***  -1.3856*** 





Log(Size)2t-1 0.0615*** 0.0611***  0.0755***  0.0393*** 0.0384***  0.0516*** 
 (18.5166) (18.3545)  (11.6965)  (14.8921) (14.5386)  (16.1658) 
Tobin's Qt-1 0.0886*** 0.0933***  0.1049***  0.0959*** 0.1039***  0.0303* 
 (6.7836) (6.5886)  (4.5699)  (6.0196) (6.1381)  (1.8398) 
Sales Growtht-1 0.0786*** 0.0805***  0.1954***  0.0576** 0.0590**  0.0220 
 (2.9126) (2.9313)  (2.8733)  (2.3799) (2.4325)  (1.2621) 
Leveraget-1 -0.3018*** -0.3577***  0.4655*  1.9906*** 1.8301***  2.6648*** 
 (-3.5047) (-4.1542)  (1.7495)  (21.7784) (20.9885)  (21.0317) 
ROAt-1 -1.4714*** -1.4448***  -0.1084  -2.7185*** -2.6826***  -3.0970*** 
 (-10.4631) (-10.1968)  (-0.3838)  (-12.7248) (-12.7021)  (-13.7723) 
Intercept 6.5708*** 6.2780***  13.4026***  6.2865*** 5.8111***  5.6995*** 
 (29.1581) (24.4455)  (9.0240)  (37.4887) (33.4729)  (28.7748) 
          
Number of Obs 21,681 21,681  21,681  22,576 22,576  22,576 
R2 0.2735 0.2738    0.5234 0.5319   
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for 
Joint Significance 
   30.27***     242.18*** 
Hansen J Statistic     0.061     2.140 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics)  
   114.468***     367.612*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median 
CEO Deltat-1 
    Industry-
median CEO 
Paygapt-1 
    Industry-median 
CEO Vegat-1 
    Industry-
median CEO 
Deltat-1 
    Number of VPst-1     Industry-
median CEO  
Vegat-1 
    Inside Promotiont-1     CFO as VPt-1 
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Table 4: CEO Pay Gap and Tail Risk 
This table reports regressions results with tail risk in percentage points as dependent variable on 
CEO pay gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011. Tail risk is measured as the negative 
of the average stock returns over the 5% worst return days in a year (Ellul and Yerramilli (2013)). 
CEO pay gap is difference in total compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO 
delta is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the 
sensitivity of CEO total compensation to stock return volatility. The OLS regressions control for 
firm and year fixed effects. The OLS regressions standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 OLS  IV(2SLS) 
 Tail Riskt Tail Riskt  Tail Riskt 
Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 -0.1172*** -0.0728***   
 (-4.9175) (-2.8400)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   0.8503***   
  (8.1811)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   -0.5766***   
  (-8.8165)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    -4.2221*** 
    (-3.6313) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    -18.6098** 
    (-2.0545) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    16.5756*** 
    (3.0234) 
Tenuret-1  -0.0068**  0.1075* 
  (-2.0099)  (1.6663) 
Log(Size)t-1  -0.9248*** -1.0396***  3.6732*** 
 (-4.6556) (-5.2481)  (2.5978) 
Log(Size)2t-1 0.0388*** 0.0471***  -0.1471* 
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 (3.1080) (3.7658)  (-1.7254) 
Tobin's Qt-1 0.1180*** 0.0984***  0.7313*** 
 (3.9724) (3.5369)  (2.5932) 
Sales Growtht-1 0.0698* 0.0675*  0.1302 
 (1.9448) (1.9459)  (1.5068) 
Leveraget-1 0.0703 0.1187  -1.3425 
 (0.2628) (0.4431)  (-1.3203) 
ROAt-1 -4.4434*** -4.5335***  2.2472 
 (-9.0927) (-9.3703)  (0.9246) 
Annual Returnt-1 -0.0644* -0.0937***  0.4918 
 (-1.7646) (-2.6652)  (1.5666) 
Altman Z-Score (dummy)t-1 -0.0000 -0.0000  0.0000 
 (-0.4561) (-0.5968)  (0.0137) 
Number of Segmentst-1 -0.0126 -0.0107  -0.3653*** 
 (-0.5012) (-0.4290)  (-2.8880) 
Intercept 10.3046*** 6.7953***  71.7661* 
 (12.4727) (6.4825)  (1.7900) 
     
Number of Obs 21,143 21,143  21,143 
R2 0.6440 0.6462   
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for Joint 
Significance 
   22.98*** 
Hansen J Statistic     1.384 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in Sargan-
Hansen Statistics)  
   99.918*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median CEO Deltat-1 
    Industry-median CEO Vegat-1 




























    Succession Plan t-1 
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Table 5:  Pre-crisis CEO Pay Gap and Crisis-period Performance 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with crisis-period performance variables as 
dependent variables on per-crisis CEO pay gap. We limit the sample to firms headed by the same 
CEOs from 2005 to 2008. We measure pre-crisis CEO pay gap as average CEO pay gap in 2005 
and 2006. The dependent variables are ROA and annual return in 2007 and 2008. ROA is 
defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation over book value of total assets. 
Annual return is defined as buy-and-hold stock return over the year. CEO pay gap is difference 
in total compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO delta is the sensitivity of 
CEO total compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of CEO total 
compensation to stock return volatility. The regressions control for industry and year fixed 
effects where industry is defined by two-digit SIC code. The regressions standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * denote 
the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 OLS  




Log (Pre-crisis CEO Pay Gap) 0.0182*** 0.0166** 0.0136** 0.0143* 
 (2.5989) (2.2298) (1.9758) (1.7548) 
Log (Pre-crisis CEO Delta)   0.0110  0.0447 
  (0.3705)  (1.5455) 
Log (Pre-crisis CEO Vega)   -0.0081  -0.0312* 
  (-0.7192)  (-1.6966) 
Tenure2006  0.0019  0.0002 
  (0.7297)  (0.1083) 
Log(Size)2006 0.3972 0.4092 -0.0129 -0.0156 
 (1.2569) (1.2727) (-0.3291) (-0.3929) 
Log(Size)22006 -0.0231 -0.0237 0.0000 0.0004 
 (-1.2695) (-1.2972) (0.0104) (0.1628) 
Leverage2006 -0.1695* -0.1695* -0.1084* -0.1047 






















ROA2006   0.1089 0.1022 
   (0.5180) (0.4854) 
Intercept -1.6345 -1.7331 0.4232 0.2351 
 (-1.1912) (-1.4433) (1.5171) (0.7510) 
     
Number of Obs 2,255 2,222 2,362 2,324 
R2 0.0395 0.0405 0.2840 0.2901 
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Table 6: CEO Pay Gap and Distance-to-Default 
This table reports regression results with distance-to-default as dependent variable on CEO pay 
gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011. Distance-to-default is the z-score estimated 
based on Merton (1974) model, in which the equity of the firm is considered as a call option on 
the underlying value of the firm and the strike price equals the value of firm's debt. CEO pay gap 
is difference in total compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO delta is the 
sensitivity of CEO total compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of 
CEO total compensation to stock return volatility. The OLS regressions control for firm and year 
fixed effects. The OLS regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 






Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 0.1116*** 0.0959***   
 (3.8458) (3.1733)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   -0.0014   
  (-0.0367)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   0.0956   
  (1.5671)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    7.4382*** 
    (2.8873) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    -23.8455*** 
    (-3.2571) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    11.3667*** 
    (3.3316) 
Tenuret-1  0.0147***  0.5200*** 
  (3.1589)  (3.2711) 
Log(Size)t-1  -0.0522 -0.0932  -7.9993*** 
 (-0.1873) (-0.3352)  (-2.8910) 
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Log(Size)2t-1 -0.0212 -0.0200  0.3778*** 
 (-1.2345) (-1.1622)  (3.0682) 
Tobin's Qt-1 0.2128*** 0.2114***  1.9167*** 
 (3.5418) (3.4825)  (4.0091) 
Sales Growtht-1 -0.1362*** -0.1363***  0.6289 
 (-2.8097) (-2.8075)  (1.4462) 
Leveraget-1 -8.4470*** -8.4437***  -16.8636*** 
 (-17.1749) (-17.1231)  (-8.1604) 
ROAt-1 5.0777*** 5.0844***  18.3781*** 
 (7.3698) (7.3742)  (6.0488) 
Altman Z-Score (dummy)t-1 0.0000*** 0.0000***  0.0001* 
 (3.7872) (3.7862)  (1.6902) 
Number of Segmentst-1 0.0372 0.0332  -0.7266** 
 (1.1004) (0.9805)  (-2.5540) 
Intercept 10.8122*** 10.6960***  93.0731*** 
 (9.8297) (9.6224)  (3.4828) 
     
Number of Obs 20,199 20,199  20,199 
R2 0.7110 0.7112   
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for Joint 
Significance 
   98.51*** 
Hansen J Statistic     0.046 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in Sargan-
Hansen Statistics)  
   317.780*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median CEO 
Deltat-1 
    Industry-median CEO 
Vegat-1 




























    Number of VPst-1 
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Table 7: CEO Pay Gap and Proportion of Short-term Debt 
This table reports regression results with ST3 (proportion of short-term debt over total debt) as 
dependent variable on CEO pay gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011. ST3 is the 
proportion of short-term debt maturing in 3 years over total debt. CEO pay gap is difference in 
total compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO delta is the sensitivity of CEO 
total compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of CEO total 
compensation to stock return volatility. The OLS regressions control for firm and year fixed 
effects. The OLS regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are 
defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 OLS  IV(2SLS) 
 ST3t ST3t  ST3t 
Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 -0.0079*** -0.0050*   
 (-2.9957) (-1.7640)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   -0.0149***   
  (-4.7983)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   0.0024   
  (1.2198)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    -0.0393*** 
    (-6.9621) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    -0.0633*** 
    (-4.1992) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    0.0384*** 
    (4.8305) 
Log(Size)t-1  -0.1026*** -0.0940***  0.0274 
 (-4.4678) (-4.0814)  (0.9349) 
Log(Size)2t-1 0.0039*** 0.0039***  0.0002 
 (2.7643) (2.7526)  (0.1602) 
Leveraget-1 -1.1056*** -1.1255***  -0.2935*** 
 (-33.7501) (-34.1043)  (-7.8328) 
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Asset Maturityt-1 -0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0019*** 
 (-0.1506) (-0.3649)  (-4.4076) 
Ownershipt-1 0.6309*** 0.7125***  1.1304*** 
 (4.4897) (5.0376)  (3.2642) 
Market/Bookt-1 0.0055** 0.0038  0.0339*** 
 (2.1090) (1.4267)  (5.0720) 
Term Structuret 0.0051 0.0055  -0.0097*** 
 (0.9558) (1.0384)  (-3.4283) 
Abnormal Earningst-1 0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 
 (0.0025) (-0.0748)  (-0.9133) 
Volatilityt-1 0.2158*** 0.1907***  -0.0850 
 (3.2884) (2.8987)  (-0.5140) 
Rate (dummy)t-1 -0.0613*** -0.0615***  -0.0232** 
 (-6.3259) (-6.3506)  (-2.0094) 
Altman Z-Score (dummy)t-1 -0.1182*** -0.1148***  0.0101 
 (-11.8201) (-11.4552)  (1.1061) 
Intercept -0.1026*** -0.0940***  0.5084*** 
 (-4.4678) (-4.0814)  (3.9923) 
     
Number of Obs 15,214 15,214  15,214 
R2 0.5506 0.5514   
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for Joint 
Significance 
   24.23*** 
Hansen J Statistic     3.665 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in Sargan-
Hansen Statistics)  
   60.025*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median CEO 
PayGapt-1 

























    Industry-median CEO 
Vegat-1 
    Number of VPst-1 
    Inside Promotiont-1 
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Table 8: CEO Pay Gap and  Debt Maturity of New Debt Issues 
This table reports regression results with years to maturity of debt issues as dependent variable 
on CEO pay gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011. Maturity is the years to maturity 
of new debt issues. CEO pay gap is difference in total compensations between CEO and other 
top executives. CEO delta is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to the change in stock 
price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to stock return volatility.  The OLS 
regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. The OLS regression standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, ** and * denote 
the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 OLS  IV (2SLS) 
 Log(Maturity)t Log(Maturity)t  Log(Maturity)t 
Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 0.0337** 0.0316*   
 (2.3706) (1.9592)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   0.0146   
  (0.6584)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   -0.0224   
  (-1.6237)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    0.2494*** 
    (4.7250) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    0.3193*** 
    (3.8576) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    -0.2105*** 
    (-3.6916) 
Log(Size)t-1  0.4232* 0.4292  0.0243*** 
 (1.7898) (1.6313)  (4.2696) 
Log(Size)2t-1 -0.0221* -0.0219  -0.5855*** 
 (-1.8178) (-1.5512)  (-4.3566) 
Leveraget-1 -0.4826** -0.3628  -1.0543*** 
 (-2.0280) (-1.6096)  (-4.4886) 
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Asset Maturityt-1 0.0041 0.0047*  0.0076*** 
 (1.5167) (1.7624)  (3.9359) 
Ownershipt-1 -0.0618 -0.0071  -5.4365*** 
 (-0.0756) (-0.0116)  (-3.2001) 
Market/Bookt-1 -0.0745*** -0.0843***  -0.1685*** 
 (-3.2824) (-3.3836)  (-6.4478) 
Abnormal Earningst-1 -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0000 
 (-0.2177) (-0.9252)  (-0.5777) 
Volatilityt-1 -1.8820*** -1.6325***  -2.9576*** 
 (-3.3092) (-2.8496)  (-4.2287) 
Average Return t-1 26.6093*** 29.2519***  17.2729** 
 (3.9882) (4.1637)  (2.1863) 
Interest Coveraget-1 0.0246 0.0472  -0.0682*** 
 (0.7940) (1.4999)  (-2.6594) 
Term Structuret -0.0311*** -0.0268**  -0.1779*** 
 (-3.0781) (-2.3251)  (-3.1039) 
Altman Z-Score (dummy)t-1 0.1116** 0.0818  0.0173 
 (2.2316) (1.4388)  (0.8685) 
Intercept 0.1507 0.0450  3.4872*** 
 (0.1296) (0.0364)  (7.3716) 
     
Number of Obs 23,216 23,216  23,216 
R2 0.1259 0.1529   
     
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for Joint 
Significance 
   15.67*** 
Hansen J Statistic     0.012 






















Hansen Statistics)  
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median CEO 
PayGapt-1 
    Industry-median CEO 
Deltat-1 





Table 9: CEO Pay Gap and Cost of Debt of New Debt Issues 
This table reports regression results with spread of debt issues as dependent variable on CEO pay 
gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011. Spread is the difference between yield to 
maturity of new debt issues and the corresponding Treasury benchmark yield. CEO pay gap is 
difference in total compensations between CEO and other top executives. CEO delta is the 
sensitivity of CEO total compensation to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of 
CEO total compensation to stock return volatility.  The OLS regressions control for firm and 
year fixed effects. The OLS regression standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
 OLS  IV (2SLS) 
 Spreadt Spreadt  Spreadt 
Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 -0.0006*** -0.0010***   
 (-3.1369) (-5.2266)   
Log(CEO Delta)t-1   0.0001   
  (0.9644)   
Log(CEO Vega)t-1   0.0016***   
  (8.7698)   
Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1    -0.0176*** 
    (-4.0729) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1    -0.0212*** 
    (-5.0318) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1    0.0118*** 
    (4.6152) 
Volatilityt-1 -0.0044 -0.0193  0.2334*** 
 (-0.3706) (-1.5200)  (8.9695) 
Average Returnt-1 -0.3200*** -0.2496***  -0.8915*** 
 (-7.3318) (-5.8219)  (-4.0623) 




 (17.4102) (11.8412)  (3.6293) 
Leveraget-1 0.0141*** 0.0136***  0.0007*** 
 (11.6536) (11.0982)  (2.8543) 
Interest Coveraget-1 -0.0027*** -0.0033***  -0.0006 
 (-5.5529) (-6.2757)  (-0.4275) 
Return on Salest-1  -0.0004*** -0.0005***  -0.0575*** 
 (-4.5217) (-5.0371)  (-4.9949) 
Treasury Benchmark Yieldt -0.0000 -0.0000  -0.0032*** 
 (-0.0149) (-0.0176)  (-5.7283) 
Yield Curve Slopet -0.0010*** -0.0009***  -0.0008* 
 (-2.7890) (-2.6282)  (-1.7026) 
Intercept 0.0069 0.0061  0.2290*** 
 (1.3689) (1.1970)  (5.9097) 
     
Number of Obs 23,216 23,216  23,216 
R2 0.5337 0.5440   
     
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for Joint 
Significance 
   94.62*** 
Hansen J Statistic     1.727 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in Sargan-
Hansen Statistics)  
   243.753*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS)    Industry-median 
CEO Deltat-1 
    Industry-median 
CEO Vegat-1 
    Succession Plant-1 
    Number of VPst-1 
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Table 10:  CEO Pay Gap and Debt Covenants 
This table reports regression results with sum of debt covenants as dependent variable on CEO 
pay gap. The sample covers period from 1993 to 2011.  Sum of debt covenants is the total 
number of debt covenants per debt issue. CEO pay gap is difference in total compensations 
between CEO and other top executives. CEO delta is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation 
to the change in stock price. CEO vega is the sensitivity of CEO total compensation to stock 
return volatility. The OLS regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. The OLS 
regression standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. All variables are defined in 
Appendix B.  ***, ** and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
  OLS   IV(2SLS) 
  
Log(Sum of Debt 
Covenants)t 
Log(Sum of Debt 
Covenants)t  
Log(Sum of Debt 
Covenants)t 



















Predicted  Log(CEO Pay Gap)t-1 
   
-0.0878*** 
    
(-2.7879) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Delta)t-1 
   
-0.1162*** 
    
(-3.1535) 
Predicted  Log(CEO Vega)t-1 
   
0.3380*** 
    
(5.9231) 




































































Number of Obs 1,843 1,843 
 
1,843 
R2 0.1449 0.1743 
  
     
Anderson-Rubin Wald F-stat for 
Joint Significance 
   
15.76*** 
Hansen J Statistic  
   
1.761 
Endogeneity Test (Difference in 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics)  
   
54.474*** 
Instruments Used in IV (2SLS) 
   
Industry-median 
CEO Deltat-1 
    
Industry-median 
CEO Vegat-1 
    
CFO as VPt-1 






Table 11:  Correlations among Measures of Executive Pay Disparity 
This table reports correlation coefficients of CEO pay gap, CEO pay slice, and Gini cofficient. 
CEO pay gap measures the dollar gap between CEO's pay and median pay of second-tier 
executives. CEO pay slice measures the percentage of total compensation of all top executives 
captured by CEO. Gini coefficient measures the pay inequity among the top executives.  ***, ** 
and * denote the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 CEO Pay Gap CEO Pay Slice Gini Coefficient 
CEO Pay Gap 1   
CEO Pay Slice 0.3381*** 1  










































Information asymmetry, as a form of market friction, restricts information flow on  a 
firm's activities, creates difficulties for the market to assess the true value of a firm, and makes it 
easier for the managers to conceal their entrenchment activities. As a result, prior literature 
documents evidence that information asymmetry is negatively related to firm value 
(Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009), and Barth, 
Konchitchki and Landsman (2013)). In another word, there exists an information asymmetry 
discount in firm value. In this study, we explore mergers & acquisitions (M&A) as a possible 
channel to capture the information asymmetry discount in the targets. Acquisitions are among the 
largest and most significant investments made by a firm. Acquirers need to go through a 
thorough due diligence process to obtain and verify both public and private information about the 
targets (Lajoux and Elson (2000)). Meanwhile, M&A announcements can stir public interests in 
the targets and encourage investors to gather more information about the targets. The careful 
scrutiny by the market and the acquirer on the targets can release large amounts of relevant 
information about the targets, and as a result, M&A announcements can potentially alleviate the 
information asymmetry discount in the targets. Empirically, we examine this conjecture by 
testing whether there are wealth gains at  M&A announcements that are related to target 
information asymmetry.  
Measuring information asymmetry is a difficult task because the true level of information 
asymmetry cannot be directly observed and there is no consensus over which proxy best capture 
the true level of information asymmetry. Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) suggest a novel 
measure of information asymmetry by employing factor analysis to produce an aggregate 
information asymmetry factor from eight information asymmetry proxies and find that the 
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information asymmetry factor is positively related to lockup periods of seasonal equity offerings. 
We extend the analysis by Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) and apply factor analysis to 
construct one information asymmetry factor using ten well-documented information asymmetry 
proxy variables. These variables include number of analyst following the firm, firm size, firm 
age, tangible assets, average bid-ask spread, abnormal accruals, return volatility, analyst forecast 
error, analyst forecast dispersion and Amihud.   
Adopting this novel measure of information asymmetry, we begin our analysis by 
exploring the relation between the information asymmetry factor and firm value. As expected, 
we find that controlling for different sets of firm characteristics, the information asymmetry 
factor remains significantly positively related to cost of equity, cost of debt, and negatively 
related to Tobin's Q, confirming the findings by prior literature that there exists an information 
asymmetry discount in firm value (Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) and Barth, Konchitchki and 
Landsman (2013)).  
After establishing the existence of information asymmetry discount, we proceed to 
explore whether M&A announcements, which are usually accompanied with release of large 
amounts of information about the targets, can serve as a mechanism to mitigate information 
asymmetry discount in the targets.  Empirically, we examine the relation between M&A 
announcement-period wealth effects and target information asymmetry factor. Using a sample of 
543 completed M&A deals of public targets from 1990 to 2014, we find strong evidence 
supporting our conjecture in that there are significantly positive M&A announcement-period 
wealth gains related to target information asymmetry factor. Specifically, we find that target-
acquirer value-weighted portfolio announcement-period abnormal returns, acquirer 
announcement-period abnormal returns, target announcement-period abnormal returns, and 
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target premium all increase significantly with target information asymmetry factor. According to 
our estimate, one standard deviation increase in the target information asymmetry factor 
increases the acquirer (target) shareholder value by 43 million (10.55 million) dollars based on 
the median market capitalization of the acquirer (target)
6
. Our findings suggest both targets and 
acquirers benefit from the positive wealth creation arising from the acquisitions of opaque targets.   
We investigate alternative explanations of the positive wealth gains from the target 
information asymmetry. One possible explanation is that the acquirer information asymmetry, 
instead of the target information asymmetry, is the contributor to the wealth gains. For example, 
there exists a transparency synergy for acquisitions by transparent acquirers. Or simply, the 
transparent acquirers make better acquisitions. We thus include acquirer information asymmetry 
into the analysis and all of our initial findings regarding the wealth gains and target information 
asymmetry factor continue to hold, suggesting acquirer information asymmetry does not appear 
to be responsible for our findings. Corporate governance literature (Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007)) suggest corporate governance variables such as board characteristics and corporate 
governance indices can  significantly impact M&A performance. To ensure that the positive 
wealth gains related to target information asymmetry are not due to better governance by either 
acquirers or targets, we control for the governance variables, including board size, independent 
board percent, CEO/chairman duality, and BCF index, of both acquirers and targets in the 
analysis. We find that the inclusion of corporate governance variables doesn't alter the 
significantly positive relation between the wealth gains and target information asymmetry factor, 
excluding corporate governance as the possible explanation for wealth creation related to target 
                                                            
6 The acquirer dollar gain is calculated by multiplying the product of coefficient estimate of target information 
asymmetry on acquirer CAR (0.0211) and the target information asymmetry standard deviation (0.75) by the median 
acquirer market capitalization (2,714 million dollars). The target dollar gain is estimated by the same manner.  
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information asymmetry. Post-merger operating performance improvement is considered as 
another possible reason for the announcement-period wealth creation in the M&A literature 
(Wang and Xie (2009)). We therefore investigate whether purchasing opaque targets leads to 
better post-merger operating performance. Following Wang and Xie (2009), we measure the 
change in the operating performance as the difference in performance-adjusted ROA of the 
acquirer and the target as a combined firm one-year prior to the acquisition to one-year, two-year, 
and three-year after the acquisition. We adjust the ROA of acquirer (target) by the ROA of 
industry-and-ROA matched firm of the acquirer (target).  We find no significant relation between 
the performance improvement post-merger and target information asymmetry factor. This 
finding precludes operating efficiency as the alternative explanation for the wealth gains related 
to target information asymmetry.  
We next investigate if the wealth gains arising from target information asymmetry 
incentivize firms to purchase targets with high information asymmetry. Following Bena and Li 
(2014), we form three different control samples that are randomly drawn, drawn by industry- and 
size-matching, or drawn by industry-, size-, and book-to-market ratio-matching. Using the three 
pools of control firms, we estimate the target selection likelihood by conditional logit model. We 
find that across all three control samples, firms with high level of information asymmetry are 
more likely to become targets. Given the massive wealth gains arising from purchasing targets 
with high information asymmetry, this finding is not surprising and further confirms the prior 
literature on the relation between acquisition synergies and M&A decisions (Betton, Eckbo, and 
Thorburn (2008)).   
 Another noteworthy aspect is how information asymmetry affects the bargaining power 
between the acquirer and the target. We measure relative gain of the target versus the acquirer as 
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the difference between target announcement-period abnormal dollar gains and acquirer 
announcement-period abnormal dollar gains scaled by the sum of market capitalization of the 
acquirer and the target. We find that target captures significantly smaller gains than the acquirer 
if there is high target information asymmetry. In addition, we find that target's relative gains 
increase in the acquirer information asymmetry. These two findings indicate that the information 
asymmetry indeed impact the relative bargaining power between the acquirer and the target and 
the party with high information asymmetry is in a weaker position when negotiating the deal.    
At last, we investigate if certain deal characteristics can be influenced by the target 
information asymmetry. One notable characteristics variable closely associated with target 
information asymmetry is the method of payment. Hansen (1987) theorizes that stock offers 
dominate cash offers when there is high level of target information asymmetry so the target is 
forced to share the risk of acquirer overpaying. To empirically examine the influence of target 
information asymmetry level on the choice of method of payment, we estimate a probit model 
with all-cash dummy as the dependent variable. We find that there exists a significantly negative 
relation between target information asymmetry level and the likelihood of all-cash financed 
acquisitions, suggesting acquirers tend to finance the deals with stocks when facing high level of 
information asymmetry in the targets. This finding corroborates the risk-sharing hypothesis 
proposed by Hansen (1987). Another deal characteristics variable receives wide attention in the 
literature is diversifying versus focus acquisitions. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
document that there is wealth gained from a spin-off that improves focus when there is high level 
of information asymmetry about a firm. Their findings suggest greater focus can mitigate 
information asymmetry, leading to higher firm value. In this study, we empirically examine 
whether target information asymmetry will bias the firms towards value-increasing focused 
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acquisitions using a probit model. We define acquisitions as diversifying if targets and acquirers 
belong to different industries defined by two-digit SIC codes. We find that target information 
asymmetry is associated with higher likelihood of focused acquisitions, complementing the 
findings by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999). Moreover, we investigate if target 
information asymmetry also affects relative deal size, measured by the ratio of deal value to 
acquirer market capitalization. We find significant negative relation between target information 
asymmetry and relative deal size, indicating that acquisitions of targets with high information 
asymmetry often involves targets that are relatively smaller in size. This finding is not surprising 
given the uncertainty involved in acquisitions of targets with high information asymmetry. The 
last aspect we examine if and how target information asymmetry impacts deal closure time, the 
number of days it takes to complete the deals, measured as the difference between announcement 
dates and effective dates. We find that higher target information asymmetry is associated with 
shorter deal closure time, possibly because of the thorough preliminary due diligence performed 
on the target with high information asymmetry prior to the deal announcements. Unfortunately, 
we don't have any data available to further test on this conjecture.    
Our paper makes two contributions to the current literature. First, by adopting a 
composite measure initially proposed by Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013), we further confirm 
the existence of information asymmetry discount. More importantly, we provide evidence that 
M&A can serve as a channel to release the information asymmetry discount in the targets. We 
examine the information-discovery aspect of M&A that is rarely discussed in the literature. 
Second, by identifying the significant relations between target information asymmetry and 
various aspects of M&A including announcement-period wealth effects, target selection choice, 
relative dollar gains of the target versus the acquirer, and certain deal characteristics, we 
74 
 
contribute to the extensive literature on the possible determinants of M&A performance. 
Interestingly, we provide our alternative explanation to the well-documented positive wealth 
effects when purchasing private targets. Our evidence indicates that apart from the liquidity 
effect suggested by Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), information asymmetry in the targets 
can also lead to the positive wealth gains in the M&A.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 
describes the data and variables used in our analysis. Section 4 reports our empirical findings and 
discussions. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review  
Our study builds on the extensive literature on information asymmetry. The first aspect of 
information asymmetry is its relation with firm value. Current literature provides overwhelming 
evidence from various aspects that information asymmetry negatively impacts firm value. Barth, 
Konchitchiki, and Landsman (2013) document that earnings transparency is negatively 
associated with cost of equity. Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) show that founders and heirs 
exploit firm opacity to extract private benefits, leading to lower firm value. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) find that there is value gained from corporate spin-off decisions that 
mitigate information asymmetry.   
Another aspect of information asymmetry is how to capture the information asymmetry 
level of a firm. Current literature has proposed numerous measures. For example, Barth, 
Konchitchiki, and Landsman (2013) use the explanatory power (R
2
) of the return-earnings 
regressions. Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) instead construct an opacity index based on the 
ranks of four individual proxies of information asymmetry: trading volume, bid-ask spread, 
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analysts following and analysts forecast errors. In our study, we follow the procedure proposed 
by Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013). They use factor analysis to construct an information 
asymmetry factor based on eight common measures of information asymmetry. The eight 
measures are firm size, firm age, number of analysts, tangible assets, number of prior stock 
offers, average bid-ask spread, return volatility, and abnormal accruals. They argue that the 
factor analysis incorporates the correlated information in these eight measures without inducing 
the multicollinarity or attenuation bias. They find that their information asymmetry factor is 
positively related to the likelihood and the duration of an seasoned equity offerings lockup.  
The last aspect of information asymmetry literature that is closely related to our research 
is the studies of the target's information asymmetry in the M&A. Hansen (1987) suggests that if 
there is greater uncertainty of target valuation, the acquirer should use stock for acquisition. In 
addition, Fuller,Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)) show that acquirers experience significantly 
positive returns when acquiring private targets but significantly negative returns when 
purchasing public targets and their interpretation is that acquirers capture the liquidity discount 
in the private targets. They propose liquidity effect as the possible explanation for the positive 
wealth gains. In our study, we extend their work and examine the validity of an information 
asymmetry explanation. We control for the liquidity effect by focusing exclusively on the public 
targets, which allows us to directly test the wealth effects related to target information 
asymmetry. 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1. Information Asymmetry Factor 
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Measuring information asymmetry is a difficult task because the true level of information 
asymmetry cannot be directly observed. Prior literature has proposed numerous proxies to 
measure information asymmetry. Yet, there is no consensus over which proxy best capture the 
true level of information asymmetry. Moreover, these proxies sometimes produce inconsistent 
even contradictory results. Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) circumvent this debate by using 
factor analysis that produces an aggregate measure of information asymmetry from several 
information asymmetry proxies. They also discuss two alternative approaches. One approach is 
to include all relevant proxies into the analysis. However, this approach can induce 
multicollinearity or attenuation bias. Another approach is to construct an equal-weighted index 
from various information asymmetry proxies. Two shortcomings are associated with this 
approach: The first shortcoming is that it arbitrarily assigned equal weight to each measure and 
another shortcoming is that units of measurement of each proxy can significantly affect the 
results. Therefore, a composite measure from factor analysis so far appears to be the most 
suitable approach.    
We extend the analysis by Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) and apply factor analysis to 
construct one information asymmetry factor using 10 well-documented information asymmetry 
proxies. These proxies are described as follows: 
 Number of analyst following the firm (Barth et al. (2001), Frankel and Li (2004), and 
Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013)): taken from I/B/E/S database, averaged over the year prior to 
the acquisition announcements; 
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Firm age (Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) and Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013)): 
measured as the number of years between the firm's IPO year and the year prior to the 
acquisition announcements;  
Firm size (Hong et al.(2000), Leary and Roberts (2010), and Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis 
(2013)): measured as the natural log of the book value of total assets in the year prior to the 
acquisition announcements;  
 Tangible assets (Leary and Roberts (2010) and Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013)): 
measured as property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets in the year prior to the 
acquisition announcements; 
 Average bid-ask spread (Clarke and Shastri (2000) and Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis 
(2013)): calculated as the average daily bid-ask spread over closing price over the year prior to 
the acquisition announcements;  
 Abnormal accruals (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) and Karpoff, Lee, and, 
Masulis (2013)): calculated based on Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) model as the absolute 
value of the difference between firm-specific abnormal accruals and median abnormal accruals 
of its corresponding industry- and performance- matched portfolio in the year prior to the 
acquisition announcements; 
 Return volatility (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis 




 Analyst forecast error (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Brown, Hillegeist, 
and Lo(2009)): calculated as the absolute value of the difference between mean earnings per 
share forecast and the actual earnings per share over the price, averaged over the year prior to the 
acquisition announcements;   
 Analyst forecast dispersion (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) and Leary and 
Roberts (2010)): calculated as the standard deviation of the earnings per share over the price, 
averaged over the year prior to the acquisition announcements;   
 Amihud (Amihud(2002)): a measure of price impact per dollar of trade, calculated as 
daily average of the ratio of absolute value of daily stock return to daily trading volume over 
year prior to the acquisition announcements; 
According to prior literature, the first 4 variables are expected to be negatively related to 
a firm's information asymmetry level whereas the remaining 6 variables are expected to be 
positively related to information asymmetry. Panel A of Table 1 reports the factor loadings of the 
first three factors using factor analysis based on the 10 variables. The sample contains 41,570 
observations from 1989 to 2013. The eigenvalues of the first three factors are 1.53, 0.56, and 
0.13 respectively, suggesting the first factor captures substantial amount of variation in the 10 
information asymmetry proxy variables. Similar to Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013), the signs 
of the factor loadings of the 10 variables in the first factor are opposite to the predicted signs 
between these variables and information asymmetry, indicating that the factor represents 
"information symmetry" characteristics of the firm. Following Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013), 
we multiply this factor by -1 to convert it to information asymmetry factor.   
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Panel B of Table 1 describes the time series distribution of the information asymmetry 
factor. The time series distribution of both the mean and the median of our information 
asymmetry factor exhibit clear descending trend from 1989 to 2013 and change from positive to 
negative in 2003,  indicating that the firms become more transparent over the years. 
3.2. Sample Selection 
We obtain our original acquisition sample from Thomson One Banker. We impose the 
following criteria in sample selection: 
1, Both acquirer and target are US firms. 
2, The acquisitions are announced between 01/01/1990 and 12/31/2014. 
3, The deal value is more than $1 million. 
4, The acquisition is completed. 
5, The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target's share prior to the acquisition 
announcements and more than 50% after the transaction. 
6, Both acquirer and target have financial statement information from Compustat and 
stock returns data from CRSP. 
7,  Both acquirer and target have information asymmetry factor. 
Consequently, we end up with 543 M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. Table 2 
presents distribution by announcement year of our sample of acquisitions. The number of 
announcements jumps notably from 1997 to 1998, peaks in 1999, and significantly declines in 
2000, reflecting the general trend documented by Wang and Xie (2009). The impact of financial 
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crisis can be seen in the acquirer and target sizes. The market capitalizations of both acquirer and 
target decline significantly in 2008. In every year over the entire sample period, the median 
acquirer information asymmetry factor is lower than the median target information asymmetry 
factor, indicating that acquirer is persistently more transparent than the target.  
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. The mean 
(median) of information asymmetry score for the full sample in Panel A is 0.00 (0.09). For the 
M&A subsample in Panel C, the mean (median) information asymmetry factor drops to -0.68 (-
0.612 for the acquirers, indicating that the acquirers are more transparent than firms in the 
overall sample. Meanwhile, the mean (median) information asymmetry score for the target is 
0.31 (0.45), suggesting that targets are tend to be more opaque than firms in the overall sample. 
We compute the 5-day acquirer (target) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the (-
2,2) window surrounding the announcement date as the primary measure of wealth effects during 
the M&A announcement periods
7
. We obtain announcement dates from Thomson One Banker. 
To calculate the abnormal returns, we use CRSP equally weighted return as the market return 
with parameters estimated over 200 days ending at day -11 of the announcement date (day 0). 
The 5-day target-acquirer portfolio abnormal returns (portfolio CAR(-2,2)) are weighted-average 
5-day abnormal returns of the target and the acquirer with the weights being the market 
capitalization of the target and the acquirer 11 trading days prior to the announcement dates. 
Consistent with existing literature on the wealth effects during acquisition announcement periods 
(Wang and Xie (2009)), we document positive abnormal returns for the targets with mean 
(median) 5-day target CAR to be 25.24% (22.23%), negative abnormal returns for the acquirers 
                                                            




with mean (median) 5-day acquirer CAR to be -1.59% (-1.52%), and positive 5-day target-
acquirer portfolio abnormal returns with mean (median) 5-day portfolio CAR to be 1.74% 
(1.18%).  To better capture the wealth effects experienced by the target shareholders, we further 
include premium into the analysis. Premium is premium of offer price to target trading price one 
week prior to the announcement date as reported in Thomson One Banker. The mean (median) 
premium in our sample is 36.93% (34.04%).   
4. Empirical Findings and Discussions 
4.1. Information Asymmetry Factor and Firm Value 
It has been established in the literature that information asymmetry is negatively related 
to firm value (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009), and 
Barth, Konchitchki and Landsman (2013)). However, these studies don't have consensus over the 
measures of information asymmetry. In our study, we follow Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013) 
and use factor analysis that aggregates the common information contained in 10 different 
measures of information asymmetry to construct an information asymmetry factor. We start our 
analysis by examining the relation between our information asymmetry factor and firm value. To 
systematically gauge the effect of information asymmetry factor on firm value, we investigate 
three different aspects of firm value: cost of equity, cost of debt, and Tobin's Q. According the 
extensive literature on information asymmetry in corporate finance, information asymmetry 
makes it difficult for outside investors to correctly assess the true economic activities of the firm 
and is often associated with higher agency costs. Thus, if our information asymmetry factor 
accurately captures the extent of information asymmetry in a firm, we should observe cost of 
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equity and cost of debt increase in the information asymmetry factor while Tobin's Q decreases 
in the information asymmetry factor.  
Table 4 presents our findings on the association between firm value and information 
asymmetry factor. Panel A reports OLS regression results of expected cost of equity on 
information asymmetry factor controlling for year and two-digit SIC code industry fixed effects. 
We estimate expected cost of equity following Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013).  For 
each firm, we first estimate the factor betas associated with the firm's return by estimating the 
following monthly time-series regression using the 60-month returns prior to year t: 
                                                    
                (1) 
where           is the firm's monthly return in excess of risk-free return.           is 
the monthly return of market portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate.      ,             
are the size, book-to-market, and momentum factor portfolio returns extracted from French's data 
library
8
. We use         ,         ,        ,and          to denote the estimated betas from (1). We 
then place the estimated betas in the following equation to calculate the expected cost of equity 
for firm i: 
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where        
              
 
            ,            , and             are the expected annual factor returns for year t+1, 
which we estimate by first calculating the average of the 60 monthly factor returns prior to 




month m and then compounding the resulting monthly returns over 12 months prior to year t. 
Column (1) reports the impact of information asymmetry factor on the expected cost of equity 
excluding other fundamental risk characteristics. As predicted, the coefficient estimate of 
information asymmetry factor is positive and significant at 1% level. In column (2), we further 
include the fundamental risk characteristics variables including leverage, book-to-market ratio, 
market capitalization, market beta, and return momentum. The coefficient estimate of 
information asymmetry factor remains positively significant at 1% level. In terms of economic 
impact, a one standard deviation increase in information asymmetry factor results in 0.045 
standard deviation increase in the cost of equity. Our findings indicate that information 
asymmetry factor contains incremental information to those already contained in these 
fundamental risk characteristics variables. Additionally, we find that expected cost of equity 
decreases in the book-to-market ratio and increases in leverage, market beta, and return 
momentum, consistent with the predictions made by Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013).    
 Panel B of Table 4 examines the relation between information asymmetry factor and cost 
of debt for new debt issues controlling for year and industry fixed effects. We obtain data on new 
debt issues from SDC Platinum database. Cost of debt is measured as the yield spread between 
yield to maturity of new debt issues and yield of maturity of benchmark Treasury Bonds with 
similar maturity. Cost of debt reflects bond investors' assessment of lending risk. Since 
information asymmetry clouds bond investors' ability to evaluate the lending risk, we expect that 
the risk premium demanded by bond investors should increase in the level of information 
asymmetry within a firm. Column (1) presents the regression results using information 
asymmetry factor as the only explanatory variable while column (2) further includes other 
control variables that can potentially impact cost of debt. In both columns, the coefficient 
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estimates of information asymmetry factor are positively significant. In column (1), the 
coefficient estimate of information asymmetry factor is 1.2062, significantly at 1% level while 
the coefficient estimate of information asymmetry factor decreases in magnitude to 0.2455 in 
column (2) but remains significant at 1% level. Using the coefficient estimate of information 
asymmetry factor in column (2), we estimate that one standard deviation increase in information 
asymmetry factor is associated with 0.19 standard deviation increase in the cost of debt. The 
findings indicate that bond investors demand higher risk premium in response to high level of 
information asymmetry within the issuing firm. In terms of control variables, consistent with 
existing literature, we find that cost of debt increases in book-to-market ratio, return risk, and 
leverage while decreases in the firm's size as proxied by sales
9
, interest coverage, Altman Z-
score, and issue size.    
So far, we document that information asymmetry factor is associated with higher cost of 
equity and cost of debt. In Panel C of Table 4, we directly gauge the impact of information 
asymmetry factor on firm value. We measure firm value by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q where 
Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of market value of total assets to the book value of total assets 
and industry-adjusted Tobin's Q is calculated by subtracting industry median Tobin's Q from the 
firm's Tobin's Q. In column (1), we control for some basic firm characteristics variables such as 
size proxied by sales, Delaware incorporation, S&P inclusion, and leverage, whereas in column 
(2), we further control for other variables documented by prior literature that can potentially 
influence Tobin's Q including capital to sales, R&D to capital, advertising to capital, and 
dividend yield. In both model specifications, we report significantly negative coefficient 
estimates of information asymmetry factor. The coefficient estimate of information asymmetry 
                                                            
9 Because total assets are used in factor analysis to estimate the information asymmetry factor. To avoid 
multicollinearity issue, we use sales to proxy for size in the firm value regressions.   
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factor is -0.2404 in the first model specification and -0.2606 in the second model specification 
and both are significant at 1% level. Coefficient estimate of information asymmetry factor in 
column (2) suggests that one standard deviation increase in the information asymmetry factor 
results in 0.11 standard deviation decrease in industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. In terms of control 
variables, we find that industry-adjusted Tobin's Q is positively related to Delaware 
incorporation , SP 500 inclusion, capital-to-sales ratio, and R&D-to-capital ratio and negatively 
related to size and leverage. The overall findings regarding cost of equity, cost of debt, and 
Tobin's Q confirm the existence of an information asymmetry discount in firm value. In the 
subsequent sections, we examine the possibility of M&A serves as a channel to recover 
information asymmetry discount in the targets by testing whether there exists M&A wealth gains 
associated with target's information asymmetry factor. We argue that since targets of M&A 
announcements usually go through careful scrutiny by the acquirer and the market, M&A 
announcements can reveal large amounts of information about the targets. As a result, M&A 
announcements can lessen  information asymmetry level in the targets, and unlock their 
information asymmetry discount.  
4.2.Target Information Asymmetry Factor and Target-acquirer Portfolio Abnormal 
Returns 
In the previous section, we establish the existence of information asymmetry discount 
using our information asymmetry factor. We conjecture that M&A announcements can serve as a 
mechanism to unlock the target information asymmetry discount because M&A announcements 
can lead to the release of large amounts of information about the targets due to careful scrutiny 
of the targets by the acquirer and the market. In this section, we examine the total M&A 
announcement-period wealth effects related to target information asymmetry. If M&A serves as 
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a mechanism to unlock target information asymmetry discount, we expect to find significant 
M&A announcement-period total wealth gains related to target information asymmetry. We 
measure the overall M&A announcement-period market reaction by value-weighted target-
acquirer portfolio 5-day abnormal returns (portfolio CAR (-2,2)) in which the weights are 
determined by the market capitalization of the target (acquirer) 11 trading days prior to the 
announcement dates. Table 5 reports the results from the total wealth effects regressions. In 
column (1), the only explanatory variable is target information asymmetry factor and thus avoids 
any potential collinearity between target information asymmetry factor and other control 
variables. In column (2), we include the acquirer and deal characteristics variables into the 
analysis. In column (3), we further control for the target characteristics variables. We control for 
the year and industry fixed effects in all three columns. In column (1),  the coefficient estimate of 
target information asymmetry factor is 0.0248 and significant at 1% level, while in column (2),  
the coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry factor is 0.0284 and significant at 1% 
level, and at last in column (3), the coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry factor is 
0.0256 and significant at 5% level. Using the coefficient estimate in column (3), we find that 
portfolio total abnormal returns increase by 1.92% per one standard deviation increase in target 
information asymmetry factor. Or in dollar terms, one standard deviation increase in target 
information asymmetry factor results in 57 million abnormal dollar gains in total wealth shared 
by target and acquirer shareholders based on the median market capitalization of the targets and 
acquirers
10
. Our findings confirm that target information asymmetry indeed is associated with 
positive total wealth creation during the M&A announcement period. In addition, we find that 
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 we multiply the product of coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry factor in column (3) 
and standard deviation of target information asymmetry by the sum of the median market capitalization of 




the portfolio abnormal returns increase in acquirer's Tobin's Q and decreases in target's Tobin's Q, 
consistent with the evidence documented by Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989).  
4.3.Target Information Asymmetry Factor and Acquirer Abnormal Returns 
In this section we examine whether acquirers benefit from the information discovery 
aspect of M&A by examining the relation between acquirer market reaction and target 
information asymmetry. We measure acquirer market reaction by acquirer 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) during the (-2,2) window surrounding the announcement date. Table 6 
presents the results of OLS regressions of acquirer 5-day abnormal returns on target information 
asymmetry factor controlling for year and industry fixed effects. In column (1) we only include 
target information asymmetry factor as the explanatory variable, the coefficient estimate of 
which is 0.0327 and significant at 1% level. In column (2), we include acquirer and deal 
characteristics variables. The coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry factor 
decreases to 0.0215 but remains significant at 5% level. Finally, in column (3), we control for 
target, acquirer, and deal characteristics variables. The coefficient estimate of target information 
asymmetry factor is 0.0211 and still significant at 5% level. In terms of economic significance of 
target information asymmetry factor on acquirer returns, based on the coefficient estimate of 
target information asymmetry in column (3), we calculate that acquirer abnormal returns increase 
by 1.58% in response to one standard deviation increase in target information asymmetry. This 
multiplying the median acquirer market capitalization of 2,714 million dollars yields 
approximately 43 million abnormal dollar gains. Our findings indicate acquirer shareholders 
benefit greatly from acquisitions of firms with high information asymmetry. In addition, we find 
that acquirers experience higher abnormal returns in acquisitions made by smaller acquirers or in  
acquisitions financed all by cash, consistent with the findings by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007).   
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4.4.Target Information Asymmetry Factor, Target Abnormal Returns, and Premium 
The findings so far confirm that the acquisitions of targets with high information 
asymmetry result in massive wealth gains in M&A, benefiting acquirer shareholders. In this 
section, we examine whether the target shareholders also benefit. To better capture the wealth 
effects experienced by the target shareholders, additional to target abnormal returns, we further 
include premium into the analysis. Premium is premium of offer price to target trading price one 
week prior to the announcement date. Column (1) and (2) of Table 7 report the effects of target 
information asymmetry factor on target abnormal returns while column (3) and (4) report the 
effects of target information asymmetry factor on premium. In column (1) and (3), we only 
include target information asymmetry factor as the explanatory variable. In column (2) and (4), 
we further control for target, acquirer, and deal characteristics. The results across all four 
columns show the positive effects of target information asymmetry on target shareholder wealth. 
The coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry factor in column (1) is 0.074 and 
significant at 1% level, in column (2) is 0.0569 and significant at 5% level, in column (3) is 
0.0892 and significant at 1% level, and in column (4) is 0.1250 and significant at 1% level. In 
terms of economic significance, the estimates in column (2) and (4) indicate that one standard 
deviation increase in target information asymmetry factor leads to 4.27% increase in target 
abnormal returns and 9.38% increase in premium. Using median target capitalization of 247 
million dollars, we calculate the abnormal dollar impact of one standard deviation of target 
information asymmetry factor is 10.55 million dollars. In terms of the control variables, we find 
that target abnormal returns increase in acquirer's Tobin's Q and decrease in target's Tobin's Q. 
Premium decreases in target size and increases in target leverage. 
4.5.Controlling for Acquirer Information Asymmetry 
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So far our results suggest that acquisitions of targets with high information asymmetry 
lead to significantly positive M&A announcement-period wealth gains and the gains are shared 
by both acquirer and target. We conjecture that the release of target information asymmetry 
discount should be attributed to the wealth creation. However, there are alternative explanations 
to the positive wealth effects. One alternative explanation is that the acquirer, instead of the 
target, information asymmetry is the reason for the wealth creation. There are two ways that 
transparent acquirers can create value. One is that transparent acquirers are easier to monitor and 
less inflicted with agency costs. Thus, they are simply better or more efficient at target selection. 
Alternatively, there could exist a transparency synergy in the acquisitions in which transparent 
acquirers improve the transparency level in the targets, creating more value. In either cases, the 
acquirer information asymmetry should play a more dominant role than the target information 
asymmetry, and its inclusion should greatly weaken our previous findings regarding the wealth 
effects related to the target information asymmetry. In this section, we investigate the validity of 
the acquirer information asymmetry argument by including acquirer information asymmetry 
factor into the analysis. Table 8 reports the results controlling for acquirer information 
asymmetry factor. The coefficient estimates of target information asymmetry factor on target-
acquirer portfolio abnormal returns, acquirer abnormal returns, target abnormal returns, and 
premium all remain significantly positive, showing that the inclusion of acquirer information 
asymmetry factor doesn't materially impact our previous findings. Specifically, according to 
column (1) of Table 8, the coefficient of target information asymmetry on target-acquirer 
portfolio abnormal returns is 0.0181, significant at 10% level. Compared to the original 
coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry at 0.0256, significant at 5% level reported 
in column (3) of Table 5. The inclusion of acquirer information asymmetry does weaken our 
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original finding on the positive aggregate value effect of target information asymmetry. But the 
impacts of target information asymmetry on the rest of dependent variables remain at the same 
magnitude and significance level as those reported in Table 6 and Table 7. These findings 
suggest that acquirer information asymmetry cannot fully explain the positive wealth gains 
related to target information asymmetry. Interestingly, the acquirer information asymmetry factor 
does significantly impact acquirer abnormal returns. The coefficient estimate of acquirer 
information asymmetry is on acquirer abnormal returns is -0.0417, significant at 1% level. The 
significantly negative relation between acquirer abnormal returns and acquirer information 
asymmetry factor indicates that transparent acquirers make better acquisitions. Note that the 
negative association between acquirer information asymmetry and acquirer abnormal returns 
suggests that the M&A information-release aspect for the target doesn't apply to the acquirer.     
4.6.Controlling for Corporate Governance 
Literature documents corporate governance can contribute significantly to the firm's 
overall performance and investment efficiency. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) show that 
various corporate governance mechanisms, especially the corporate governance indices, can 
significantly impact the acquirer M&A announcement-period abnormal returns. Wang and Xie 
(2009) report that there exists a corporate governance synergy in that when the acquirer has 
better corporate governance than the target, the acquisition can improve the target's corporate 
governance, generating greater total shareholder value for both acquirer and target. In this 
section, we examine whether our previously documented relation between the M&A wealth 
effects and target information asymmetry can be explained by the corporate governance of the 
acquirer and the target. Table 9 presents the regression results controlling for corporate 
governance variables. We control for two different sets of corporate governance variables: board 
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characteristics and the corporate governance index (BCF index
11
). Because the board 
characteristics data are available from 1996 and BCF index is available from 1990, we regress 
them separately to maintain the maximum number of observations. The board characteristics 
variables include board size, independent board percentage, CEO/Chairman duality. Column (1), 
(3), (5), and (7) report the effects of target information asymmetry on portfolio abnormal returns, 
acquirer abnormal returns, target abnormal returns and, premium after controlling for board 
characteristics respectively. Compared to the original coefficient estimates of target information 
asymmetry reported in Table 5, 6, and 7, the effect of target information asymmetry on target 
premium weakens slightly but remains significantly positive at 5% level while the effects of 
target information asymmetry on the remaining variables stay qualitatively  same in both 
magnitude and significance level. In terms of the corporate governance index, we control for 
BCF index and target-acquirer BCF difference to capture the effects of acquirer shareholder 
rights and shareholder rights transfer from the acquirer to the target. Column (2), (4), (6), and (8) 
report the effects of target information asymmetry on portfolio abnormal returns, acquirer 
abnormal returns, target abnormal returns and, premium after controlling for corporate 
governance index effect respectively. The impact of target information asymmetry on portfolio 
abnormal returns after controlling for corporate governance index effect remains positive and 
becomes more significant. Meanwhile, the impact of target information asymmetry on acquirer 
abnormal returns after controlling for corporate governance index effect stays the same in 
magnitude but becomes significant only at 10% level. At last, the impacts of target information 
asymmetry on target abnormal returns and premium after controlling for corporate governance 
index effect remain qualitatively the same in both magnitude and significance level. Our findings 
                                                            
11 ISS (formerly RiskMetrics) changes their data gathering practice after 2006, which unfortunately fails to provide 
enough information to construct the GIM index, which is used by Wang and Xie (2008).  
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indicate that corporate governance can't explain the positive M&A wealth effect arising from 
target information asymmetry. Finally, the regression results show that only target board size has 
a significantly positive relation with target abnormal returns while the rest of the corporate 
governance variables are not significant. The discrepancy between our findings and the findings 
by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) could be because of the different samples we use. Our sample 
includes only public targets while sample employed by Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) includes 
private, subsidiary, and public targets.  
4.7. Long-term Operating Performance Change and Target Information Asymmetry 
We conjecture that the positive wealth creation from target information asymmetry factor 
during the M&A announcement periods arises from the release of the information asymmetry 
discount in the targets. If so, the gains should be one-time gains. However, it is possible the 
announcement-period gains reflect the market expectation of long-term operating performance 
improvement in acquiring the opaque targets. We therefore investigate the if the acquisitions of  
targets with high information asymmetry results in the long-term operating performance 
improvement. Following Wang and Xie (2009), we measure the operating performance 
improvement by the change in return on assets (ROA) of the acquirer and the target as a 
combined firm from prior to the acquisition to three years after the acquisition. We adjust the 
ROA of the acquirer (target) by the ROA of acquirer's (target's) pre-merger performance- and 
industry- matching firm. We select the control firm of the acquirer (target) first by matching by 
two-digit SIC codes and then we choose from the industry-matching firms the firm that has 
closest pre-merger ROA with the acquirer (target). We combine the control firm of the target 
with the control firm of the acquirer to form an imaginary combined firm where the weights are 
determined by the total assets. We adjust the pre-merger ROA, one-year, two-year, three-year 
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post-merger ROA of the merged firm by the imaginary combined firm and calculate the change 
in the adjusted ROA from pre-merger to one-year, two-year, and three-year post-merger. Table 
10 reports the regression results. We don't find any significant relation between target 
information asymmetry factor and changes in performance-adjusted ROA over the three years. 
We therefore can exclude the performance operating efficiency improvement as the alternative 
explanation for the wealth gains related to target information asymmetry during M&A 
announcements.  
4.8. Information Asymmetry and Target Selection 
We have identified that there exist significant wealth gains related to target information 
asymmetry during M&A announcement period, which we attribute to the release of the 
information asymmetry discount in the targets. We preclude the acquirer information asymmetry, 
corporate governance, and long-term operating performance efficiency improvement as the 
alternative explanations. In this section, we examine whether the wealth gains can motivate the 
target selection choice. Bena and Li (2014) argue that synergies can drive the M&A decisions. 
Given the massive wealth creation arising from purchasing targets with high information 
asymmetry, we expect information asymmetry can be an important determinants of target 
selection.  To examine the relation between information asymmetry and target selection, we form 
three pools of control sample (Bena and Li (2014)). The first control sample is formed by  5 
firms randomly drawn from the control sample of firms that are not targets or acquirers over the 
three years prior to the acquisition announcements and have information asymmetry factor 
available. The second control sample is formed by 5 industry- and size-matched firms that are 
drawn from the control sample of firms that are not targets or acquirers over the three years prior 
to the acquisition announcements and have information asymmetry factor available. The last 
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control sample is formed by 5 industry-, size-, and book-to-market ratio-matched firms that are 
drawn from the control sample of firms that are not targets or acquirers over the three years prior 
to the acquisition announcements and have information asymmetry factor available. Employing 
the three different pools of control samples, we estimate the effect of information asymmetry on 
target selection choice using a conditional logit model. Table 11 reports the results. Consistent 
with our expectation, across the three different sample pools, we find that consistent evidence 
that firms with high information asymmetry are more likely to be the targets. Additionally, we 
find that firms with higher R&D, higher ROA, cash, and lower stock returns are more likely to 
be chosen as the targets, consistent with evidence presented by Bena and Li (2014). 
4.9. Relative Dollar Gains and Target Information Asymmetry 
In this section, we examine how the division of M&A announcement-period gains 
between the acquirer and the target related to target information asymmetry. According to Ahern 
(2012), the division of gains can indicate the relative bargaining power between the acquirer and 
the target. In this section, we examine how target information asymmetry related to the relative 
gains of the target versus the acquirer. Following Ahern (2012), the relative dollars gains is 
measured as the difference in target 5-day announcement-period dollar gains minus acquirer 5-
day announcement-period dollar gains scaled by the sum of the acquirer market cap and the 
target market cap 50 days prior to the announcement date. Table 12 reports the estimation results. 
We find that target captures significantly smaller gains than the acquirer if there is high target 
information asymmetry. In addition, we find that target's relative gains increase in the acquirer 
information asymmetry. These two findings indicate that the information asymmetry indeed 
impact the relative bargaining power between the acquirer and the target and the party with high 
information asymmetry is in a weaker position when negotiating the deal.    
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4.10. Deal Characteristics and Target Information Asymmetry 
Prior literature documents that certain deal characteristics in M&A are influenced by  
information asymmetry level in the targets. One notable characteristics variable closely 
associated with target information asymmetry is the method of payment. Hansen (1987) 
theorizes that stock offers dominate cash offers when there is high level of target information 
asymmetry so the target is forced to share the risk of acquirer overpaying. To examine the 
influence of target information asymmetry level on the choice of method of payment, we 
estimate a probit model with all-cash dummy as the dependent variable controlling for year and 
industry fixed effects. All-cash dummy takes a value of one if the acquisition is financed entirely 
by cash and zero if the acquisition is financed partly or entirely by stock. Column (1) of Table 13 
reports the estimation results. The coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry factor on 
all-cash dummy is negative (-0.5341) and significant at 1% level, indicating that target 
information asymmetry is associated with higher likelihood of stock-financed acquisitions. This 
finding is consistent with the risk-sharing of acquirer overpaying hypothesis proposed by Hansen 
(1987).  
Another deal characteristics variable receives wide attention in the literature is 
diversifying versus focus acquisitions. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) document that 
there is wealth gained from a spin-off that improves focus when there is high level of 
information asymmetry about a firm. Their findings suggest greater focus can mitigate 
information asymmetry, leading to higher firm value. Meanwhile, diversifying acquisitions are 
often associated with risk-reduction motives. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggests that managers to 
engage in diversifying acquisitions to reduce the exposure to firm-specific risk. we therefore 
empirically examine whether target information asymmetry will bias the firms towards value-
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increasing focused acquisitions or risk-reduction diversifying acquisition using a probit model. 
We define acquisitions as diversifying if targets and acquirers belong to different industries 
defined by two-digit SIC codes. Column (2) of Table 13 reports the estimation results. The 
coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry on diversifying dummy is negative (-0.5048) 
and significant at 5% level. This finding complements the findings by Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) , confirming that firms resort to focus-increasing activities when facing 
high level of information asymmetry. This finding  indicates that better understanding of 
acquirers of their own industry allows them competitive advantage when purchasing opaque 
target in the same industry .  
The third feature we look at in association with target information asymmetry is relative 
deal size. We posit that deals with relative smaller deal size can be better integrated and thus 
target information asymmetry should be associated with smaller relative deal size. We measure 
the relative deal size as the ratio of deal value as reported by Thomson One Banker to acquirer 
market capitalization 11 trading days prior to the announcement dates. Column (3) of Table 13 
reports that the coefficient estimate of target information asymmetry on relative deal size is 
negative (-0.2329) and significant at 1% level, suggesting that targets with high information 
asymmetry are often involved in deals small in size relative to the acquirer market capitalization. 
The last aspect we examine is how target information asymmetry impacts the number of 
days it takes to close the deals, measured as the difference between announcement dates and 
effective dates. Because of the skewness of the distribution of deal closure time, we use the 
logarithm transformation of the variable plus one. We find that target information asymmetry 
negatively affects the deal closure time. We conjecture that the due diligence prior to the official 
announcements of the deals might contribute to this finding. In particular, our untabulated results 
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suggest that this relation concentrates in focused acquisitions, again confirming the information 
advantage of acquisitions of targets in the same industry.  
4.11. Robustness check: 11-day abnormal returns and target information asymmetry 
Our primary measure of M&A announcement-period wealth effects are 5-day cumulative 
abnormal returns during the (-2,2) window surrounding the announcement date. In this section, 
we use the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns during the (-5,5) window surrounding the 
announcement date as the alternative measure of shareholder wealth effects and re-examine how 
target information asymmetry factor impacts shareholder wealth during the M&A announcement 
periods. Table 14 reports the regression results using  the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns. 
We find that our previous findings regarding the relation between target information asymmetry 
factor and target-acquirer portfolio abnormal returns, acquirer abnormal returns, and target 
abnormal returns stay robust. 
5. Conclusion    
In this paper, we study the target information asymmetry as a possible contributor to the 
wealth gains in M&A. We argue that because M&A usually is usually accompanied by large 
amounts of information-gathering on the targets, M&A can serve as a channel to release the 
information asymmetry discount in the targets. Using a novel measure of information asymmetry, 
we first confirm the existence of information asymmetry discount in firm value. We then test the 
relation between M&A wealth effects and target information asymmetry and find that 
significantly positive relations between target information asymmetry and all measures of the 
announcement-period wealth effects including target-acquirer portfolio abnormal returns, 
acquirer abnormal returns, target abnormal returns, and premium. We test and precludes acquirer 
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information asymmetry, corporate governance, and long-term operating performance 
improvement as the alternative explanations of the wealth gains. Our findings confirm the 
information-discovery aspect of M&A. In addition, we find that firms with high information 
asymmetry are more likely to become targets and the bargaining power between the acquirer and 
the target weakens in the party's information asymmetry level. Our probit regressions analysis 
shows that target information asymmetry is associated with higher likelihood of stock-financed 
acquisitions and focused acquisitions. Finally, both the relative deal size and deal closure time 
decrease in the target information asymmetry. In summary, we show that target information 
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Appendix : Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
Panel A: Information Asymmetry Factor and Variables 
Information asymmetry factor The first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-
documented information asymmetry proxy variables, 
multiplying by (-1) 
Number of analyst following 
the firm 
taken from I/B/E/S database, averaged over the year prior to the 
acquisition announcements 
Firm age measured as the number of years between the firm's IPO year 
and the year prior to the acquisition announcements 
Firm size measured as the natural log of the book value of total assets in 
the year prior to the acquisition announcements 
Tangible assets measured as property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets in the year prior to the acquisition announcements 
Average bid-ask spread calculated as the average daily bid-ask spread over closing 
price over the year prior to the acquisition announcements 
Abnormal accruals calculated based on Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) model 
as the absolute value of the difference between firm-specific 
abnormal accruals and median abnormal accruals of its 
corresponding industry- and performance- matched portfolio in 
the year prior to the acquisition announcements 
Return volatility calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over 
the year prior to the acquisition announcements 
Analyst forecast error calculated as the absolute value of the difference between mean 
earnings per share forecast and the actual earnings per share 
over the price, averaged over the year prior to the acquisition 
announcements.   
Analyst forecast dispersion calculated as the standard deviation of the earnings per share 
over the price, averaged over the year prior to the acquisition 
announcements 
Amihud a measure of price impact per dollar of trade, calculated as 
daily average of the ratio of absolute value of daily stock return 
to daily trading volume over year prior to the acquisition 
announcements 
Panel B: Dependent Variables 
Expected cost of equity Estimated based on size, book-to-market, and momentum 
factors (Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013)) 
Cost of debt The yield spread between yield to maturity of new debt issues 
and yield of maturity of benchmark Treasury Bonds with 
similar maturity 
Deal Closure Time Number of days to close the deal, measured as the difference 
between date announced and date effective 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is calculated as market value of assets divided by 
book value of assets, where market value of assets is computed 
as book value of assets less book value of common stock plus 
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the market value of common stock ((item6-
item60+item25*item199)/item6). Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 
is the firm Tobin's Q less industry-median Tobin's Q where 
industry is defined by two-digit SIC code 
Portfolio CAR (-2,2) Value-weighted 5-day target-acquirer portfolio abnormal 
returns where the weight is determined by the market value of 
equity 11 trading days prior to the announcement date  
Portfolio CAR (-5,5) Value-weighted 11-day target-acquirer portfolio abnormal 
returns where the weight is determined by the market value of 
equity 11 trading days prior to the announcement date 
Acquirer CAR (-2,2) 5-day acquirer announcement-period abnormal returns where 
day 0 is the announcement date 
Acquirer CAR (-5,5) 11-day acquirer announcement-period abnormal returns where 
day 0 is the announcement date 
Target CAR (-2,2) 5-day target announcement-period abnormal returns where day 
0 is the announcement date 
Target CAR (-5,5) 11-day target announcement-period abnormal returns where 
day 0 is the announcement date 
Premium Premium of offer price to target trading price one week prior to 
the announcement date as reported in Thomson One Banker 
Change in ROA The difference between post-acquisition performance-adjusted 
ROA and pre-acquisition performance-adjusted ROA. 
Performance-adjusted ROA is computed as the ROA of the 
acquirer or the target less ROA of its corresponding control 
firm. ROA is calculated as operating income before 
depreciation (item 13) over book value of total assets (item6) 
Target Selection Dummy variable, equals one for the target firms and zero for 
the control firms 
Relative dollar gains  Measured as the difference in target 5-day announcement-
period dollar gains minus acquirer 5-day announcement-period 
dollar gains scaled by the sum of the acquirer market 
capitalization and target market capitalization 50 trading days 
prior to the announcement date 
Panel C: Characteristics Variables 
All-Cash deal Dummy variable, equals one for purely cash-financed 
acquisitions, zero otherwise 
BCF index Constructed based on BCF (2009), the sum of 6 shareholder 
rights provisions    
Board size Number of directors on the firm's board 
Cash Measured as cash (item 1) over book value of total assets (item 
6) 
CEO/Chairman duality Dummy variable, equals one if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board 
Competing offer Dummy variable, equals one for deals that have competing 
bidders, zero otherwise. 










share the same two-digit SIC code, zero otherwise. 
High tech combination Dummy variable, equals one if the acquirer and the target are 
both from high tech industry with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577,3578, 3661, 3663,3669, 3674, 3812,3823, 3825, 3826, 
3827, 3829, 3841, 3845, 4812, 4813, 4899,7370, 7371, 7372, 
7373, 7374, 7375, 7378 and 7379 
Independent board The percentage of board members that are independent 
Leverage Computed as book value of debts (item34+item9) over market 
value of total assets(item6-item60+item25*item199). 
Market Cap Market capitalization, calculated as number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the 6th trading day 
prior to the announcement date 
R&D Competed as the research & development expenditure (item13) 
scaled by total assets (item 6) 
Relative deal size Computed as deal value over acquirer's market capitalization 
Return on Assets (ROA) Computed as operating income before depreciation (item 13) 
over book value of total assets (item6) 
Book to market Measured as book value of equity (item 60) over market value 
of equity (item25*item199) 
Sales Taken as item 12 
Sales growth The growth rate of sales 
Stock return Buy-and-hold stock return over the year prior to the acquisition 
announcements 
Tobin's Q Calculated as market value of assets divided by book value of 
assets, where market value of assets is computed as book value 
of assets less book value of common stock plus the market 





Table 1: Information Asymmetry Factor 
Panel A: Factor Loadings 
This table reports the factor loadings for the first three factors from the factor analysis used to 
construct one information asymmetry factor. The sample contains 41,570 observations from 
1989 to 2013. Following  Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013), we apply factor analysis using ten 
well-documented information asymmetry proxy variables to construct the information 
asymmetry factor. Similar to Karpoff, Lee, and Masulis (2013), the factor loadings of factor 1 
has opposite signs with information asymmetry as predicted. We transform it by multiplying the 
factor by (-1). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures the sampling adequacy. All variables 








Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 KMO 
No. of Analysts - 0.5846 -0.0571     -0.1524 0.6346 
Firm age - 0.4442 -0.0087     0.1598 0.7749 
Firm size - 0.7437   -0.0348     0.0484 0.6175 
Tangible assets - 0.1562     0.0774     0.2376 0.6098 
Average bid-ask spread + -0.0584     0.0890    -0.0844 0.6687 
Abnormal accruals + -0.1309   0.1119    -0.0120 0.6390 
Return volatility + -0.4638    0.3996    -0.1714 0.6910 
Analyst forecast error + -0.0449    0.4755     0.0297 0.6133 
Analyst forecast 
dispersion 
+ -0.0713     0.4966     0.0479 0.6066 
Amihud + -0.1292   0.1633    -0.0591 0.7202 
KMO overall     0.6524 




Graph 1: Scree  Plot 
This graph depicts the eigenvalues of the factors based on the 10 original information asymmetry 
proxy variables. It provides a visual assessment on which factor explains most variations in the 











Panel B: Time Series Distribution of Information Asymmetry Factor 
This table presents times series distribution of information asymmetry factor. The sample 
contains 41,570 observations of from 1989 to 2013.All variables are defined in the Appendix.   








1989 605 1.46 0.39 0.34 
1990 689 1.66 0.48 0.44 
1991 740 1.78 0.48 0.40 
1992 941 2.26 0.51 0.40 
1993 1,149 2.76 0.47 0.37 
1994 1,366 3.29 0.46 0.36 
1995 1,514 3.64 0.42 0.32 
1996 1,936 4.66 0.48 0.38 
1997 2,089 5.03 0.42 0.33 
1998 2,124 5.11 0.40 0.34 
1999 2,106 5.07 0.35 0.29 
2000 2,054 4.94 0.39 0.32 
2001 1,772 4.26 0.32 0.26 
2002 1,668 4.01 0.10 0.04 
2003 1,590 3.82 -0.09 -0.16 
2004 1,735 4.17 -0.13 -0.22 
2005 1,833 4.41 -0.17 -0.26 
2006 1,918 4.61 -0.17 -0.25 
2007 2,022 4.86 -0.19 -0.27 
















2009 1,848 4.45 -0.17 -0.25 
2010 1,889 4.54 -0.35 -0.43 
2011 1,967 4.73 -0.34 -0.43 
2012 1,987 4.78 -0.38 -0.48 
2013 2,062 4.96 -0.45 -0.51 
Total  41,570 100.00 0.08 0.00 
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Table 2: M&A Distribution by Announcement Year 
The sample consists of 543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. Both 
acquirers and targets have information asymmetry factor scores available. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix.   


















1990 4 0.74 0.08 1.20 431.59 43.16 
1991 4 0.74 -0.11 0.42 683.67 127.41 
1992 5 0.92 -0.09 0.50 735.52 204.68 
1993 5 0.92 0.35 0.79 239.39 87.25 
1994 11 2.03 -0.30 0.55 1,970.39 87.98 
1995 21 3.87 -0.35 0.76 2,281.43 148.25 
1996 20 3.68 -0.61 0.80 3,186.70 149.52 
1997 31 5.71 -0.20 0.76 1,124.00 172.69 
1998 46 8.47 -0.27 0.64 1,399.88 126.42 
1999 47 8.66 -0.16 0.66 2,368.67 210.76 
2000 33 6.08 -0.05 0.65 1,587.21 225.79 
2001 29 5.34 -0.00 0.85 2,174.97 107.87 









2003 24 4.42 -0.90 0.54 4,609.85 270.18 
2004 28 5.16 -0.78 0.16 3,583.82 702.07 
2005 21 3.87 -1.37 0.11 3,736.06 509.36 
2006 19 3.50 -1.09 0.20 9,950.35 389.78 
2007 25 4.60 -1.33 -0.28 6,326.10 819.68 
2008 28 5.16 -0.95 0.22 3,475.77 205.47 
2009 23 4.24 -0.90 0.09 6,450.87 386.09 
2010 22 4.05 -0.78 0.43 2,545.41 411.01 
2011 10 1.84 -1.03 -0.35 3,102.89 802.64 
2012 16 2.95 -1.21 -0.07 4,474.46 390.48 
2013 22 4.05 -1.35 -0.23 5,027.49 966.12 
2014 27 4.97 -1.42 -0.50 8,025.13 1,427.02 
Total  543 100 -0.62 0.45 2,713.92 247.38 
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Table 3:  Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables. Panel A reports the summary 
statistics of information asymmetry factor and variables constituting information asymmetry 
factor. Panel B reports the summary statistics of variables related to firm values. Panel C reports 
the summary statistics of abnormal returns and information asymmetry factor in M&A sample. 
Panel D reports the summary statistics of characteristics variables in M&A sample. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in Appendix.  
Panel A: Information Asymmetry Factor and Variables 
 
Panel B: Firm Value Variables 







Expected cost of equity 26,277 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.19 
Cost of debt (%) 11,746 1.06 1.07  0.54 0.86 1.28 









41,570 0.00 0.81 -0.48 0.09 0.58 
No. of Analysts 41,570 6.75 5.87 2.67 4.75 8.78 
Firm age 41,570 8.23 7.35 3.00 6.00 12.00 
Firm size 41,570 6.05 1.80 4.75 5.86 7.16 
Tangible assets 41,570 0.43 0.40 0.14 0.31 0.64 
Average bid-ask spread 41,570 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Abnormal accruals 41,570 0.40 0.73 0.07 0.18 0.42 
Return volatility (%) 41,570 3.60 1.86 2.32 3.20 4.41 
Analyst forecast error (%) 41,570 3.66 22.15 0.33 0.90 2.45 
Analyst forecast dispersion 
(%) 
41,570 1.12 4.64 1.14 0.36 0.93 
Amihud 41,570 0.40 4.51 0.00 0.01 0.11 
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Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 32,229 0.54 1.94 -0.30 0.05 0.78 
   
Panel C: Abnormal Returns and  Information Asymmetry Factors  







Portfolio CAR (-2, 2) 
(%) 
543 1.74 10.14 -3.67 1.18 6.42 
Portfolio CAR (-5,5) (%) 543 2.04 11.94 -4.26 1.40 7.83 
Acquirer CAR (-2, 2) 
(%) 
543 -1.59 10.19 -7.04 -1.52 3.24 
Acquirer CAR (-5, 5) 
(%) 
543 -1.48 12.01 -7.28 -1.96 4.08 
Target CAR (-2,2) (%) 543 25.24 24.19 9.88 22.23 36.60 
Target CAR (-5,5) (%) 543 27.73 25.67 10.78 24.30 39.69 
Premium  (%) 509 36.93 34.82 17.37 34.04 50.54 
Acquirer information 
asymmetry factor 
543 -0.68 0.99 -1.29 -0.62 0.03 
Target information 
asymmetry factor 
543 0.31 0.75 -0.14 0.45 0.83 
 
 
Panel D: Characteristics Variables  







Log (acquirer market cap) 543 7.90 1.91 6.62 7.85 9.11 
Acquirer Tobin's q 543 3.18 3.45 1.54 2.24 3.63 
Acquirer leverage 543 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.14 
Acquirer ROA 543 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.21 
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Log (target market cap)  543 5.63 1.60 4.53 5.48 6.81 
Target Tobin's q 543 2.44 2.14 1.34 1.78 2.74 
Target leverage 543 0.10 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.16 
Target ROA 543 0.03 0.23 -0.01 0.09 0.15 
Relative deal size  543 0.38 0.54 0.07 0.20 0.50 
High-tech combination 
(dummy) 
543 0.26 0.46 0 0 1 
Competing offer (dummy) 543 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 
Diversifying (dummy) 543 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
Deal Closure Time 543 115.52 76.27 66.50 98.00 138.00 














Table 4:  Firm Value and  Information Asymmetry Factor 
Panel A: Cost of Equity and Information Asymmetry Factor 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with expected cost of equity as dependent variable 
on information asymmetry factor. The sample covers the period from 1990 to 2014. The 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit 
SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and 






 Expected Cost of Equity 
Information asymmetry factor 0.0055*** 0.0078*** 
 (5.1326) (3.1928) 
Leverage  0.0128** 
  (2.4709) 
Book-to-market  -0.0022* 
  (-1.7187) 
Log(market cap)  0.0008 
  (0.7540) 
Beta  0.0499*** 
  (26.2549) 
Momentum  0.0198*** 
  (10.5657) 
Intercept 0.1398*** 0.1011*** 
 (27.4090) (12.1871) 
   
Number of Obs 26,277 26,277 
R2  0.2790 0.3465 
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Panel B: Cost of Debt of New Debt Issues and Information Asymmetry Factor 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with cost of debt of new debt issues as dependent 
variable on information asymmetry factor. The sample covers the period from 1990 to 2012. The 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit 
SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and 




 Cost of Debt 
Information asymmetry factor 1.2062*** 0.2455** 
 (21.3918) (2.2788) 
Return on assets  -0.6511 
  (-1.0680) 
Log (sales)  -0.3356*** 
  (-5.8642) 
Book-to-market  0.0959*** 
  (8.5764) 
Volatility  3.0746* 
  (1.8557) 
Stock return  -6.9621 
  (-0.9176) 
Leverage  1.8275*** 
  (5.9209) 
Interest coverage  -0.3118*** 
  (-5.5397) 
Altman Z-Score (dummy)  -0.3920*** 
  (-3.6235) 
Log (issue size)  -0.0631*** 
  (-4.8220) 
Benchmark yield  -0.0380 
  (-0.4319) 
Intercept 2.2580*** 3.9441*** 
 (15.1520) (5.0927) 
   
Number of Obs 11,746 11,746 
R2 0.4925 0.5321 
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Panel C: Firm Value and Information Asymmetry Factor 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with industry-adjusted Tobin's Q as dependent 
variable on information asymmetry factor. The sample covers the period from 1990 to 2014. The 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit 
SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and 
* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 OLS 
 Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 
Information asymmetry factor -0.2404*** -0.2606*** 
 (-6.3784) (-3.5702) 
Log (sales) -0.2063*** -0.1216*** 
 (-11.5043) (-4.0313) 
Delaware incorporation 0.1355*** 0.2214*** 
 (6.1309) (5.6559) 
S&P 500 inclusion 0.5727*** 0.4664*** 
 (13.4176) (5.3609) 
Leverage -2.3851*** -3.0410*** 
 (-40.9292) (-24.7686) 
Capital to sales  0.0014*** 
  (8.5737) 
R&D to capital  0.0167** 
  (2.1376) 
Advertising to capital  -0.0191 
  (-1.0984) 
Dividend yield  0.3261 
  (1.1330) 
Intercept 2.1871*** 1.2954*** 
 (11.3566) (4.9376) 
   
Number of Obs 32,229 8,328 
R2 0.0813 0.0858 
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Table 5:  Acquirer-target Portfolio Abnormal Returns and Target Information Asymmetry 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with 5-day acquirer-target value-weighted portfolio 
abnormal returns as dependent variable on target information asymmetry factor. The sample 
consists of 543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. The regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. 
The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry 
factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented information 
asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 Portfolio CAR (-2, 2) 
Target information asymmetry factor 0.0248*** 0.0284*** 0.0256** 
 (2.9722) (3.3514) (2.5259) 
Log (acquirer market cap)  -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (-0.3998) (-0.4275) 
Acquirer Tobin's q  0.0018 0.0036* 
  (0.8949) (1.6891) 
Acquirer leverage  0.0604 0.0651 
  (0.9689) (0.9808) 
Acquirer ROA  -0.0613 -0.0419 
  (-1.2604) (-0.9083) 
Log(target market cap)   0.0011 
   (0.9750) 
Target Tobin's q   -0.0065** 
   (-2.2239) 
Target leverage   -0.0189 
   (-0.3987) 
Target ROA   -0.0575* 
   (-1.9127) 
High-tech combination  -0.0128 -0.0126 
  (-0.7320) (-0.7153) 
Competing offer  -0.0068 -0.0144 
  (-0.2236) (-0.4432) 
Relative deal size  0.0352*** 0.0387*** 
  (2.6186) (2.8541) 
Diversifying  -0.0205 -0.0225 
  (-1.5307) (-1.5980) 
All-cash deal  0.0289** 0.0286* 
  (1.9824) (1.8755) 
Intercept 0.0911 0.0680 0.0770 
 (1.3463) (1.0418) (1.1132) 

























Number of Obs 543 543 543 
R2 0.2130 0.2726 0.2961 
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Table 6:  Acquirer Abnormal Returns and Target Information Asymmetry 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with 5-day acquirer abnormal returns as dependent 
variable on target information asymmetry factor. The sample consists of 543 completed U.S. 
M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. The regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from 
factor analysis using 10 well-documented information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 Acquirer CAR (-2, 2) 
Target information asymmetry factor 0.0327*** 0.0215** 0.0211** 
 (3.8661) (2.5246) (2.0026) 
Log (acquirer market cap)  -0.0089* -0.0085* 
  (-1.9077) (-1.7348) 
Acquirer Tobin's q  0.0035 0.0044** 
  (1.6327) (2.1487) 
Acquirer leverage  0.0904* 0.0864 
  (1.9023) (1.6003) 
Acquirer ROA  -0.0443 -0.0214 
  (-1.0034) (-0.4978) 
Log(target market cap)   0.0030** 
   (2.5067) 
Target Tobin's q   -0.0042 
   (-1.4944) 
Target leverage   0.0228 
   (0.5595) 
Target ROA   -0.0855*** 
   (-2.8795) 
High-tech combination  0.0073 0.0057 
  (0.5495) (0.4370) 
Competing offer  -0.0171 -0.0248 
  (-0.5106) (-0.7145) 
Relative deal size  -0.0122 -0.0080 
  (-1.1655) (-0.7480) 
Diversifying  -0.0046 -0.0018 
  (-0.4606) (-0.1687) 
All-cash deal  0.0394*** 0.0409*** 
  (2.6311) (2.6089) 


























 (-1.3322) (0.0287) (0.0779) 
    
Number of Obs 543 543 543 
R2 0.1829 0.2261 0.2603 
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Table 7:  Target Abnormal Returns and Target Information Asymmetry 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with 5-day target abnormal returns and target 
premium as dependent variables on target information asymmetry factor. The sample consists of 
543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. The regressions control for year 
and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The regressions 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry factor is the first 
factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented information asymmetry proxy 
variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 Target CAR (-2, 2) Premium 
Target information asymmetry factor 0.0740*** 0.0569** 0.0892*** 0.1250*** 
 (4.2653) (2.2838) (3.1371) (3.2694) 
Log (acquirer market cap)  -0.0015  -0.0042 
  (-0.1455)  (-0.2568) 
Acquirer Tobin's q  0.0109***  0.0150 
  (2.5969)  (0.8815) 
Acquirer leverage  0.2553*  0.1743 
  (1.9101)  (0.7119) 
Acquirer ROA  -0.0144  0.3029 
  (-0.1348)  (1.4396) 
Log(target market cap)  -0.0036*  -0.0072** 
  (-1.7555)  (-2.0814) 
Target Tobin's q  -0.0194***  -0.0116 
  (-3.3701)  (-0.8328) 
Target leverage  -0.0812  0.3622* 
  (-0.7045)  (1.8130) 
Target ROA  0.0337  -0.1891 
  (0.5228)  (-1.0814) 
High-tech combination  -0.0611*  0.0224 
  (-1.6726)  (0.3581) 
Competing offer  0.0234  0.1583 
  (0.4054)  (1.4722) 
Relative deal size  -0.0462*  0.0433 
  (-1.8595)  (0.8039) 
Diversifying  -0.0276  0.0132 
  (-0.9950)  (0.3078) 
All-cash deal  0.0492*  0.0525 
  (1.6500)  (1.1828) 
Intercept 0.4806*** 0.5483*** 0.9151*** 0.7733*** 
 (3.1538) (3.3494) (3.3410) (2.6266) 
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Number of Obs 543 543 509 509 
R2 0.1990 0.2496 0.1938 0.2364 
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Table 8:  Controlling for Acquirer Information Asymmetry 
This table reports results of OLS regressions controlling for acquirer information asymmetry 
factor. The sample consists of 543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. 
The regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-
digit SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and 
* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 Portfolio CAR  
(-2, 2) 
Acquirer CAR    
(-2, 2) 
Target CAR    
(-2, 2) 
Premium 
Target information asymmetry factor 0.0181* 0.0261** 0.0598** 0.1232*** 
 (1.6692) (2.4566) (2.3918) (3.1693) 
Acquirer information asymmetry factor 0.0139 -0.0417*** -0.0241 0.0158 
 (1.4091) (-2.8759) (-0.6787) (0.3120) 
Log (acquirer market cap) 0.0001 -0.0268*** -0.0121 0.0027 
 (0.6002) (-2.9675) (-0.6163) (0.0910) 
Acquirer Tobin's q 0.0034 0.0064*** 0.0120*** 0.0143 
 (1.5924) (3.2488) (2.6841) (0.8009) 
Acquirer leverage 0.0830 0.0639 0.2423* 0.1824 
 (1.2347) (1.2383) (1.7911) (0.7545) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0282 -0.0304 -0.0196 0.3059 
 (-0.6475) (-0.7043) (-0.1828) (1.4490) 
Log(target market cap) 0.0011 0.0032** -0.0035* 0.0071** 
 (0.9679) (2.3994) (-1.6770) (2.0650) 
Target Tobin's q -0.0058* -0.0039 -0.0192*** -0.0118 
 (-1.9468) (-1.3776) (-3.3336) (-0.8505) 
Target leverage -0.0204 0.0161 -0.0851 0.3654* 
 (-0.4340) (0.3914) (-0.7291) (1.8191) 
Target ROA -0.0625** -0.0734*** 0.0406 -0.1934 
 (-2.0334) (-2.6287) (0.6382) (-1.1031) 
High-tech combination -0.0081 0.0003 -0.0642* 0.0246 
 (-0.4592) (0.0249) (-1.7340) (0.3922) 
Competing offer -0.0153 -0.0278 0.0216 0.1594 
 (-0.4731) (-0.8094) (0.3722) (1.4803) 
Relative deal size 0.0336*** -0.0101 -0.0475* 0.0439 
 (2.6997) (-0.9218) (-1.9002) (0.8174) 
Diversifying -0.0206 -0.0033 -0.0285 0.0135 
 (-1.5073) (-0.3103) (-1.0278) (0.3141) 
All-cash deal 0.0330** 0.0349** 0.0458 0.0546 
 (2.0635) (2.4307) (1.5029) (1.2048) 
Intercept 0.0880 0.0891 0.5970*** 0.7419** 
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 (1.2603) (1.3072) (3.3181) (2.4622) 
     
Number of Obs 543 543 543 509 
R2 0.3003 0.2791 0.2507 0.2366 
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Table 9: Controlling for Corporate Governance  
This table reports results of OLS regressions controlling for corporate governance variables. The 
board characteristics sample consists of 448 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1997 
and 2014. The BCF index sample consists of 507 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 
1991 and 2014. The regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is 
defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis 
using 10 well-documented information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS   
 Portfolio CAR (-2, 2) Acquirer CAR (-2, 2) Target CAR (-2, 2) Premium 
Target information asymmetry 
factor 
0.0300** 0.0261*** 0.0263** 0.0200* 0.0561** 0.0585** 0.0775** 0.1146*** 
 (2.5353) (2.5912) (2.2294) (1.9417) (2.2082) (2.3840) (1.9958) (2.9682) 
Board Size  -0.0029  -0.0002  -0.0005  -0.0119  
 (-0.8592)  (-0.0675)  (-0.0748)  (-1.1965)  
Independent board  0.0550  0.0352  0.1367  0.2314  
 (1.3465)  (0.8720)  (1.2580)  (1.3036)  
CEO/Chairman duality 0.0029  0.0022  0.0133  -0.0168  
 (0.2428)  (0.2010)  (0.5202)  (-0.4503)  
Target board Size  0.0437  0.0146  0.2928**  -0.0576  
 (0.6394)  (0.2370)  (2.2362)  (-0.2240)  
Target independent board  0.0025  0.0007  0.0077  0.0103  
 (0.4160)  (0.1572)  (0.6408)  (0.5559)  
Target CEO/Chairman duality -0.0106  -0.0209  0.0446  0.0988  
 (-0.6989)  (-1.4905)  (1.3645)  (1.4923)  
BCF index  0.0035  -0.0043  0.0138  -0.0123 
  (0.2862)  (-0.4272)  (0.4782)  (-0.3053) 
Target-acquirer BCF difference  -0.0007  -0.0065  0.0147  -0.0001 
  (-0.0676)  (-0.8068)  (0.6148)  (-0.0030) 
Log (acquirer market cap) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0096* -0.0088* 0.0004* 0.0054 0.0001 0.0030 
 (-0.1285) (-0.3236) (-1.7310) (-1.7316) (1.6831) (0.5747) (0.1780) (0.2027) 
Acquirer Tobin's q 0.0038* 0.0036* 0.0044** 0.0043** 0.0107*** 0.0101** 0.0168 0.0120 
 (1.7751) (1.6842) (2.3061) (2.3681) (2.6181) (2.4786) (0.9572) (0.6917) 
Acquirer leverage 0.0515 0.0633 0.0917 0.0843 0.2080 0.2004 0.3070 0.1311 
 (0.6600) (0.9535) (1.4989) (1.5212) (1.5007) (1.5967) (1.2588) (0.5673) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0382 -0.0374 -0.0178 -0.0166 -0.0440 -0.0451 0.2625 0.1893 
 (-0.7317) (-0.7815) (-0.3719) (-0.3754) (-0.4019) (-0.4366) (1.1521) (0.9009) 
Log(target market cap) 0.0015 0.0011 0.0035*** 0.0030** -0.0064** -0.0044* 0.0015 0.0056 
 (1.1994) (0.9842) (2.6704) (2.4569) (-2.3492) (-1.8728) (0.3740) (1.5678) 

















 (-2.1273) (-2.2089) (-1.3728) (-1.4395) (-3.7580) (-3.6872) (-1.1958) (-0.7199) 
Target leverage 0.0252 -0.0067 0.0636 0.0270 0.0351 0.0112 0.2708 0.4375** 
 (0.4524) (-0.1400) (1.4101) (0.6700) (0.2980) (0.1053) (1.3924) (2.3539) 
Target ROA -0.0618** -0.0601** -0.0873*** -0.0860*** 0.0675 0.0476 -0.2307 -0.1974 
 (-1.9770) (-1.9876) (-2.8419) (-2.8617) (0.9960) (0.7175) (-1.2620) (-1.1133) 
High-tech combination -0.0163 -0.0150 0.0050 0.0046 -0.0457 -0.0467 0.0132 0.0224 
 (-0.8390) (-0.8333) (0.3403) (0.3307) (-1.1984) (-1.3514) (0.2123) (0.3937) 
Competing offer -0.0165 -0.0109 -0.0229 -0.0205 0.0208 0.0270 0.1987* 0.1957* 
 (-0.4891) (-0.3304) (-0.6406) (-0.5708) (0.3110) (0.4244) (1.6557) (1.7198) 
Relative deal size 0.0370*** 0.0375*** -0.0071 -0.0082 -0.0498** -0.0461** 0.0248 0.0360 
 (2.6082) (2.7819) (-0.6399) (-0.7702) (-1.9764) (-1.9684) (0.4656) (0.6887) 
Diversifying -0.0228 -0.0196 -0.0047 -0.0002 -0.0356 -0.0291 0.0098 0.0067 
 (-1.4131) (-1.3526) (-0.4104) (-0.0177) (-1.1868) (-1.0583) (0.2228) (0.1621) 
All-cash deal 0.0325* 0.0285* 0.0440** 0.0416*** 0.0540* 0.0616** 0.0758 0.0522 
 (1.8758) (1.8452) (2.5604) (2.6417) (1.7839) (2.0731) (1.6442) (1.1898) 
Intercept -0.1130 -0.0809 -0.0508 -0.0438 -0.2756* -0.0518 0.0256 -0.0322 
 (-1.5607) (-1.3373) (-0.7268) (-0.6934) (-1.8660) (-0.3449) (0.1203) (-0.1176) 
         
Number of Obs 448 507 448 507 448 507 426 479 
R2 0.3007 0.2860 0.2704 0.2602 0.2682 0.2421 0.2516 0.2312 
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Table 10:  Post-merger Operating Performance Change and Target Information 
Asymmetry 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with one-year, two-year, and three-year post-merger 
change in performance-adjusted ROA of the merged firms as dependent variables on target 
information asymmetry factor. The regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where 
industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis 
using 10 well-documented information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 1-year ∆ in 
Performance-adjusted 
ROA 
2-year ∆ in 
Performance-adjusted 
ROA 
3-year ∆ in 
Performance-adjusted 
ROA 
Target information asymmetry factor -0.0140 0.0030 -0.0317 
 (-0.6109) (0.1156) (-1.2493) 
Log (acquirer market cap) 0.0093 0.0105 0.0115 
 (1.2219) (0.7969) (0.8654) 
Acquirer Tobin's q -0.0018 -0.0056 0.0141* 
 (-0.3838) (-0.6610) (1.7320) 
Acquirer leverage 0.0309 0.1144 0.2124 
 (0.3225) (0.9240) (1.4788) 
Acquirer ROA -0.0504 -0.1218 -0.2583* 
 (-0.4851) (-0.8665) (-1.9562) 
Log(target market cap) -0.0040 -0.0020 0.0023 
 (-1.6207) (-0.8002) (0.7595) 
Target Tobin's q 0.0002 0.0031 -0.0077 
 (0.0199) (0.2329) (-0.5584) 
Target leverage -0.0441 -0.0489 -0.0331 
 (-0.4723) (-0.6393) (-0.3122) 
Target ROA -0.0272 0.0312 -0.0928 
 (-0.4104) (0.3467) (-1.1750) 
High-tech combination -0.0012 -0.0190 -0.0867** 
 (-0.0368) (-0.4713) (-2.2527) 
Competing offer -0.0248 0.0276 -0.0184 
 (-0.8658) (0.3832) (-0.1846) 
Relative deal size 0.0506* 0.0507 0.0258 
 (1.7924) (1.6160) (0.9334) 
Diversifying 0.0350 0.0837** -0.0147 
 (1.4161) (2.5857) (-0.3809) 
All-cash deal 0.0392 -0.0099 0.0397 

























Intercept -0.2867 -0.1284 0.0048 
 (-1.1943) (-0.9284) (0.0342) 
    
Number of Obs 277 206 161 
R2 0.3783 0.4273 0.5986 
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Table 11:  Target Firm Selection and Target Information Asymmetry Factor 
This table reports results of conditional logit models. The dependent variable target selection 
equals one for the target firms and zero for the control firms. The random control sample is 
formed by five randomly drawn control firms for each target. The industry and size control 
sample is formed by five control firms matched by industry and size with each target where 
industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The industry, size, and book-to-market (B/M) 
control sample is formed by five control firms matched by industry, size, and book-to-market 
(B/M) with each target where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and 





 Conditional Logit 
 Random Sample Industry and Size 
Sample 
Industry, Size, and 





0.4613*** 0.2811*** 0.4040*** 0.2836*** 0.3296** 
 (6.6159) (3.6113) (3.7427) (2.8969) (3.6830) (2.3429) 
Log (sales)  0.0654  0.0801  0.0730 
  (1.1838)  (1.3063)  (1.1473) 
R&D  0.9755**  1.1985**  1.4717*** 
  (2.3121)  (2.4921)  (2.9697) 
Sales growth  -0.0100  -0.0219  -0.0247 
  (-0.3114)  (-0.7749)  (-0.7537) 
ROA  0.5127*  0.4206*  0.0516 
  (1.7908)  (1.8403)  (0.1793) 
Leverage  -0.5710  0.3157  0.5296 
  (-1.5332)  (0.7795)  (1.2818) 
Cash  0.8354***  0.4927*  0.6569** 
  (3.2730)  (1.8753)  (2.4198) 
Book-to-market  -0.0526  -0.0669   
  (-1.2072)  (-0.9464)   
Stock return  -0.1830**  -0.1940***  -0.1499** 
  (-2.5147)  (-2.7539)  (-2.1604) 
Number of Obs 3,154 2,987 3,137 2,979 3,123 2,984 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
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Table 12:  Relative M&A Announcements Dollar Gains and Target Information 
Asymmetry  
This table reports results of OLS regressions with relative dollar gains as dependent variable on 
target information asymmetry factor. The relative dollars gains is the difference in target 5-day 
announcement-period dollar gains minus acquirer 5-day announcement-period dollar gains 
scaled by the sum of the acquirer market cap and the target market cap 50 days prior to the 
announcement date. The sample consists of 543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 
1990 and 2014. The regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is 
defined by the two-digit SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis 
using 10 well-documented information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 Relative Dollar Gains 
Target information asymmetry 
factor 
-0.0302*** -0.0232*** -0.0326*** 
 (-4.3304) (-2.8721) (-3.6910) 
Acquirer information asymmetry 
factor 
  0.0178** 
   (2.2328) 
Log (acquirer market cap)  -0.0001* -0.0000 
  (-1.8904) (-0.0251) 
Acquirer Tobin's q  -0.0046** -0.0048*** 
  (-2.5600) (-2.6649) 
Acquirer leverage  -0.0234 0.0003 
  (-0.3760) (0.0055) 
Acquirer ROA  0.0110 0.0285 
  (0.3225) (0.8527) 
Log(target market cap)  -0.0030*** -0.0030*** 
  (-3.5613) (-3.5602) 
Target Tobin's q  0.0022 0.0030 
  (0.9667) (1.2954) 
Target leverage  -0.0717* -0.0730* 
  (-1.8374) (-1.8945) 
Target ROA  0.0737*** 0.0683** 
  (2.8355) (2.5276) 
High-tech combination  -0.0217 -0.0160 
  (-1.4147) (-1.0672) 
Competing offer  0.0050 0.0037 
  (0.2245) (0.1672) 
Relative deal size  0.0294*** 0.0230** 
  (2.9696) (2.3481) 
Diversifying  -0.0155 -0.0128 
























All-cash deal  -0.0239** -0.0184* 
  (-2.5234) (-1.8508) 
Intercept 0.0765 0.0409 0.0564 
 (1.1084) (0.6561) (0.9398) 
    
Number of Obs 543 543 543 
R2 0.2200 0.3386 0.3482 
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Table 13:  Certain Deal Characteristics and Target Information Asymmetry 
This table reports results the effects of target information asymmetry factor on certain deal 
characteristics including relative deal size, all-cash deals, and diversifying deals. The sample 
consists of 543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. The regressions 
control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit SIC codes. 
The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information asymmetry 
factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented information 
asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote the 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Probit Probit OLS OLS 




Target information asymmetry 
factor 
-0.5341*** -0.5048** -0.2329*** -0.1589*** 
 (-3.5221) (-2.1511) (-4.7259) (-2.6112) 
Log (acquirer market cap) 0.0021 0.3946*** -0.0010* -0.0001 
 (1.4591) (4.9477) (-1.8837) (-0.1498) 
Acquirer Tobin's q -0.0933 -0.1258** -0.0110 0.0130* 
 (-1.5782) (-2.4852) (-1.4806) (1.9332) 
Acquirer leverage -0.8759 -2.7626** 0.2794 -0.2458 
 (-0.9872) (-2.5141) (1.1908) (-0.5487) 
Acquirer ROA 0.5432 -1.6697** -1.1203* -0.3163* 
 (0.8419) (-2.5620) (-1.9358) (-1.8744) 
Log(target market cap) -0.1147** -0.4368*** -0.0056 0.0035 
 (-2.5187) (-3.3786) (-1.0134) (0.4240) 
Target Tobin's q -0.1075** 0.1228** 0.0141* -0.0201 
 (-2.2196) (2.4073) (1.6675) (-1.6252) 
Target leverage -1.9451*** -0.2783 0.3448 0.4510 
 (-2.7241) (-0.3215) (1.3433) (1.6308) 
Target ROA -0.1961 0.1013 0.1290 -0.1060 
 (-0.5343) (0.2083) (0.9646) (-0.7133) 
High-tech combination 0.2476 -0.7895*** 0.0371 -0.0181 
 (1.2254) (-3.4179) (0.6574) (-0.2481) 
Competing offer 0.6359* -0.4450 0.1751* 0.2236 
 (1.8339) (-1.0223) (1.6755) (1.2254) 
Relative deal size -0.9147*** 0.2062  0.0470 
 (-2.6254) (0.8583)  (0.8179) 
Diversifying 0.0800  -0.0849 -0.3947*** 
 (0.4296)  (-1.4561) (-6.1496) 
All-cash deal  -0.0158 -0.1351** 0.0135 
  (-0.0826) (-2.4157) (0.1783) 
Intercept 0.5417 3.9176*** 1.2453*** 4.1712*** 


























     
Number of Obs 543 543 543 543 
R2  (Pseudo R2) 0.2025 0.3605 0.3870 0.2607 
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Table 14: Robustness Check: 11-day Abnormal Returns and Target Information 
Asymmetry 
This table reports results of OLS regressions with 11-day target-acquirer portfolio, acquirer, and 
target 11-day abnormal returns as dependent variables on target information asymmetry factor. 
The sample consists of 543 completed U.S. M&A transactions between 1990 and 2014. The 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects where industry is defined by the two-digit 
SIC codes. The regressions standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Information 
asymmetry factor is the first factor obtained from factor analysis using 10 well-documented 
information asymmetry proxy variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and 
* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 OLS 
 Portfolio CAR (-5, 5) Acquirer CAR (-5, 5) Target CAR (-5, 5) 
Target information asymmetry 
factor 
0.0287*** 0.0266** 0.0355*** 0.0243* 0.0902*** 0.0637** 
 (3.0820) (2.2381) (4.0612) (1.9642) (4.8669) (2.3135) 
Log (acquirer market cap)  -0.0001  -0.0072  -0.0036 
  (-0.7024)  (-1.1455)  (-0.3197) 
Acquirer Tobin's q  -0.0010  -0.0008  0.0092** 
  (-0.4086)  (-0.2920)  (2.5206) 
Acquirer leverage  0.0007  0.0414  0.1427 
  (0.0094)  (0.6425)  (1.0348) 
Acquirer ROA  -0.0735  -0.0534  -0.0444 
  (-1.1622)  (-0.8636)  (-0.3616) 
Log(target market cap)  0.0003  0.0020*  -0.0032 
  (0.2678)  (1.7727)  (-1.4965) 
Target Tobin's q  -0.0032  -0.0009  -0.0196*** 
  (-0.8228)  (-0.2338)  (-2.7852) 
Target leverage  0.0172  0.0514  0.0064 
  (0.2875)  (0.9528)  (0.0520) 
Target ROA  -0.0308  -0.0536  0.0138 
  (-0.7683)  (-1.2639)  (0.1871) 
High-tech combination  -0.0118  0.0055  -0.0655* 
  (-0.5918)  (0.3297)  (-1.6790) 
Competing offer  -0.0005  -0.0049  0.0028 
  (-0.0189)  (-0.2449)  (0.0456) 
Relative deal size  0.0376**  -0.0037  -0.0527** 
  (2.0485)  (-0.3253)  (-2.1704) 
Diversifying  -0.0235  -0.0084  -0.0273 
  (-1.2071)  (-0.6223)  (-0.9070) 
All-cash deal  0.0307  0.0360*  0.0834*** 
  (1.6359)  (1.9004)  (2.6854) 
Intercept 0.1176 0.1185 -0.0626 0.0122 0.4644*** 0.5842*** 
 (1.5178) (1.6086) (-0.9439) (0.1532) (2.8105) (3.2894) 



























Number of Obs 543 543 543 543 543 543 































The separation of ownership and control in corporations introduces the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and management. The power balance between the two parties reflects the 
level of internal monitoring by the shareholders: if there are more rights enjoyed by the 
shareholders, the more capable they are to discipline the management. Recent studies have 
proposed several indices to quantitatively measure monitoring structure by the shareholders 
(corporate governance structure) based on individual firms’ corporate governance provisions. 
Examples include GIM index by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick(2003) and BCF index by Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell (2009). Those studies document negative relations between the corporate 
governance indices and firm value as well as long-run stock returns. Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2007) further identify acquisitions as one of the possible channels through which values can be 
destroyed for the poorly governed firms. 
 Given the importance of market for corporate control in disciplining management, most 
of those studies focus exclusively on the antitakeover implications of the corporate governance 
indices. In fact, the BCF index is constructed using a subset of provisions within the GIM index 
that are most effective in fending off hostile takeover bids.  Masulis et al.(2007) find that BCF 
index has stronger indicative power on acquirer returns than GIM index and therefore confirms 
this selection criterion.  In particular, they single out the staggered board, shown by previous 
studies (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005) as the most 
powerful antitakeover provision, and find it has highly significant negative effect on acquirer 
returns all by itself.  However, a close examination of the original 24 provisions in the GIM 
index suggests they are more than antitakeover protections. Taken in its entirety, it is an indicator 
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of the balance of power between shareholders and management (Gompers et al., 2003)
12
. 
Unfortunately, those two layers of information delivered by the governance indices are difficult 
to disentangle. For firms facing constant threats of hostile takeovers, the provisions’ antitakeover 
implication is more dominant and their balance of power effect has been largely ignored.  In this 
paper, we intent to examine whether or not the balance of power effect of governance provisions 
also matters to the investors.  In order to do so, we chose an industry where firms are safe from 
hostile takeover threats---the banking industry. 
It has been well documented that because most of the banking mergers require regulatory 
approvals
13
, hostile takeovers are rare in the banking industry (Whidbee,1997; Brook et al., 
2000; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Hagendorff et al., 2007). Our own sample further confirms this 
fact---none of the observations in our sample are hostile
14
 . Despite the lack of hostile takeover 
threats, the summary statistics of our sample shows that banks on average have scores of the 
corporate governance indices comparable to the levels reported by Masulis et at.(2007 )for 
overall industries. This fact allows us to re-examine the three indices in an environment free of 
market for corporate control. Such analysis can provide insights in answering the following two 
questions regarding corporate governance provisions: 1, does the balance of power effect of the 
corporate governance provisions matter to the investors? 2, do the strong negative relations 
between the BCF and staggered board
15
 indices and stock returns reported by Masulis et at. 
(2007 ) and Bebchuk et al.(2009)  are indeed due to their antitakeover effect as claimed by the 
authors? 
                                                            
12 Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) divided the 24 provisions into five groups: tactics for delaying hostile bidders; 
voting rights; director/officer protection; other takeover defenses and state laws.    
13 See Section 18(C) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. [section] 1828(c))(the “Bank Merger Act”)    
14Out of 677 observations in our sample, we are able to find the acquisition attitude records for 671 observations. 
Among them, 662 are friendly and the other 9 are not applicable.  
15 We refer staggered board and cumulative voting as separate indices for simplicity.   
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Among GIM, BCF and staggered board indices, GIM includes all 24 corporate 
governance provisions, and therefore is the most comprehensive measure of the power balance 
between shareholders and the management. If the power-balance effect of the governance 
provisions does matter to the investors, the relation between GIM index and stock returns should 
remain significant in the banking industry. In addition, if the BCF index and staggered board are 
causing the firms to perform poorly because of their powerful antitakeover effects, we should 
expect them to become much less important for banks. At last, in order to further study the 
power balance effect, we singled out cumulative voting provision. Although it does not receive 
the same level of attention as staggered board in governance index literature
16
, it is widely 
considered as a measure of investor protection (La Porta et al., 2002).  Cumulative voting allows 
minority shareholders proportional representation on the board of directors. Firms with 
cumulative voting are tend to be more democratic than those that without.  In this study, we 
intend to test if cumulative voting provision is priced by investors.  
 
Our research contributes to the current literatures of corporate governance indices in the 
following two main aspects: first, by focusing on an industry absent of market for corporate 
control, we are, according to our knowledge, the first study to examine the power balance effect 
of corporate governance provisions separate from their antitakeover effect.  Second, we provide 
further evidence confirming the linkage between market for corporate control, antitakeover 
provisions and firm value.  
 
                                                            
16 In Bebchuck et al., 2008, they pointed out cumulative voting as the only provision outside the BCF index that 
received significant precatory resolutions between 2003 and 2004. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as following: section 2 reviews the past literatures 
related to our study and discusses our hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents 
the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1. Corporate governance indices research 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) construct the GIM index based on 24 corporate 
governance provisions and show that the GIM index is negatively related to firm value. Since the 
GIM index is constructed by adding one point for each provision that is detrimental to 
shareholder rights, their findings suggest that the firms that distribute more rights to their 
shareholders perform better.  
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) choose 6 out of the 24 provisions in GIM index based 
on the provisions’ antitakeover effectiveness and propose an entrenchment index (BCF index). 
They find that BCF index is monotonically negatively associated with firm value as well as 
abnormal stock returns. Meanwhile, they do not find any such association for the rest 18 
provisions in the GIM index. They conclude that the BCF index is fully responsible for the 
negative relation between corporate governance provisions and firm value documented by GIM.   
In terms of staggered board studies, Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian( 2002) point out 
the powerful antitakeover implications of staggered boards. Later on, Bebchuk and Cohen(2005) 
further establish the link between presence of staggered board and lower firm value.  They list 
long waiting time and prohibitively high acquiring cost as two main impediments for hostile 
bidders to gain control of a company with staggered board.  
Although the studies abovementioned establish negative relations between various 
corporate governance indices and firm value, they stop short at identifying possible channels 
141 
 
through which poorly governed management can destroy firm value. To fill in this gap, Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2007) propose acquisitions as a possible channel. The authors study the relations 
between various corporate governance indices (GIM, BCF and staggered board) and acquisitions 
announcement-period abnormal stock returns (CARs). They find that firms with higher index 
scores in GIM, BCF or with a staggered board experience significantly lower acquisitions CARs. 
They suggest that those firms are poorer acquirers because their managers are entrenched by the 
antitakeover provisions and therefore are more likely to indulge in empire-building acquisitions. 
There are very limited studies on cumulative voting. In what is now an old study, Bhagat 
and Brickley (1984 )find that the management-sponsored proposals which reduce the impact of 
cumulative voting lead to significantly negative stock reactions. Gordon (1994) argues for 
cumulative voting as well. He states that for many firms, cumulative voting mechanism provides 
a cost-effective avenue for activist institutions to put directors on the board and thus, enhances 
the quality, independence and accountability of the board. However, he reasons the impact of 
cumulative voting will depend on the firm’s ownership concentration, the easiness with which its 
institutional shareholders can exit, and its competitive environment.        
2.2. Corporate governance in the banking industry literatures 
Banks are special in corporate governance studies. Adam and Mehran (2003) list the 
characteristics of bank holding companies (BHC) that are different from those of manufacturing 
firms, most notably, the presence of regulation and high leverage. They argue that the uniqueness 
of banking industry can systematically affect its corporate governance mechanisms as well. To 
test this hypothesis, the authors compare summary statistics of several key corporate governance 
variables of BHC with those of the manufacturing firms. They find that on average BHC have 
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larger boards, higher percentage of outside directors, lower CEO and institutional ownership and 
rely less on incentive-based compensation such as stock options than manufacturing firms.  
Hagendorff et al.(2007) summarize previous studies on the impacts of mergers and 
acquisitions on the performance of banks.  They show that for the period from 1971 to 1997, 6 
out of 8 studies on M&A of US banks document negative abnormal returns while the remaining 
2 studies don’t report any results. The authors then look at the studies on the relations between 
several important governance variables and M&A performance of the banks. For banks, CEO 
ownership is positively associated with merger performance but the relation is nonlinear and 
turns negative when the ownership reaches 25%, consistent with the findings on CEO ownership 
for overall firms.  Banking literatures depart from general studies when it comes to the relation 
between independent board representation and merger performance. Contrary to their well-
documented non-linear positive relations for overall firms (Byrd and Hickman,1992), 
independent board members don’t seem to contribute to merger performance in the banking 
industry despite their larger than average representation in bank boards (Subrahmanyam et al., 
1997).  
Booth, Cornett,and Tehranian(2002) studies the substitution effect of regulation for 
internal monitoring mechanisms (CEO/Chair duality, managerial stock ownership and outside 
directors). They find that for highly regulated firms (utilities and banks), internal governance 
mechanisms are less important in controlling agency conflicts.  John, Mehran and Qian(2010) 
take another look at the role of regulators in the banking industry. They find that regulators and 
debtholders play a role in monitoring the risk choice of the banks.  
2.3. Our Hypothesis 
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In this study, we want to re-examine the relations between the various corporate 
governance indices and firm values in the banking industry. Since the prior researchers on 
corporate governance indices mainly focus on the their antitakeover implications , we are 
interested to test that in an industry where market for corporate control is absent, how the 
relations between corporate governance provisions and firm values will change. The results can 
shed light on two aspects of corporate governance provisions: 1, does the balance of power effect 
of the corporate governance provisions matter to the investors? 2, do the strong negative 
relations between the BCF and staggered board indices and stock returns reported by Masulis et 
at. (2007 ) and Bebchuk et al.(2009)  are indeed due to their antitakeover effect. If as suggested 
by GIM(2003) that those 24 provisions on an aggregate level indicate the balance of power 
between management and shareholders and this information is priced by the investors, we should 
expect to see that the GIM index continues to be significantly associated with firm value in the 
banking industry. In particular, the presence of cumulative voting as an important indicator of 
shareholder rights should contribute positively to firm value.  Meanwhile, if the negative 
relations between BCF staggered board indices and firm value are caused by the antitakeover 
effect of those indices, such relations should disappear in the banking industry.  Since Masulis et 
al., 2007 is the only study we can find that compares the effects of BCF index, GIM index and 
staggered board side by side, we decide to follow their methodology and look at the effects of 
corporate governance indices on acquisition announcement-period abnormal returns for bank 
acquirers. We propose our main hypothesis as follows:  
Balance of power effect hypothesis:  corporate governance provisions collectively reflect 
the balance of power between shareholders and management. Banks distributing more rights to 
their shareholders (democracy) are better managed than those distributing fewer rights 
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(dictatorship). Democratic banks are less likely to engage in empire-building acquisitions and 
therefore are better acquirers.  
Antitakeover effect hypothesis:  the previously documented negative relations between 
BCF index and staggered board index are caused by their antitakeover effects.  In an industry 
where firms face no hostile takeover threats, the antitakeover effect of those indices becomes 
inconsequential. Those two indices have limited predicative power on the acquisition 
performance of the banks.  
3. Sample Selection 
From a unique dataset of M&A transactions, we identify 677 acquisitions made by 120 
commercial banks (SIC code 6000, 6021, 6022 and 6712) from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 
2006 that meet the following criteria: 
1, The acquisition is completed. 
2, The acquirer control less than 50% prior to the acquisition announcement date and 100% 
after. 
3, The deal value is more than 1 million and is at least 1% of the acquirer's market value of 
equity. 
4, The acquirers have annual financial information available from CRSP  and  COMPUSTAT 
and governance information available from IRRC.  
It is worth noting that we follow the data selection criteria by Masulis et al. (2007) exactly to 
ensure the possible differences in our findings are not due to the sample selection standards.   
We obtain data on financial statement from COMPUSTAT and on stock price and trading 
volume from CRSP. We obtain data on the individual corporate governance provisions, the GIM 
index score, board of directors, from RiskMetrics. We obtain data on CEO compensations and 
ownership from ExeComp. We obtain the BCF score from professor Bebchuk’s website. All the 
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datasets are matched by CUSIP number and announcement date. Except for the governance-
provision related datasets, we use fiscal year prior to announcement date as the matching year. 
For governance-provision related datasets, we follow the convention and use the IRRC-
publication year prior to the announcement date as the matching year. We calculate all the 
variable values based on the appendix on variable definitions of Masulis et al. (2007) 
Table 1 lists the distribution of the sample by years of the initial announcements. The highest 
number of acquisitions occurred in year 1994. The year congress passed the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency act allowing interstate banking practice. However, 
the both the acquirer size and deal size didn’t pick up until year 1997. The year Riegle-Neal went 
into effect.  The lag was possibly caused by the fact many states allowed interstate banking 
shortly after the passage of Real-Neal act but many large nationwide bank acquisitions took 
place after the act’s effective date. Another landmark year in banking industry was year 1999, 
when Gramm-Leach act was enacted. This act allows combination of commercial banks, 
investment banks and insurance companies. Acquirer size experienced a large jump that year and 
reached the largest in year 2000, reflecting big banks move quickly to take advantage of the 
deregulation
17. The period from year 1999 to 2000 coincided with the M&A “bubble” period 
reported in Masulis et al.(2007). So it is difficult to disentangle Gramm-Leach Effect from 
overall M&A boom. But evidently affected by the general trend, bank acquisition activities in 
2001 took a big dip before recovering in 2002.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1.Variable Description 
4.1.1. Acquirer Return  
                                                            
17 Studies on Gramm-Leach act have found larger banks stand to gain more than smaller banks. (Lee and Tompkins 
(2000); Barth et al. (2000); Akhigbe and Whyte (2001)) 
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For comparison purposes, we follow Masulis et al.(2007 )methodology closely. We use 
short-term event-study methodology to measure shareholder reaction to initial acquisition 
announcements. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated over a 5-day period 
from (-2, 2) with day 0 as the announcement date and are adjusted by equal-weighted market 
returns. The market returns are estimated over 200- day period from day -210 to day -11. 
The first column of Panel A of Table 2 reports mean CARs of -0.91% for the whole 
sample, significantly different from zero at 1% level, which is 1.125% lower than the 0.215% 
acquirer CARs reported by Masulis et al.(2007).  This result is consistent with past literatures on 
acquirer returns in US banking industry summarized by Hagendorff et al.(2007). They tabulate 
eight studies on announcement returns to bidding banks in US covering period from year 1972 to 
1997, none of which report positive returns. They attribute the massive acquisition-related 
shareholder wealth destruction in the banking industry to agency costs.  
Column 2 to column 4 of Panel A breaks down the CARs by methods of payment.  Cash-
financed deals generate slightly positive mean CARs of 0.24%, which is significantly higher than 
the mean CARs of -1.14% by the stock-financed deals. The difference is 1.38% or $103 million 
if we multiply the 1.38% by the mean market value of acquirers in our sample. Such difference is 
in accordance with the documented general trend and can be attributed to the fact that stock-
financed deals are more likely to be initiated by acquirers whose shares are over-valued.  
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes CARs by target ownership status. The acquisitions of 
publicly-owned targets generate -1.42% mean CARs while the acquisitions of privately-owned 
targets generate -0.15% CARs. The difference is about -1.28%, significant at 1% level. Again, 
this is consistent with the results recorded by the general studies. The argument is that privately-
owned targets come with a liquidity discount and therefore are cheaper for the acquirers.   
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At Last, we further divide the targets in our sample into five categories based on their 
SIC codes: commercial banks(SIC codes: 6021, 6022, 6029,  6081 and 6712), insurance firms or 
investment banks(SIC codes: 6211, 6282,  6289, 6311, 6331, 6371 ,6726, 6733, 6794 and 6799), 
savings institution(SIC codes:6035 and 6036),other financial firms(SIC codes within the 6000 
range but not covered by the listed financial firm categories), and non-financial firms(SIC codes 
not within 6000 range). Panel C of Table 2 reports acquirer CARs by target industries. As shown 
by the number of observations, commercial banks most often target at commercial banks---470 
of 677 observations target at commercial banks. Those acquisitions appear to perform the poorest 
among the five categories of targets, providing evidence that there might be some diversification 
gains for banks acquiring at non-bank targets.  However, the gains are very limited and in a 
relative manner since none of 5 categories of targets generate significantly positive average 
CARs.   
4.1.2.  Corporate Governance Indices and Acquirer Returns 
The variables of interest in this study are governance indices GIM , BCF, staggered board  
and cumulative voting. The first three variables are frequently discussed in studies of corporate 
governance provisions. The last one has been studied less often. However, since one of the main 
purposes of this paper is to test if banks distributing more rights to their shareholders are better 
acquirers and the presence of cumulative voting represents a bank’s attitude towards minority 
shareholders, we decide to include it as a separate index.    
Panel A of Table 3 reports mean and median scores of the indices and their correlations 
with acquirers CARs. Compared with Masulis et al.(2007), who report scores of three indices: 
GIM, BCF and staggered board, the values of the indices in our sample are slightly higher. A 
more important difference between our results and the findings by Masulis et al.(2007) is that 
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except for GIM index, the other two indices appear to have no significant associations with 
acquirers CARs. Given the lack of hostile takeover threats in the banking industry, we consider 
that the zero correlations between the BCF and staggered board indices and CARs in the banking 
industry provide evidence to the linkages between market for corporate control and those two 
indices as predicted by Antitakeover effect hypothesis . Moreover, consistent with Balance of 
power effect hypothesis, the correlation between GIM index and acquirer CARs remains 
significantly negative, indicating that more democratic bank acquirers can create more wealth or 
at least destroy less value for their shareholders by means of internal governance even without 
the presence of market for corporate control. To further test the Balance of power effect 
hypothesis, we take a look at another important provision related to shareholder-right protection: 
cumulative voting.  As expected, although only a small percentage of banks have cumulative 
voting (0.17), this provision is strongly and positively
18
 associated with acquirers CARs. 
 Panel B of Table 3 reports the results of univariate analysis using the portfolio approach.  
Our portfolio classification schemes are the same as those used by Masulis et al.(2007). For GIM 
index, we apply two classification schemes: one to compare the CARs of the portfolios at the 
extreme ends of GIM index while the other studies its median effect. For the first scheme, we 
assign banks with GIM score of 5 or less into the Democracy portfolio and with 14 or more into 
the Dictatorship portfolio.  For the second scheme, we use score 9 as the cut-off point to assign 
the bank acquirers. For BCF index, Democracy portfolio consist of banks with BCF score of 2 or 
less and Dictatorship portfolio consist of banks with BCF score of 3 or more.  The results are the 
same with the findings of correlation analysis: banks in GIM-democracy portfolio perform better 
than their peers in GIM-dictatorship portfolio under both schemes and the difference is more 
                                                            
18 Unlike other provisions, cumulative voting and secret ballot are consider beneficial to shareholders and in the 
GIM and BCF calculation, the authors add one point to the index value when there is an absence of cumulative 
voting or secret ballot.   
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pronounced at the extreme ends while there is no significance difference in performance between 
BCF-democracy group and BCF-dictatorship group.  Again, those finding are consistent with 
Balance of power effect hypothesis and antitakeover effect hypothesis.   
4.1.3.  Important Characteristics Variables 
Panel B of Table 4 summarizes acquirer characteristics. Compare to the levels reported by 
Masulis et al.(2007), on average our bank acquirers are larger by asset size ($36,769  million 
versus $9,005 million) , more leveraged(82% versus 15%), and have lower Tobin’s Q(1.1 versus 
1.98). Those different characteristics between banks and other firms have been documented by 
many banking literatures such as Adam and Mehran (2003) and Hagendorff et al.(2007), who 
suggest they provide grounds for separate studies in corporate governance of banks.  Panel C 
reports deal characteristics. Again the deal characteristics of our sample are notably different 
from those reported by Masulis et al.(2007): deals of our sample are smaller(7.32% versus 16%), 
more likely to be a public company (60% versus 33%) and less likely to be financed by cash (17% 
versus 46%). Given all of those features have been shown by prior researchers to significantly 
affect acquirer returns (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz(2004); Chang (1998); Fuller, Netter, 
and Stegemoller (2002)),  it is important for us to control for them in the following regression 
analysis to ensure that the findings in the relations between the corporate governance indices and 
acquirer CARs in the banking industry are not caused by those characteristics variables. 
4.2.Regression Results 
4.2.1. Baseline Regression 
Table 6 reports baseline results of regressing bank acquirers CARs on the four indices 
controlling for the bidder and deal characteristics and target industries. All four regressions are 
adjusted for year fixed effects and acquirer clustering.  Among the four indices, BCF, GIM and 
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staggered board have negative coefficients while coefficient of cumulative voting is positive. 
Those signs are in line with our expectations about the impacts of the indices on the firm value. 
More importantly, in terms of statistical significance, with values of coefficient estimates of -
0.0008(t-statistic 0.77) and -0.0035(t-statistic 0.87), BCF and staggered board are no longer 
significantly related to acquirer CARs. The lack of significance in the BCF and staggered board 
indices contrasts with the findings by Masulis et al.(2007) who report both indices to be highly 
significant and confirms our antitakeover effect hypothesis. However, coefficients of the GIM 
and cumulative voting indices remain significant, providing evidence for our Balance of power 
effect hypothesis. In particular, the coefficient estimate for GIM index is -0.0012 with t-statistic 
of 2.12. To measure the economic significance of the different impact of GIM and BCF index, 
we calculate change in acquirer CARs as a result of one standard deviation increase in each 
index.  We find that one standard deviation increase in GIM index (BCF index) lowers acquirer 
returns by about 0.294% (0.102%), suggesting the impact of GIM index on acquirer returns is 
about 3 times greater than that of the BCF index. Note that Masulis et al.(2007) find the effect of 
BCF is about 1.5 times stronger than that of GIM index.  We consider the reverse in effects 
between the two indices is the consequence of the combination of Balance of power effect 
hypothesis and antitakeover effect hypothesis. At last, the coefficient of cumulative voting is 
estimated at 0.0091(t-statistic 2.23), indicating firms with cumulative voting generate 0.91% 
higher acquisition announcement returns than those without cumulative voting. This value 
represents the highest return difference brought about by a single provision among the four 
indices, providing further evidence that banks distributing more rights to shareholders perform 
better.           
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Next, we examine the impact of controlling variables. For acquirer characteristics, 
leverage is the only significant variable, suggesting debtholders play an important role in 
monitoring bank management, which is consistent with the argument proposed by John, Mehran 
and Qian(2010) . The positive sign of our coefficient estimate of Tobin’s q is consistent with the 
positive relation between Tobin’s q and acquirer returns documented by Lang, Stulz and 
Walking (1991) and Servaes(1991). The sign between relative deal size and acquirer returns is 
negative. According to Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz(2004), relative deal size only 
negatively affects acquirer returns for large acquirers. Since our summary statistic shows that the 
bank acquirers on average are much larger than acquirers in overall industries, this result is in 
line with the evidence presented by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz(2004).  In terms of deal 
characteristics, we classify the deals into four categories based on methods of payments and 
target ownership status: stock-financed public target acquisitions, cash-financed public target 
acquisitions, stock-financed private target acquisitions and cash-financed private target 
acquisitions. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, we omit stock-financed public target acquisitions 
from the regression. The coefficients of the rest three deal categories are all positive, suggesting 
stock-financed public target acquisitions are responsible for the overall negative stock returns for 
the bank acquirers. Ordering the coefficient estimates of the three deal categories from lowest to 
highest, we find cash-financed private deals generate highest returns for the acquirer 
shareholders, followed by stock-financed private deals, and lastly cash-financed public deals. 
This finding indicates that the relations documented by past literatures on the effects of method 
of payments and target ownership status on acquirer returns (Chang (1998); Fuller, Netter, and 
Stegemoller (2002)) apply to bank acquisitions as well. At last, we control for the target 
industries.  We divide the target industries into four categories: investment banks or insurance 
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firms, savings and loan institutions, other financial firms, and non-financial firms. Only the 
acquisitions of investment banks or insurance firms are significantly and positively associated 
with bank acquirers CARs, indicating gain from economy of scale for commercial banks 
acquiring investment banks or insurance firms.  
4.2.2. Controlling for Board Characteristics 
The results of the baseline regression are consistent with our antitakeover effect 
hypothesis and Balance of power effect hypothesis. However, to ensure they are not caused by 
governance variables such as board characteristics and CEO characteristics, we decide to include 
those variables in our regression analysis.  
Table 7 reports the regression results controlling for board characteristics. Since our 
director data from RiskMetrics only date back to 1996, our sample size decreases from 677 to 
320. Despite that, our previous findings of the relations between the four corporate governance 
indices and bank acquirer CARs continue to hold, indicating that they are not caused by board 
characteristics variables. With regard to board characteristics variables, none of the variables 
included are significant. Adam and Mehran (2003) argue that in the banking industry, regulators 
as outside monitors strongly influence the board size and composition. As a result, the 
importance of board oversights in the banking industry may be reduced as well.  In addition, it is 
worth noting that independent board percentage has a negative albeit insignificant sign, echoing 
the finding by Subrahmanyam et al.(1997), who document a negative relation between acquirer 
returns and percentage of outside directors in the banking industry. In terms of acquirer and deal 
characteristics variables, we find that in this subsample, the variable signs stay the same but their 
magnitudes become stronger, especially for Tobin’s q and relative deal size. As shown by table 1, 
from 1997(the year Riegle-Neal act became effective) onward, both deal size and acquirer size 
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increase notably. Since by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz(2004), relative deal size only 
negatively affects acquirer returns for large acquirers, we consider the greater impact of acquirer 
and deal characteristics variables in this later period can be due to the size effect. At last, with 
respect to target industries, the coefficient estimates of the target category of investment banks or 
insurance firms are no longer significant but remain positive.  Another target category with 
positive coefficient estimates is the savings institution, which are significant in three out of the 
four regressions.  According to Curry and Shibut (2000), the clean-up of the savings and loan 
institution crisis was nearly completed in the year-end of 1995. Since the sub-sample used in this 
regression starts in year 1996, the significantly positive coefficient estimates might reflect the 
improvements in quality of the savings and loan institution targets after the clean-up.  
4.2.3. Controlling for CEO Characteristics 
Table 8 presents regression estimates controlling for CEO characteristics. In this set of 
regressions, we choose CEO age as the proxy for CEO experience, CEO equity-based 
compensation (percentage of value of annual stock options and restricted stock grants over the 
total compensation), CEO ownership (number of shares owned over year-end shares outstanding) 
and CEO ownership-square (the square term of CEO ownership) as the proxy for CEO incentive 
and at last, the three-year operating income growth rate as the proxy for management quality. We 
obtain CEO compensation and ownership data from ExeComp, which starts from year 1992. Due 
to data restriction, our sample size decreases further to 161 observations.  
As shown in Table 8, the coefficient estimates of the four corporate governance indices 
continue to have the same signs and statistical significances as in the previous regressions, 
indicating our antitakeover effect hypothesis and Balance of power effect hypothesis are still 
valid after considering CEO incentive and performance characteristics. Notice that none of the 
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CEO characteristics variables are significant. The insignificant coefficient estimates of CEO 
equity-based compensation and CEO ownership are in line with the findings by Masulis et 
al.(2007), who point out in footnote 22 that Qiu(2006) also finds the relation between acquirer 
CARs and equity-based compensation to be insignificant. Another point worth noting about the 
CEO ownership is that its relation with acquirer CARs appears to be quadratic: the coefficient 
estimates of the CEO ownership are positive and of the square term of the CEO ownership are 
negative, which is consistent with the findings by Hughes et al.(2003).  Among all other 
controlling variables, only the coefficient estimates of cash-financed public-target deal type 
remains significant in all 4 regressions. However, the signs of the coefficient estimates stay 
unchanged from the previous 2 set of regressions and their magnitudes are approximately the 
same, suggesting the reductions in the significance level are mainly due to the decreased sample 
size.  
4.2.4. Controlling for Frequent Acquirer Effect and Office of Bank Holding Companies 
Since our full sample includes 677 observations by 120 bank acquirers, it is necessary to 
control for the acquirers that make multiple acquisitions within a year. We introduces three 
dummy variables for this purpose---freq_dummy1 for acquirers who has completed one 
acquisition within a year before the announcement, freq_dummy2 for two acquisitions and 
freq_dummy2 for three or more acquisitions.  In addition, to distinguish the acquisitions made by 
office of bank holding companies (SIC code 6712), we include a dummy variable for office of 
bank holding companies. Table 9 reports the regression results. As shown by the top section, the 
magnitudes and significance levels of the four corporate governance indices remain the same, 
suggesting that our balance of power effect hypothesis and antitakeover effect hypothesis are still 
valid. Furthermore, none of the newly introduced dummy variables are significant and other 
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controlling variables maintain their magnitudes and significance levels as in the baseline 
regressions. 
4.2.5. Controlling for Riegle-Neal Act and Gramm-Leach Act 
There are two acts in the 1990s that changed the overall landscape of banking industry: 
Riegle-Neal interstate banking and efficiency act and Gramm-Leach act. Riegle-Neal act allows 
interstate bank mergers and acquisition. Under this act, banks are able to operate and compete at 
national level. In Panel A of Table 10, we report deal summaries before and after the effective 
date of Rigle-Neal act. We find that the number of deals is about the same before and after the 
act. However, post the act the average acquirer market value of equity and the average deal value 
increase by more than 4 times and 6 times respectively. The differences are significant at 1% 
level. Since both the acquirer and target grow considerably in size, the relative deal size does not 
change as significantly post the act as the first two variables---only the median values are 
different at 10% level. In Panel B, we report the results of the similar comparison analysis for 
Gramm-Leach Act. This act was enacted in 1999 and removes the barriers of mergers among 
commercial banks, investment banks and insurance firms.  Although smaller number of deals is 
consummated after the passage of the Gramm-Leach act, the increases in both the market value 
of the acquirers and the deal value are more pronounced than post the Riegle-Neal Act and the 
differences are significant at 1% level. This evidence is consistent with the large jump in acquirer 
size from year 1999 to 2000 reported by Table 1, which we interpret to reflect that large banks 
move quickly to take advantage of the opportunities created by the passage of the Gramm-Leach 
act. Given the significant changes in acquirer and deal size, it is necessary to control for those 
two acts in our analysis. The results are presented in Panel C (for Riegle-Neal Act) and Panel 
D(for Gramm-Leach Act)  of Table 10. In both Panels, the magnitude, sign and statistical 
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significance of the coefficient estimates of the four corporate governance indices remain the 
unchanged---the coefficient estimates of the GIM index are significantly negative, of the BCF 
index and the staggered board provision are negative but not significant, and of the cumulative 
voting provision are significantly positive, suggesting our balance of power effect hypothesis and 
antitakeover effect hypothesis are robust to those two acts. With respect to the effects of the two 
acts, the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act contributes positively albeit insignificantly to acquirer 
returns while that of the Gramm-Leach Act is significantly and negatively associated with 
acquirer returns. 
4.2.6. Additional Explanatory Power of the GIM Index and Provisions of the BCF Index 
So far, our analysis has shown that in the banking industry where market for corporate 
control is absent, the antitakeover implications of the corporate governance provisions do not 
matter anymore while the balance of power message reflected by those provisions remains. 
However, our analysis up to this point has treated the BCF index and the GIM index as separate 
indices and ignored the fact that the BCF index is consisted of six provisions that are also in the 
GIM index. In this section, we intend to examine the additional explanatory power of the GIM 
index on top of the six provisions within the BCF index.  For this purpose, in this section, we 
include the O index in the regression analysis alongside the BCF index as well as the provisions 
within the BCF index. The O index was first introduced by Bebchuk, Cohen and Farrel(2008). It 
is the sum of all the other eighteen provisions not included in the BCF index. BCF(2008) finds 
that after controlling for the BCF index, the O index has no significant association with stock 
returns. However, a possible explanation of this finding is that due to the high correlation 
between the BCF index and the GIM index(0.74 by BCF(2008) and 0.67 by our sample) and the 
strong antitakeover implication of the BCF index in the overall industries, the power balance 
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effect of the GIM index has largely been overshadowed. In the banking industry where the 
antitakeover concerns subside, we should expect to see the additional explanatory power of the O 
index if both of our balance of power effect hypothesis and antitakeover effect hypothesis hold. 
In addition, BCF(2008) find that each of the 6 provisions within the BCF index is significantly 
and negatively associated with the firm value. However, under our antitakeover effect hypothesis 
for the banking industry, those provisions should lose their significance level to a great extent.  
Our analysis results with regard to the O index and provisions within the BCF index are 
presented in Table 11. In Panel A, we report the regression results of the O index on acquirer 
CARs controlling for the BCF index or each provision within the BCF index.  In Panel B, we 
report the results of the CARs-Oindex regression controlling for each provision within the BCF 
index and the BCF index minus the provision chosen. In all the regressions, we further control 
for the acquirer and deal characteristics and the target industries but omit the results here for 
brevity. As expected, in all sets of regressions, the coefficient estimates of the O index are 
significantly negative, suggesting the GIM index does explain significantly more variations in 
bank acquirers CARs than the BCF index or any individual provision within the BCF index. 
Consistent with our previous findings, the coefficient estimates of the BCF index and the 
staggered board provision are negative but not significant. The coefficient estimate of another 
powerful antitakeover provision poison pill is not significant either, neither does the limit to 
amend charter provision or the supermajority to approve a merger provision. Another provision 
limit to amend bylaw is even significantly positive. The only provision that is significantly 
negative is the golden parachutes provision but only at 10% level. Those estimates are in stark 
contrast to the findings by BCF (2008), who find all the provisions within the BCF index to be 
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significantly negative at 5% level at least, and further confirms our antitakeover effect hypothesis.  
5. Conclusion 
By re-examining the relations between various corporate governance indices (GIM, BCF, 
staggered board and cumulative voting) and acquirer announcement-period abnormal stock 
returns in the banking industry market for corporate control is absent, we find that acquirer 
returns are significantly and negatively associated with the GIM index, significantly and 
positively associated with the cumulative voting provision, and have no association with the BCF 
index and the staggered board provision. Those results are notably different from findings by 
previous researchers on corporate governance indices in the overall industries such as Masulis, 
Wang and Xie(2007) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) and confirms the linkage between 
market for corporate control, the BCF index and the staggered board provision and firm value. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that the corporate governance provisions have implications 
beyond antitakeover defenses and their management-shareholder power balance message is 
priced by the investors.  
Our findings are robust when we control for the CEO and board characteristics and stay 
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Table 1: Market Value of Bank Mergers  
















Mean   Relative Size    
(Median) 
1991 29 4.28 2013.66 299.67 0.1209 
   (873.70) (32.00) (0.0268) 
1992 41 6.06 1988.16 82.21 0.0597 
   (1167.59) (45.05) (0.0225) 
1993 74 10.93 2092.33 84.84 0.0505 
   (1299.74) (44.71) (0.0335) 
1994 91 13.44 2684.60 116.30 0.0668 
   (1461.57) (48.82) (0.0250) 
1995 41 6.06 2349.23 289.95 0.0921 
   (1541.78) (35.35) (0.0341) 
1996 34 5.02 2400.63 152.44 0.0772 
   (1441.04) (45.45) (0.0352) 
1997 53 7.83 5859.47 433.78 0.0866 
   (2711.31) (81.19) (0.0240) 
1998 61 9.01 6589.07 385.13 0.063 
   (4936.56) (118.86) (0.023) 
1999 44 6.50 11968.91 275.64 0.0532 












2000 34 5.02 22790.80 1580.66 0.0603 
   (8615.94) (163.29) (0.0308) 
2001 20 2.95 14627.35 196.97 0.0365 
   (8015.76) (120.06) (0.0251) 
2002 16 2.36 19713.35 443.40 0.0496 
   (1570.65) (66.97) (0.0120) 
2003 26 3.84 14150.23 2264.59 0.108 
   (2404.38) (221.06) (0.067) 
2004 42 6.20 14341.93 1999.72 0.076 
   (2397.31) (138.71) (0.046) 
2005 32 4.73 14272.07 1430.69 0.0762 
   (2731.95) (154.97) (0.0514) 
2006 39 5.76 8148.58 686.24 0.1166 
   (2329.64) (160.07) (0.0570) 
Total 677 100 7509.18 568.38 0.0732 





   
 
Panel B: CARs by Target Ownership Status 
  
      Public Target Private Target Pub.-Pri. Diff 
CAR Mean -0.0142*** -0.0015 -0.0128*** 
(-2,2) Median -0.0076*** -0.0032 -0.0082*** 




Panel C: CARs  by Target Industries 




Insurance/        
Inv. Banks 




CARs Mean -0.0104*** -0.0080***      0.0071 -0.0143** -0.0045 
(-2,2) Median -0.0114*** -0.0074***     -0.0006      -0.0232*        -0.0047 











      
Table 2: Announcement Abnormal Returns 
Panel A: CARs by Methods of Payments 
  
Whole Sample All Cash Stock Cash-Stock Diff. 
CAR Mean -0.0091*** 0.0024 -0.0114*** 0.0138*** 
(-2,2) Median -0.0074*** -0.0027 -0.0083*** 0.0056** 




Table 3: Univariate analysis  on Corporate Governance Indices and CARs 
Panel A: Correlation Analysis 
 Mean Median Correlation with CAR 
GIM 9.83 10 -0.09** 
BCF 2.65 3 -0.05 
Staggered Board 0.78 1 -0.05 













Panel B: Portfolio Difference in CARs  
  Democracy Dictatorship Diff. Test in Diff. 




Mean 0.0064 -0.0157*** 0.0221
 
2.68*** 
Median 0.0074     -0.0097** 0.0171             2.06** 
Number of Obs. 17 33   




Mean -0.0057** -0.0120*** 0.0064         2.21** 
Median -0.0049** -0.0091*** 0.0042         1.72* 
Number of Obs. 318 359   
BCF  Classification 
(Democracy: Index<=2 
 Dictatorship: Index>=3) 
Mean -0.0069*** -0.0108*** 0.0039           1.36 
Median -0.0058*** -0.0084*** 0.0026           1.12 



















Table 4: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for CAR and Antitakeover Provisions(N=677) 
Variable  Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
CAR (%) -0.91 3.71 -2.81 -0.73 1.07 
GIM index 9.83 2.45 8 10 12 
BCF index 2.65 1.27 2 3 4 
Staggered Board 0.78 0.42 1 1 1 
Cumulative Voting 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics (N=677) 
Variable  Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
Total Assets($mil) 36,769.12 93,344 6,660.28 13,185.10 30,906.40 
Market Value of 
Equity($mil) 
7509.18 20,355.91 1,175.71 2359.59 5,639.59 
Tobin’s Q 1.10 0.10 1.04 1.07 1.15 
Free Cash Flow(%) 2.31 0.47 2.01 2.30 2.55 
Leverage (%) 82 7 78 83 88 
Stock Price Runup(%)     8.08 22.46 -6.03 5.98 19.97 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics(N=677) 
Variable  Mean S.D. Q1 Median Q3 
Relative Deal Size (%)     7.32 12.21 1.23 3.10 8.18 
Public (Dummy) 0.60 0.49 0 1 1 
Private (Dummy) 0.40 0.49 0 0 1 
All Cash (Dummy) 0.17 0.37 0 0 0 




Table6: Initial Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal 
Returns 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and 
controlled for year fixed effect, whose coefficient estimates are 
suppressed.  
 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4)   
Dependent 
Variable  Car2  Car2 Car2 Car2 
GIM Index -0.0012**    
 (-2.12)    
BCF Index  -0.0008   
  (-0.77)   
Staggered Board   -0.0035  
   (-0.87)  
Cumulative 
Voting    0.0091** 
    (2.23) 
Acquirer Characteristics  
Firmsize 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0009 
 (0.32) (0.37) (0.37) (0.57) 
Tobin's Q 0.0596 0.0659 0.0701 0.0426 
 (1.34) (1.47) (1.48) (0.93) 
FCF -0.3303 -0.3325 -0.3878 -0.2460 
 (-1.01) (-0.98) (-1.16) (-0.78) 
Leverage 0.0841* 0.0892* 0.0905* 0.0774 
 (1.66) (1.72) (1.71) (1.58) 
Runup -0.0112 -0.0111 -0.0110 -0.0091 
 (-1.44) (-1.42) (-1.41) (-1.17) 
Deal 
Characteristics         
RelDealSz -0.0367 -0.0365 -0.0365 -0.0361 
 (-1.50) (-1.48) (-1.49) (-1.46) 
Cash*Private 0.0152*** 0.0155*** 0.0153*** 0.0151*** 
 (3.15) (3.12) (3.21) (3.25) 
Cash*Public 0.0075 0.0077 0.0077 0.0085 
 (1.25) (1.29) (1.28) (1.45) 
Stock*Private 0.0074*** 0.0077*** 0.0080*** 0.0073*** 
 (3.06) (3.12) (3.29) (2.96) 
Target 
Industries     
Ins_Inv 0.0150* 0.0146* 0.0143* 0.0148* 
 (1.75) (1.70) (1.71) (1.77) 
Savings_Inst 0.0013 0.0016 0.0018 0.0010 
 (0.36) (0.41) (0.47) (0.28) 
OtherFinancial -0.0064 -0.0066 -0.0068 -0.0066 
 (-0.93) (-0.96) (-0.98) (-0.94) 
NonFinancial -0.0037 -0.0051 -0.0059 -0.0045 
 (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.27) (-0.22) 
Constant -0.1182 -0.1387 -0.1431 -0.1141 
 (-1.35) (-1.56) (-1.55) (-1.30) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 
Adjusted R-







Table7: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns Controlling Board 
Characteristics 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed.  
 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
GIM Index -0.0021**    
 (-2.17)    
BCF Index  -0.0026   
  (-1.48)   
Staggered Board   -0.0143  
   (-1.62)  
Cumulative Voting    0.0228** 
    (2.64) 
Board Characteristics     
Duality 0.0013 0.0019 0.0011 0.0007 
 (0.33) (0.46) (0.27) (0.15) 
BdSz -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0005 
 (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.32) (-0.92) 
IndepPerc -0.0163 -0.0156 -0.0176 -0.0233 
 (-1.03) (-0.9) (-1.04) (-1.40) 
Acquirer  Characteristics  
Firmsize 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0040* 
 (1.51) (1.40) (1.41) (1.71) 
Tobin's Q 0.1320** 0.1380** 0.1732** 0.0663 
 (2.39) (2.39) (2.46) (1.17) 
FCF -0.7966 -0.6786 -1.0540* -0.4991 
 (-1.45) (-1.17) (-1.67) (-0.96) 
Leverage 0.1890** 0.1948** 0.2292** 0.1518* 
 (1.66) (2.30) (2.51) (2.00) 
Runup -0.0190 -0.0188 -0.0184 -0.0155 
 (-1.38) (-1.34) (-1.33) (-1.15) 
Deal Characteristics     
RelDealSz -0.0644*** -0.0645*** -0.0630*** -0.0654*** 
 (-3.24) (-3.17) (-3.04) (-3.15) 
Cash*Private 0.0254** 0.0250** 0.0255** 0.0233** 
 (2.56) (2.44) (2.59) (2.56) 
Cash*Public 0.0197** 0.0199** 0.0213** 0.0208** 
 (2.12) (2.09) (2.23) (2.08) 
Stock*Private 0.0056 0.0062 0.0069 0.0072 
 (1.22) (1.36) (1.48) (1.65) 
Target industries     
Ins_Inv 0.0137 0.0129 0.0116 0.0127 
 (1.07) (1.02) (0.95) (1.02) 
Savings_Inst 0.0108* 0.0109* 0.0123** 0.0085 
 (1.84) (1.82) (2.05) (1.46) 
OtherFinancial -0.0063 -0.0066 -0.0069 -0.0095 
 (-0.45) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.62) 
NonFinancial 0.0027 0.0002 -0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.12) (0.01) (-0.02) (0.01) 
Constant -0.2796** -0.3072** -0.3623** -0.2122* 
 (-2.19) (-2.31) (-2.47) (-1.70) 
Observations 320 320 320 320 





Table8: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns Controlling CEO Characteristics 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, whose coefficient 
estimates are suppressed.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
GIM Index -0.0029**    
 (-2.03)    
BCF Index  -0.0041   
  (-1.55)   
Staggered Board   -0.0294  
   (-1.63)  
Cumulative Voting    0.0397** 
    (2.27) 
CEO Characteristics     
CEOAGE 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.85) (0.33) (0.17) (0.21) 
CEOEqtyComp -0.0024 -0.0071 0.0023 -0.0072 
 (-0.14) (-0.4) (0.13) (-0.44) 
CEO_Ownership 0.3330 0.4073 0.0637 0.4590 
 (0.80) (0.97) (0.11) (1.06) 
CEO_Ownership2 -2.6688 -3.3382 -0.4848 -3.3271 
 (-0.69) (-0.85) (-0.09) (-0.78) 
OprtGrth -0.0065 -0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0022 
 (-1.30) (-0.93) (-0.85) (-0.47) 
Acquirer  Characteristics 
Firmsize 0.0049 0.0049 0.0046 0.0083** 
 (1.24) (1.17) (1.13) (2.17) 
Tobin's Q 0.1521* 0.1477 0.2448* 0.0606 
 (1.79) (1.65) (1.99) (0.73) 
FCF -1.4850 -1.2023 -2.3445 -1.1356 
 (-1.32) (-1.09) (-1.46) (-1.11) 
Leverage 0.1236 0.1157 0.2299 0.0991 
 (0.99) (0.86) (1.56) (0.78) 
Runup -0.0341 -0.0375 -0.0342 -0.0326 
 (-1.4) (-1.5) (-1.45) (-1.37) 
Deal Characteristics     
RelDealSz -0.0549 -0.0525 -0.0412 -0.0518 
 (-1.18) (-1.11) (-0.84) (-1.14) 
Cash*Private 0.0243 0.0230 0.0282* 0.0251 
 (1.54) (1.46) (1.70) (1.64) 
Cash*Public 0.0256** 0.0262** 0.0270** 0.0284** 
 (2.3) (2.27) (2.30) (2.35) 
Stock*Private -0.0026 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0022 
 (-0.25) (-0.03) (0.04) (0.22) 
Target industries 
Ins_Inv 0.0328 0.0319 0.0295 0.0302 
 (0.96) (0.93) (1.00) (0.97) 
Savings_Inst 0.0115 0.0112 0.0141* 0.0094 
 (1.51) (1.45) (1.92) (1.17) 
OtherFinancial -0.0074 -0.0096 -0.0146 -0.0118 
 (-0.81) (-1.05) (-1.40) (-1.11) 
NonFinancial -0.0154 -0.0168 -0.0202 -0.0183 
 (-0.51) (-0.55) (-0.68) (-0.69) 
Constant -0.2977 -0.2870 -0.4450* -0.2259 
 (-1.44) (-1.28) (-1.84) (-1.01) 
Observations 161 161 161 161 




Table9: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns Controlling the Effect of 
Frequent Acquirers and Office of Bank Holding Companies 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, 
whose coefficient estimates are suppressed.  
 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
GIM Index -0.0011**    
 (-2.07)    
BCF Index  -0.0006   
  (-0.51)   
Staggered Board   -0.0028  
   (-0.70)  
Cumulative Voting    0.0098** 
    (2.49) 
Effect of Frequent Acquirers and Office of Bank Holding Companies 
Freq_dummy1 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 
 (-0.01) (-0.02) (0.00) (-0.08) 
Freq_dummy2 -0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0032 
 (-0.50) (-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.72) 
Freq_dummy3 -0.0042 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0054* 
 (-1.35) (-1.21) (-1.12) (-1.68) 
BHC -0.0039 -0.0047 -0.0048 -0.0043 
 (-0.80) (-0.89) (-0.90) (-0.87) 
Acquirer  Characteristics 
Firmsize 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 
 (0.33) (0.38) (0.37) (0.61) 
Tobin's Q 0.0637 0.0688 0.0725 0.0465 
 (1.38) (1.49) (1.51) (0.99) 
FCF -0.3376 -0.3604 -0.4020 -0.2411 
 (-1.00) (-1.04) (-1.17) (-0.75) 
Leverage 0.0906* 0.0933* 0.0955* 0.0859* 
 (1.74) (1.78) (1.78) (1.69) 
Runup -0.0111 -0.0110 -0.0109 -0.0088 
 (-1.41) (-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.12) 
Deal Characteristics     
RelDealSz -0.0372 -0.0369 -0.0369 -0.0367 
 (-1.53) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.50) 
Cash*Private 0.0149*** 0.0151*** 0.0149*** 0.0146*** 
 (3.11) (3.06) (3.14) (3.22) 
Cash*Public 0.0069 0.0070 0.0070 0.0079 
 (1.12) (1.17) (1.15) (1.30) 
Stock*Private 0.0077*** 0.0080*** 0.0082*** 0.0077*** 
 (3.14) (3.28) (3.35) (3.08) 
Target industries 
Ins_Inv 0.0144* 0.0141 0.0139 0.0140* 
 (1.69) (1.64) (1.66) (1.70) 
Savings_Inst 0.0014 0.0017 0.0018 0.0010 
 (0.38) (0.44) (0.48) (0.29) 
OtherFinancial -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0065 -0.0062 
 (-0.88) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.87) 
NonFinancial -0.0031 -0.0046 -0.0051 -0.0037 
 (-0.15) (-0.22) (-0.24) (-0.18) 
Constant -0.1271 -0.1441 -0.1484 -0.1249 
 (-1.41) (-1.60) (-1.59) (-1.38) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 




Table 10 Panel A: Deal Summary Pre- and Post- Riegle-Neal Act  
This table compares bank mergers and acquisitions deals before and after Riegle-Neal act.  The cut-off date 





Mean Acquirer                               
Market Value of 





Mean  Relative  
Deal Size    
(Median) 
Prior 304 2257.67 155.51 0.0744 
  (1353.73) (42.85) (0.0295) 
Post  311 10628.12 945.87 0.0801 











Table 10 Panel B: Deal Summary Pre- and Post- Gramm-Leach Act  
This table compares bank mergers and acquisitions deals before and after Gramm-Leach act.  The cut-off 





Mean Acquirer                               
Market Value of 






Deal Size    
(Median) 
Prior 463 3846.1 223.0 0.0709 
  (1999.8) (62.0) (0.0287) 
Post  214 15434.5 1315.7 0.0780 





















Table10 Panel C: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns Controlling the Effect of 
Riegle-Neal Act 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, whose 
coefficient estimates are suppressed.  
 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
GIM Index -0.0011**    
 (-2.04)    
BCF Index  -0.0008   
  (-0.72)   
Staggered Board   -0.0034  
   (-0.85)  
Cumulative Voting    0.0091** 
    (2.25) 
Effect  of the Riegle-Neal Act 
Riegle-Neal 0.0174 0.0182 0.0182 0.0184 
 (1.57) (1.63) (1.62) (1.64) 
Acquirer  Characteristics 
Firmsize 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.31) (0.52) 
Tobin's Q 0.0557 0.0615 0.0657 0.0383 
 (1.25) (1.37) (1.39) (0.83) 
FCF -0.3220 -0.3246 -0.3772 -0.2357 
 (-0.98) (-0.95) (-1.12) (-0.74) 
Leverage 0.0775 0.0820 0.0836 0.0706 
 (1.55) (1.61) (1.61) (1.45) 
Runup -0.0108 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0087 
 (-1.39) (-1.36) (-1.35) (-1.11) 
Deal Characteristics     
RelDealSz -0.0364 -0.0362 -0.0362 -0.0358 
 (-1.49) (-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.45) 
Cash*Private 0.0150*** 0.0152*** 0.0151*** 0.0148*** 
 (3.09) (3.05) (3.14) (3.18) 
Cash*Public 0.0076 0.0078 0.0077 0.0086 
 (1.27) (1.31) (1.29) (1.46) 
Stock*Private 0.0074*** 0.0077*** 0.0080*** 0.0073*** 
 (3.06) (3.19) (3.27) (2.95) 
Target industries 
Ins_Inv 0.0147* 0.0143* 0.0140* 0.0145* 
 (1.71) (1.66) (1.66) (1.73) 
Savings_Inst 0.0016 0.0019 0.0021 0.0013 
 (0.43) (0.49) (0.55) (0.36) 
OtherFinancial -0.0060 -0.0062 -0.0064 -0.0061 
 (-0.88) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.89) 
NonFinancial 0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0003 
 (0.01) (-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.01) 
Constant -0.1083 -0.1274 -0.1319 -0.1032 
 (-1.24) (-1.44) (-1.44) (-1.18) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 






Table10 Panel D: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns Controlling the Effect of 
Gramm-Leach Act 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, whose 
coefficient estimates are suppressed.  
 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
GIM Index -0.0013**    
 (-2.33)    
BCF Index  -0.0009   
  (-0.82)   
Staggered Board   -0.0038  
   (-0.95)  
Cumulative Voting    0.0088** 
    (2.17) 
Effect  of the Gramm-Leach Act 
Gramm-Leach -0.0551** -0.0530* -0.0535** -0.0520* 
 (-2.07) (-1.96) (-2.02) (-1.95) 
Acquirer  Characteristics 
Firmsize 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0012 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.54) (0.74) 
Tobin's Q 0.0500 0.0572 0.0619 0.0344 
 (1.11) (1.25) (1.29) (0.74) 
FCF -0.2797 -0.2853 -0.3442 -0.2060 
 (-0.83) (-0.81) (-1.00) (-0.63) 
Leverage 0.0764 0.0820 0.0839 0.0701 
 (1.51) (1.58) (1.58) (1.43) 
Runup -0.0107 -0.0106 -0.0105 -0.0087 
 (-1.41) (-1.38) (-1.37) (-1.15) 
Deal Characteristics     
RelDealSz -0.0371 -0.0369 -0.0369 -0.0365 
 (-1.52) (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.48) 
Cash*Private 0.0163*** 0.0165*** 0.0164*** 0.0161*** 
 (3.47) (3.41) (3.52) (3.58) 
Cash*Public 0.0075 0.0077 0.0077 0.0086 
 (1.23) (1.28) (1.26) (1.43) 
Stock*Private 0.0081*** 0.0084*** 0.0087*** 0.0081*** 
 (3.52) (3.68) (3.80) (3.40) 
Target industries 
Ins_Inv 0.0140 0.0137 0.0133 0.0138 
 (1.63) (1.58) (1.58) (1.65) 
Savings_Inst 0.0010 0.0012 0.0015 0.0007 
 (0.27) (0.34) (0.40) (0.20) 
OtherFinancial -0.0071 -0.0073 -0.0075 -0.0072 
 (-1.02) (-1.04) (-1.07) (-1.03) 
NonFinancial -0.0041 -0.0056 -0.0064 -0.0051 
 (-0.19) (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.25) 
Constant -0.1048 -0.1274 -0.1326 -0.1031 
 (-1.20) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.17) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 







Table11 Panel A: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns on the BCF Index or Provisions in the 
BCF Index with the O index 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, whose coefficient estimates 
are suppressed.  Only coefficient estimates of variables of interest are displayed. The coefficients of independent variables 
other than the variables of interest are the same as in Table 6. 
    
         (1) (2) (3) (4)        (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent 
Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
O index -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0017** -0.0016** -0.0021*** -0.0017** -0.0017** 
 (-2.51) (-2.25) (-2.52) (-2.52) (-3.09) (-2.51) (-2.49) 
BCF Index -0.0002       
 (-0.23)       
Staggered Board  -0.0009      
  (-0.21)      
Poison Pill   0.0003     
   (0.12)     
Golden Parachutes     -0.0057*    
    (-1.72)    
Limit to Amend 
Bylaws     0.0054* 
  
     (1.72)   
Limit to Amend 




      (0.18)  
Supermajority       0.0000 
       (-0.01) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 
Adjusted R-

















Table11 Panel B: Regression of Acquirer Announcement Abnormal Returns on each provision in the BCF index, the 
BCF index minus the provision and the O index 
OLS adjusted for Heteroskedasticity, and acquirer clustering and control for year fixed effect, whose coefficient estimates are 
suppressed. Only coefficient estimates of variables of interest are displayed. The coefficients of independent variables other 
than the variables of interest are the same as in Table 6.  
   
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 Car2 
O index -0.0016** -0.0016** -0.0018*** -0.0020*** -0.0016** -0.0016** 
 (-2.26) (-2.41) (-2.76) (-3.12) (-2.51) (-2.33) 
BCF Index-the 
provision -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (-0.11) (-0.37) (1.01) (-0.85) (-0.31) (-0.23) 
Staggered Board -0.0008      
 (-0.18)      
Poison Pill  0.0006     
  (0.19)     
Golden Parachutes    -0.0062*    
   (-1.83)    
Limit to Amend Bylaws    0.0056*   
    (1.80)   
Limit to Amend Charter     0.0011  
     (0.22)  
Supermajority      0.0002 
      (0.05) 
Observations 677 677 677 677 677 677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0477 0.0478 0.0527 0.051 0.0477 0.0477 
 
